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vocero-client/s2s-client/server.py
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"""
Tiny server for the speech-to-speech demo.
The demo used to ship as a `sdk: static` Space, but the web-search tool needs a
search key the browser must NOT see. A static Space has no runtime process, so it
can't hold a secret the front-end uses. This server fixes that: it serves the
unchanged front-end AND exposes a same-origin `/api/search` proxy that holds the
Serper key server-side (see docs/adr/0001).
Everything lives in one container; the speech-to-speech backend stays a separate,
load-balanced service the browser talks to over WebSocket as before. The load
balancer's address is a secret too (like the Serper key): the browser never sees
it. `/api/session` proxies the session handshake server-side so only the
per-session compute URL the LB hands back (which the browser must dial) is exposed.
On the deployed Space the server also meters conversation time by HF login tier
(anonymous / signed-in / PRO) — see `limiter.py` and `auth.py`. That whole feature
is off unless BOTH `LOAD_BALANCER_URL` and `SPACE_ID` are set, so it runs only on
the live Space, never locally (even with the LB exported for testing).
`SPEECH_TO_SPEECH_URL` overrides everything: when set, the LB logic above is
disabled entirely (no session proxy, no queue, no metering, no sign-in) and the
browser connects directly to that URL, shown read-only in Settings.
Endpoints:
GET /api/config -> { search, lb, allowDirect, s2sUrl, auth }
GET /api/me -> login + tier + remaining budget (LB mode only)
POST /api/search -> { results, answer } Google via Serper.dev
POST /api/session -> proxies <LB>/session: a grant, or a queue ticket
GET /api/queue/{id} -> proxies <LB>/queue/{id}: position, or a grant on claim
DELETE /api/queue/{id} -> leave the queue (explicit "Leave queue" button)
POST /api/queue/end -> leave the queue (sendBeacon on teardown)
POST /api/session/heartbeat-> extend the reservation; { expired }
POST /api/session/end -> reconcile + refund (sendBeacon on teardown)
/* -> static files (index.html, main.js, ...)
When every compute slot is busy the load balancer hands back a queue ticket
instead of a grant; the browser polls /api/queue/{id} until it reaches the front
and a slot frees. Waiting reserves nothing — the daily budget is only reserved at
the moment a slot is actually claimed (a grant), never while queued.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
from datetime import datetime, timezone
import datetime as _dt_module
import json
import logging
import os
import re
from urllib.parse import parse_qsl, urlencode, urlsplit, urlunsplit
import httpx
import websockets
from dotenv import load_dotenv
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request, WebSocket, WebSocketDisconnect
from fastapi.responses import JSONResponse
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from pydantic import BaseModel
import auth
import limiter
logger = logging.getLogger("s2s")
_logging_configured = False
if not _logging_configured:
_handler = logging.StreamHandler()
_handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter(
"%(asctime)s %(levelname)-7s [%(name)s] %(message)s",
datefmt="%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S",
))
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, handlers=[_handler], force=True)
_lvl_env = (os.environ.get("LOG_LEVEL") or os.environ.get("S2S_LOG_LEVEL") or "INFO").strip().upper()
_is_debug = _lvl_env in {"DEBUG", "TRACE", "10"}
# Logger rumorosi: a meno che LOG_LEVEL=debug esplicito, tienili quiet.
logging.getLogger("httpx").setLevel(logging.DEBUG if _is_debug else logging.WARNING)
logging.getLogger("websockets").setLevel(logging.DEBUG if _is_debug else logging.INFO)
logging.getLogger("uvicorn").setLevel(logging.DEBUG if _is_debug else logging.INFO)
logging.getLogger("uvicorn.access").setLevel(logging.DEBUG if _is_debug else logging.INFO)
logging.getLogger("httpcore").setLevel(logging.DEBUG if _is_debug else logging.WARNING)
logger.setLevel(logging.DEBUG if _is_debug else logging.DEBUG) # s2s sempre almeno DEBUG in dev
_logging_configured = True
logger.debug(
"LOG_LEVEL env=%s — noisy-logger levels: httpx=%s uvicorn=%s websockets=%s",
_lvl_env,
logging.getLevelName(logging.getLogger("httpx").level),
logging.getLevelName(logging.getLogger("uvicorn").level),
logging.getLevelName(logging.getLogger("websockets").level),
)
ROOT_DIR = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
load_dotenv(os.path.join(ROOT_DIR, ".env"), override=False)
logger.debug("Loaded .env from %s", ROOT_DIR)
def _normalize_reasoning_type(value: str) -> str:
normalized = (value or "").strip().strip('"').strip("'").replace("-", "_").upper()
if normalized == "OPENAI":
return "OPENAI"
if normalized in {"NODE_RED", "NODERED"}:
return "NODE_RED"
return "PROXY"
SERPER_KEY = os.environ.get("SERPER_API_KEY", "").strip()
S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT = os.environ.get("S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT", "").strip()
if S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT:
S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT = S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT.replace("\\n", "\n")
# External user-by-phone info endpoint. When set, GET /api/user/phone proxies
# to this URL (passing ?phoneNumber=) and forwards the JSON payload to the
# browser so the UI can render caller identity / caller context.
VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL = os.environ.get("VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL", "").strip().rstrip("/")
# Feature flag: when "true" (case-insensitive) => injects the resolved caller
# profile into the realtime session (patch session.update client->upstream,
# append profile to the LLM system instructions prompt instructions, and prepend it to the
# reasoning user_context for the /api/reasoning HTTP body.
# Default = disabled (generic deploy; pure passthrough; all characterization lives
# in the backend RAG per original architectural decision.)
S2S_INJECT_PROFILE = (
(os.environ.get("S2S_INJECT_PROFILE", "") or "").strip().lower()
in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
)
# Endpoint URL for fetching the latest per-caller conversation summary, used when
# both S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=true AND S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY is set. Completely
# generic: the proxy performs a plain GET S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY?phoneNumber=<x>
# and expects JSON back (optionally wrapped as {"result": <value>}). Empty
# string means the feature is off (no network call, nothing injected).
S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY = (os.environ.get("S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY", "") or "").strip()
# Static / hardcoded latest-summary text. When set (non-empty string), it takes
# PRIORITY over S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY: the proxy SKIPS the HTTP fetch entirely and
# injects this raw plain-text value directly into the prompt as the latest
# conversation summary. Designed for cases where the operator wants a clean,
# essential, pre-cleaned summary snippet without depending on an upstream API.
# Bypasses all HTTP logic (no login-by-phone bearer forwarding, no timeout, no
# JSON unwrapping) — the string is passed as-is to _resolve_latest_summary_context
# (which still applies the 1600-char cap + the LATEST_SUMMARY_HINT wrapper).
S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT = (os.environ.get("S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT", "") or "").strip()
if S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT:
# Interpret \n escape sequences so multi-line summaries can be written as a
# single env line (matches S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT convention above).
S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT = S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT.replace("\\n", "\n")
# Optional: login-by-phone endpoint. When set (and S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=true and
# phoneNumber is available), before fetching user profile / latest summary the proxy
# first performs a POST S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE with {"phoneNumber": "..."} JSON body,
# extracts an auth token from the response (if any), and forwards it as
# Authorization: Bearer <token> for subsequent profile / summary / reports HTTP calls.
S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE = (os.environ.get("S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE", "") or "").strip().rstrip("/")
# Optional: list of scheduled reports / podcasts endpoint. When set (and S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=true)
# the proxy performs a plain GET S2S_REPORT_LIST, unwraps the JSON array (or {"result": [...]}),
# filters per-item fields (sourceScheduleLabel, date, podcastScript), sorts by date DESC,
# and injects the compiled block into the LLM instructions / user_context between
# the caller profile block and the latest conversation summary block.
S2S_REPORT_LIST = (os.environ.get("S2S_REPORT_LIST", "") or "").strip().rstrip("/")
# Feature flag: when "true" (case-insensitive) => actually injects the REPORT LIST
# contents (podcastScript) into the LLM instructions / context. When "false" (DEFAULT)
# the proxy NEVER injects scheduled reports into the prompt — not even the TOC — and
# skips the upstream S2S_REPORT_LIST network call entirely, fixing the user issue:
# "Attualmente stai iniettando TUTTI i reports con tutto il loro podcastScript integrale."
#
# Historical note (2026-09-11): before this flag existed, if S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=true AND
# S2S_REPORT_LIST was set the server eagerly fetched every scheduled report for the
# caller, serialized all their full podcastScript fields into a single block (capped at
# 12000 chars) and appended it to every LLM turn. That was a huge prompt-bloat injection
# the user explicitly flagged as unwanted. The safe default is therefore DISABLED: to
# restore mass-report-injection, operators must opt in with S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true.
S2S_INJECT_REPORTS = (
(os.environ.get("S2S_INJECT_REPORTS", "") or "").strip().lower()
in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
)
# Max number of scheduled reports to surface in the QUICK-HINT line block (the TOC of
# label + date shown before the serialized JSON entries). Also applied as a hard cap to
# the final filtered+serialized entries list — so the wrapped prompt block never carries
# content for more than N reports, even when the upstream API returns 20+. Configurable
# from .env; value is integer-parsed and clamped to [1, 50] (invalid values fall back to
# the default = 5, which is the user's requested "max 3-5" default range). User request
# 2026-09-11: "riduci il quick hint report max 3-5 configurabile da .env".
try:
_S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX_RAW = int((os.environ.get("S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX", "") or "5").strip())
except Exception:
_S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX_RAW = 5
S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX = max(1, min(50, _S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX_RAW))
del _S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX_RAW
# Feature flag: when "true" → prepend a TODAY date + anti-hallucination guard to
# every LLM prompt and session instructions. Fixes user bug 3 2026-09-11:
# "Qwen2.5 training cutoff ~2024 metà, vede report 2026 e impazzisce meta-commenti in cinese:
# 'L'ora mondiale oggi è 2023, perché report nel 2026?'"
# Default = ON (safe even when empty/unset). Explicit S2S_INJECT_TODAY="false" to disable.
# Injected text contains:
# • real "La data di OGGI è: YYYY-MM-DD (ISO, server local date)
# • "Report con date precedenti = archivio storico → non commentare date future
# • Rule anti-meta-commenti: NIENTE commenti interni / prompt introspection
# • Rule anti-thinking-leak (GPTQ Int4 quantized): "sólo lo que dice Vocero en voz alta"
# • Rule RAG report: "para contenido de reportes usa RAG, no inventes con el resumen"
S2S_INJECT_TODAY = not (
(os.environ.get("S2S_INJECT_TODAY", "") or "").strip().lower()
in {"0", "false", "no", "off"}
)
# Feature flag: S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE controls what the server sends into the LLM
# prompt for scheduled reports. Values (case-insensitive, default="minimal"):
# • "minimal" → ONLY last N = S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX items as a pure
# TOC (label + date ONLY). NO podcastScript is ever exposed. This
# the user's "Mantieni i report? Allora solo sommario MINIMO"
# fix. Token budget: ~50 tokens instead of ~3200.
# • "full" → legacy behaviour: full JSON array with podcastScript
# (still capped to S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX items). Used to be
# the default before 2026-09-11; kept only for explicit opt-in
# because of the user explicitly flagged the massive script injection
# as unwanted on this session.
# • "off" / "none" → no reports injection at all (same as S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=false)
# even when S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true. Use this to keep the HTTP
# fetch running while keeping the prompt clean, or as a redundant kill.
S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE = (os.environ.get("S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE", "") or "").strip().lower()
if S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE not in {"minimal", "full", "off", "none"}:
S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE = "minimal"
# Feature flag: when "true" the proxy logs the FULL PROMPT TEXT (not just
# lengths) going to the upstream LLM/realtime backends. Includes:
# - WS session.update session.instructions (before/after patch)
# - /api/reasoning NODE_RED instructions + user_context full text
# - /api/reasonING OPENAI full system message + user transcript
# Default = off; only length summaries are logged (current behaviour).
# WARNING: setting this on will log potentially PII / sensitive caller
# profile data / user transcripts. Use only in development / debugging.
S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT = (
(os.environ.get("S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT", "") or "").strip().lower()
in {"1", "true", "yes", "on"}
)
S2S_START_SESSION_MODE = (os.environ.get("S2S_START_SESSION_MODE", "") or "").strip().upper()
S2S_THEME = (os.environ.get("S2S_THEME", "") or "").strip().lower()
if S2S_THEME and S2S_THEME not in {"white", "dark"}:
S2S_THEME = ""
S2S_REASONING_TYPE = _normalize_reasoning_type(os.environ.get("S2S_REASONING_TYPE", "PROXY"))
OPENAI_API_KEY = os.environ.get("OPENAI_API_KEY", "").strip()
OPENAI_BASE_URL = os.environ.get("OPENAI_BASE_URL", "https://api.openai.com/v1").strip().rstrip("/")
OPENAI_REASONING_MODEL = os.environ.get("OPENAI_REASONING_MODEL", "gpt-4.1-mini").strip()
OPENAI_ORGANIZATION = os.environ.get("OPENAI_ORGANIZATION", "").strip()
OPENAI_PROJECT = os.environ.get("OPENAI_PROJECT", "").strip()
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# APIPILOT — Backend AquaPortal dynamic-tool bridge (GUIDA_APIPILOT_CLIENTE.md)
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# URL base per il discovery e l'esecuzione dei tool dinamici ApiPilot. Quando
# valorizzata, il proxy effettua GET <url>/tools con include_unauthorized=true
# (§2.1 della guida) per ottenere la lista tool e POST <url>/execute per
# invocarne uno (§2.2). Può finire o meno con "/": il proxy normalizza
# sempre con rstrip("/") sotto.
#
# ES.: S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL=https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/apipilot
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL = os.environ.get("S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL", "").strip().rstrip("/")
# Override ESPLICITO per l'URL di execute (§2.2 GUIDA_APIPILOT_CLIENTE.md).
# Se valorizzato, ha la precedenza su S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL per le chiamate POST execute.
# Normalizza togliendo "/" alla fine; il proxy appenderebbe "/execute" SOLO se la URL
# non termina già con "/execute".
# ES.1 (base): S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL=https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/apipilot
# → POST https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/apipilot/execute
# ES.2 (utente .env:45): S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL=https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/apipilot/tools
# → POST https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/apipilot/tools/execute
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL = os.environ.get("S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL", "").strip().rstrip("/")
# Bearer token fisso (opzionale) usato SOLO se il chiamante NON fornisce un
# token di sessione (Authorization / x-demo-session). Utile in ambienti di
# pre-produzione con token di servizio hardcoded.
S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN = os.environ.get("S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN", "").strip()
# 2026-09-25 SUPER API KEY (BYPASS AUTENTICAZIONE AQUAPORTAL TEMPORANEO).
# Se valorizzata: 3 forme contemporaneamente in headers per max compatibilità:
# 1) X-API-Key: <key>
# 2) Authorization: Bearer <key>
# 3) x-demo-session: <key>
# Ha MAXIMA priorità e disabilita completamente login_by_phone (non serve).
# Basta vuotare la stringa per tornare al login standard.
S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY = os.environ.get("S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY", "").strip().strip("\"'")
# TTL della cache di discovery tools (in secondi). La guida dice "max ogni 5
# minuti se tieni cache lato client"; lato server usiamo lo stesso valore per
# default: 300 secondi = 5 minuti.
try:
_APIPILOT_TTL_RAW = int((os.environ.get("S2S_APIPILOT_TTL_SEC", "") or "300").strip())
except Exception:
_APIPILOT_TTL_RAW = 300
APIPILOT_CACHE_TTL_SEC = max(15, min(3600, _APIPILOT_TTL_RAW))
del _APIPILOT_TTL_RAW
# Timeout HTTP per chiamate ApiPilot (discovery + execute), in secondi.
try:
_APIPILOT_TO_RAW = float((os.environ.get("S2S_APIPILOT_TIMEOUT_SEC", "") or "15.0").strip())
except Exception:
_APIPILOT_TO_RAW = 15.0
APIPILOT_HTTP_TIMEOUT = max(1.0, min(120.0, _APIPILOT_TO_RAW))
del _APIPILOT_TO_RAW
# Cache in-process + lock asyncrona (uno solo refresha, gli altri leggono la
# entry stantia). Struttura `_APIPILOT_CACHE[auth_fingerprint] = (fetched_at_monotonic, tools_list)`.
_APIPILOT_CACHE: dict[str, tuple[float, list[dict]]] = {}
_APIPILOT_CACHE_LOCK = asyncio.Lock()
# Helper tempo monotonic per misure duration senza drift NTP.
import time as _time_mod_gbl
_monotonic_now: callable = _time_mod_gbl.monotonic
del _time_mod_gbl
def _apipilot_auth_fingerprint(auth_header: str | None, demo_session: str | None) -> str:
"""Return a short string used as cache key scoped to the caller identity.
We don't want to share cached tool-lists across users with different auth
tokens (requires_auth flags can be token-dependent via /tools?include_unauthorized=true
because the back-end may still attach per-role metadata)."""
parts: list[str] = []
if auth_header:
# Don't cache the raw bearer. SHA-256 truncated 12 chars = safe fingerprint.
import hashlib
parts.append("h:" + hashlib.sha256(auth_header.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()[:12])
if demo_session:
parts.append("d:" + demo_session)
return "|".join(parts) if parts else "anon"
def _apipilot_parse_authorization(request: Request | None) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
"""Extract (Authorization header value, x-demo-session header value) from a FastAPI request.
Returns a tuple of two optional strings. Both are forwarded to the upstream
ApiPilot backend verbatim when non-empty (see GUIDA_APIPILOT_CLIENTE.md §2.1 note).
"""
if request is None:
return None, None
auth = None
demo = None
try:
raw_auth = request.headers.get("authorization") or request.headers.get("Authorization")
if isinstance(raw_auth, str) and raw_auth.strip():
auth = raw_auth.strip()
raw_demo = request.headers.get("x-demo-session") or request.headers.get("X-Demo-Session")
if isinstance(raw_demo, str) and raw_demo.strip():
demo = raw_demo.strip()
except Exception:
pass
return auth, demo
def _apipilot_resolve_execute_url() -> str:
"""Resolve the final POST URL for ApiPilot tool execution.
Priorità (§2.2 + override esplicito utente .env riga 45):
1. S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL se valorizzato: se NON termina con
"/execute", appendiamo "/execute".
2. Fallback S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL + "/execute".
La funzione non può mai restituire stringa vuota: se nessuna è configurata
è responsabilità del caller (tipicamente _apipilot_execute_tool) tornare
envelope errore APIPILOT_NOT_CONFIGURED prima di arrivare qui.
"""
base = S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL or S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL
base = base.strip().rstrip("/")
if not base:
return ""
if base.lower().endswith("/execute"):
return base
return f"{base}/execute"
def _apipilot_strip_tool_for_llm(tool_def: dict) -> dict:
"""Return a tool definition that is safe for LLM function-calling providers.
§4 della guida:
"NON mandare direttamente l'output grezzo di /tools al modello, perché
contiene il campo requires_auth che non fa parte dello standard
function-calling e alcuni provider lo rifiutano."
Questa funzione è l'esatto complemento di quella regola: prende un
`ToolDefinition` nativo e restituisce la proiezione OpenAI-compatibile
`{type: "function", function: {name, description, parameters}}`.
"""
if not isinstance(tool_def, dict):
return {}
name = tool_def.get("name") if isinstance(tool_def.get("name"), str) else ""
description = tool_def.get("description") if isinstance(tool_def.get("description"), str) else ""
parameters = tool_def.get("parameters")
if not isinstance(parameters, dict):
parameters = {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []}
out: dict = {
"type": "function",
"function": {
"name": name,
"description": description,
"parameters": parameters,
},
}
return out
async def _apipilot_fetch_tools(
*,
auth_header: str | None,
demo_session: str | None,
include_unauthorized: bool = True,
force_refresh: bool = False,
refresh: bool | None = None,
) -> list[dict]:
"""Fetch ApiPilot tool definitions with a short in-process TTL cache.
Implements §2.1 (GET /tools?include_unauthorized=true). The cache key is
scoped by caller auth fingerprint (see `_apipilot_auth_fingerprint`) so
per-token variations in `requires_auth` or list length don't leak between
identities.
Returns a list of tool definitions (parsed JSON, may be empty). Raises
`HTTPException` only when `S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL` is set but the backend
replied with a non-2xx / non-JSON response. When env is empty → returns
`[]` silently (passthrough).
"""
# 2026-09-25 ALIAS BACKWARD: parametro `refresh` usato in WS connect L4632
# (nome sbagliato) — se presente, usa force_refresh corrispondente.
if refresh is not None:
force_refresh = bool(refresh) or bool(force_refresh)
if not S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL:
return []
import time as _time_mod
# 2026-09-25 FIX FINGERPRINT CONSISTENCY: PRIMA determiniamo auth/demo EFFETTIVI
# (SUPER API KEY PRIORITÀ MASSIMA), POI calcoliamo fp cache.
# Altrimenti fp = anon-ws... ma headers reali = APIKEY → chiave cache sbagliata
# e sessione demo session non matcha (Aquachile user_type=null → 403).
if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY:
final_auth = "BYPASS-API-KEY"
_demo_used = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
_effective_auth_for_fp = f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY}"
_effective_demo_for_fp = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
else:
final_auth = auth_header or (f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN}" if S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN else None)
_demo_used = demo_session
_effective_auth_for_fp = final_auth if isinstance(final_auth, str) and final_auth.strip() else (auth_header or "")
_effective_demo_for_fp = _demo_used if isinstance(_demo_used, str) and _demo_used.strip() else ""
fp = _apipilot_auth_fingerprint(_effective_auth_for_fp, _effective_demo_for_fp)
now = _time_mod.monotonic()
cached = _APIPILOT_CACHE.get(fp)
if (not force_refresh) and cached and (now - cached[0]) < APIPILOT_CACHE_TTL_SEC:
logger.debug(
"[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] cache HIT ttl=%.1fs fp=%s tools=%d",
APIPILOT_CACHE_TTL_SEC - (now - cached[0]), fp, len(cached[1]),
)
return cached[1]
# Prefer to serve stale (if any) rather than block many callers.
stale_tools = cached[1] if cached else None
async with _APIPILOT_CACHE_LOCK:
# Double-check after acquiring lock (another coroutine may have refreshed).
now2 = _time_mod.monotonic()
recheck = _APIPILOT_CACHE.get(fp)
if (not force_refresh) and recheck and (now2 - recheck[0]) < APIPILOT_CACHE_TTL_SEC:
return recheck[1]
url = f"{S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL}/tools"
params = {"include_unauthorized": "true" if include_unauthorized else "false"}
headers = {"accept": "application/json"}
# 2026-09-25 SUPER API KEY: MAX PRIORITY. Se valorizzata → disabilita tutti gli altri auth
# e mette TUTTE e 3 le forme contemporaneamente per max compatibilità.
if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY:
headers["X-API-Key"] = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY}"
headers["x-demo-session"] = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
else:
if final_auth:
headers["Authorization"] = final_auth
if _demo_used:
headers["x-demo-session"] = _demo_used
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] → GET %s?include_unauthorized=%s fp=%s auth=%s demo=%s",
url, params["include_unauthorized"], fp,
("APIKEY" if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY else ("Y" if final_auth else "-")),
("APIKEY" if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY else ("Y" if _demo_used else "-")),
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=APIPILOT_HTTP_TIMEOUT, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.get(url, params=params, headers=headers)
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] ✗ network error: %s", exc)
if stale_tools is not None:
logger.warning("[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] using STALE cached fallback tools=%d", len(stale_tools))
return stale_tools
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={"code": "APIPILOT_NETWORK_ERROR", "message": f"Error al contactar ApiPilot tools backend: {exc}"},
)
if resp.status_code >= 300:
logger.error("[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] ✗ backend HTTP %s body=%s", resp.status_code, resp.text[:400])
if stale_tools is not None:
logger.warning("[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] using STALE cached fallback tools=%d", len(stale_tools))
return stale_tools
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={
"code": "APIPILOT_BAD_UPSTREAM",
"message": f"Backend ApiPilot tools devolvió HTTP {resp.status_code}",
"status_code": resp.status_code,
},
)
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.error("[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] ✗ risposta non JSON: %s", resp.text[:500])
if stale_tools is not None:
return stale_tools
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail={"code": "APIPILOT_BAD_JSON", "message": "La risposta di ApiPilot tools non è JSON valido."},
)
# Backend might return: list OR {"result": [...]} OR {"tools": [...]} OR
# {"data": {"tools": [...]}}. Unwrap generic wrapper-style payloads.
tools: list[dict] = []
if isinstance(payload, list):
tools = [t for t in payload if isinstance(t, dict)]
elif isinstance(payload, dict):
for key in ("tools", "result", "data"):
cand = payload.get(key)
if isinstance(cand, list):
tools = [t for t in cand if isinstance(t, dict)]
break
if isinstance(cand, dict):
sub = cand.get("tools") if isinstance(cand.get("tools"), list) else cand.get("result")
if isinstance(sub, list):
tools = [t for t in sub if isinstance(t, dict)]
break
# Validate minimal ToolDefinition contract §2.1: name + description + parameters.
sanitized: list[dict] = []
for raw in tools:
name = raw.get("name")
if not isinstance(name, str) or not name.strip():
continue
description = raw.get("description") if isinstance(raw.get("description"), str) else ""
parameters = raw.get("parameters")
if not isinstance(parameters, dict):
parameters = {"type": "object", "properties": {}, "required": []}
requires_auth = raw.get("requires_auth", False)
if not isinstance(requires_auth, bool):
# Some backends return 0/1; normalize to bool. Guard per regola.
try:
requires_auth = bool(int(requires_auth))
except Exception:
requires_auth = False
tool_def = {
"name": name.strip(),
"description": description,
"parameters": parameters,
"requires_auth": requires_auth,
}
sanitized.append(tool_def)
_APIPILOT_CACHE[fp] = (now2, sanitized)
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] ← OK tools=%s fp=%s status=%s upstreamFmt=%s cachedTools=%d",
len(sanitized), fp, resp.status_code,
"list" if isinstance(payload, list) else "object",
len(sanitized),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and sanitized:
logger.debug(
"[APIPILOT-DISCOVERY] raw first tool preview: %s",
json.dumps(sanitized[0], ensure_ascii=False)[:400],
)
return sanitized
def _apipilot_validate_arguments(arguments: dict | None, tool_def: dict) -> tuple[dict, list[str]]:
"""Validate / execute arguments strictly against the tool's JSON-Schema parameters.
Implements §2.2 PRE-CHECK #3:
• rimuove TUTTE le chiavi extra non in parameters.properties — MA SOLO SE
parameters.properties è un dict NON VUOTO.
• Caso speciale 2026-09-25 (OSSERVATO AquaPortal):
tool.get_user_briefing ha parameters.properties={} e required=[].
Significa "nessuno schema esplicito dichiarato / args flessibili"
(phone viene preso internamente al backend dal token). In questo caso
NON facciamo stripping di chiavi (altrimenti rimuoveremmo phone
indispensabile per la business logic).
• valorizza required (restituisce errori se mancanti)
• NON inventare parametri → non vengono aggiunte chiavi.
Returns `(filtered_args, list_of_validation_errors_in_spagnolo)`.
If the returned errors list is non-empty, MUST block the execution (see
the `_apipilot_execute_tool` caller).
"""
errors: list[str] = []
schema = tool_def.get("parameters") if isinstance(tool_def.get("parameters"), dict) else {}
properties = schema.get("properties") if isinstance(schema.get("properties"), dict) else {}
required = schema.get("required") if isinstance(schema.get("required"), list) else []
required = [x for x in required if isinstance(x, str)]
args = arguments if isinstance(arguments, dict) else {}
# ── 2026-09-25 FLESSIBILITÀ SCHEMA VUOTO: se parameters non ha properties
# dichiarate esplicitamente (dict vuoto) → pass-through TUTTI gli args,
# nessuno stripping. Utile per AquaPortal tool tipo get_user_briefing.
schema_is_open: bool = (not isinstance(properties, dict)) or len(properties) == 0
requires_auth_flag = bool(tool_def.get("requires_auth"))
# 2026-09-25 TOOL AUTH-ONLY: requires_auth=true + parameters.properties vuoto
# + required=[] + description contiene "Requires a valid session token"
# → AquaPortal ricava TUTTI i dati utente dal bearer JWT del token.
# In questo caso passiamo arguments={} (nessun parametro) per evitare
# conflitti (es. phone argomento vs phone utente token) → 403.
auth_only_tool = False
if schema_is_open and requires_auth_flag and len(required) == 0:
_d = tool_def.get("description") if isinstance(tool_def.get("description"), str) else ""
if (not _d) or "valid session token" in _d.lower() or "authenticated" in _d.lower():
auth_only_tool = True
if auth_only_tool:
cleaned = {}
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT-VALIDATE] tool=%s richiede SOLO sessione auth (nessun parametro) → arguments forzati {} (evitiamo conflitto phone-args vs user-token)",
tool_def.get("name") or "?",
)
elif schema_is_open:
cleaned = dict(args)
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT-VALIDATE] tool=%s schema aperto (parameters.properties vuoto) → pass-through tutti gli args N=%d keys=%s",
tool_def.get("name") or "?",
len(cleaned),
sorted(list(cleaned.keys())),
)
else:
cleaned: dict = {}
for key in args.keys():
if key in properties:
cleaned[key] = args[key]
else:
logger.warning(
"[APIPILOT-VALIDATE] tool=%s removing unknown arg=%s",
tool_def.get("name") or "?", key,
)
# Required check: abilitato SOLO se lo schema NON è open (altrimenti
# required=[] è vacuo e non ha senso).
if (not schema_is_open):
for req in required:
if req not in cleaned:
errors.append(f"Falta el parámetro requerido: {req}")
return cleaned, errors
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# APIPILOT — Integrazione nel motore di reasoning (2 passate)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Marker dedup/inizio/fine usati da _classify_context_block per evitare
# doppie injection dello stesso blocco (se client già lo invia o se dedup layer 2
# lo trova già nel base_instructions originale).
APIPILOT_PASS1_LIST_MARKER = "<<<APIPILOT_TOOLS_LIST_BEGIN>>>"
APIPILOT_PASS2_RESULT_MARKER = "<<<APIPILOT_RESULT:"
# Regola:
# PASSATA 1: iniettiamo lista {name,description,required,parameters} + regole
# marker nel prompt. AI deve decidere se matcha description e
# emettere <<<APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=nome_tool,ARGUMENTS={...}>>>.
# PASSATA 2: marker catturato → esegui S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL via
# helper → prendi body text risultato → inietta nel prompt e
# chiedi all'AI di rielaborarlo in linguaggio naturale per
# raccontarlo all'utente via voce.
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
_APIPILOT_CALL_MARKER_RE = re.compile(
r"[<]{1,3}\s*APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+),ARGUMENTS=(.*?)[>]{1,3}",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
# 2026-09-25: marker INVERTITO caso osservato (LLM sbaglia sintassi):
# >>>APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=tool,ARGUMENTS=json<<<
_APIPILOT_CALL_MARKER_INVERTED_RE = re.compile(
r"[>]{1,3}\s*APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=([A-Za-z0-9_.-]+),ARGUMENTS=(.*?)[<]{1,3}",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
def _apipilot_parse_call_marker(answer_text: str, *, defaults: dict | None = None) -> tuple[str | None, dict | None]:
"""Parse the mandatory CALL marker emitted by the LLM in passata 1.
Returns (tool_name, arguments_dict) oppure (None, None) se nessun marker.
Gestisce:
(1) ARGUMENTS={"key":"val"} JSON valido (formato corretto)
(2) ARGUMENTS={} vuoto corretto
(3) ARGUMENTS= vuoto SENZA graffe (OSSERVATO oggi su WS realtime)
(4) args_raw tipo key=val,key2=val2 string semplice (fallback manual parse)
(5) FASE 2: dopo il parse, applica un dict di defaults (es. phone, episode_id)
riempiendo parametri required MANCANTI in args (se non sono presenti).
"""
if not isinstance(answer_text, str) or not answer_text.strip():
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=PARSE_EMPTY_INPUT name=None markerFound=N")
return None, None
m = _APIPILOT_CALL_MARKER_RE.search(answer_text.strip())
inverted = False
if not m:
m = _APIPILOT_CALL_MARKER_INVERTED_RE.search(answer_text.strip())
inverted = bool(m)
if not m:
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=PARSE_NO_MATCH name=None markerFound=N textHead=%r", answer_text.strip()[:80])
return None, None
name_raw = m.group(1).strip()
args_raw = (m.group(2) if m.lastindex and m.lastindex >= 2 and isinstance(m.group(2), str) else "").strip()
if not name_raw:
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=PARSE_EMPTY_NAME name=None markerFound=Y argsRawHead=%r inverted=%s", args_raw[:60], ("Y" if inverted else "N"))
return None, None
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=PARSE_MARKER_OK name=%r argsRawLen=%d markerFound=Y inverted=%s", name_raw, len(args_raw), ("Y" if inverted else "N"))
args: dict = {}
# ── Parse args_raw a dict (varianti tollerate) ────────────────────────────
if args_raw == "" or args_raw in {"{}", "null", "None"}:
args = {}
else:
# Tenta 1: JSON standard (graffe incluse o NO)
_candidate = args_raw
try:
args = json.loads(_candidate)
except Exception:
try:
# Tenta 2: mancano graffe esterne, aggiungiamo { } attorno
args = json.loads("{" + _candidate + "}")
except Exception:
try:
# Tenta 3: virgolette singole invece che doppie
args = json.loads(_candidate.replace("'", '"'))
except Exception:
try:
# Tenta 4: { } + virgolette singole
args = json.loads("{" + _candidate.replace("'", '"') + "}")
except Exception:
# Fallback 5 manuale: separatore = e virgole.
# Es. args_raw="phone=+56,name=Mario" → dict
args = {}
for piece in args_raw.split(","):
kv = piece.strip()
if not kv or "=" not in kv:
continue
k, v = kv.split("=", 1)
k = k.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
v = v.strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if k:
args[k] = v
if not isinstance(args, dict):
args = {}
# ── FASE 2: auto-fill defaults (phone, etc.) per parametri mancanti ──────
if isinstance(defaults, dict) and defaults:
for dk, dv in defaults.items():
if dk not in args or args[dk] in (None, "", []):
if dv not in (None, "", []):
args[dk] = dv
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=PARSE_RETURN_FINAL name=%r finalArgsKeys=%s defaultsApplied=%s", name_raw, sorted(list(args.keys())), ("Y" if isinstance(defaults, dict) and defaults else "N"))
return name_raw, args
def _resolve_apipilot_reasoning_context_block(
tools_list: list[dict] | None,
*,
call_result: dict | None = None,
context_defaults: dict | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Build the ApiPilot context block for the reasoning prompt.
Quando call_result=None → PASSATA 1: emetti la lista strumenti + la regola
sintattica del marker che l'AI deve emettere quando description matcha.
Quando call_result={'name':str, 'text':str, 'error':bool} → PASSATA 2:
inietta il risultato testuale ottenuto da execute e chiedi all'AI di
rielaborarlo per l'utente finale (voce / testo).
Parametro NUOVO 2026-09-25 context_defaults (dict opzionale):
per PASSATA 1 se non-None aggiunge una sezione "VALORES POR DEFECTO
CONOCIDOS" per dire all'AI "quando lo strumento richiede 'phone' usa
esattamente questo valore già disponibile (non inventarlo)."
Tipicamente contiene {"phone": "+56..."} da inject_phone del caller.
"""
# ── PASSATA 2: Risultato strumento già iniettato ─────────────────────────
if isinstance(call_result, dict) and call_result.get("name"):
name = call_result.get("name") or "?"
text = (call_result.get("text") if isinstance(call_result.get("text"), str) else "") or ""
is_err = bool(call_result.get("error"))
status_label = "ERROR" if is_err else "OK"
title = f"<<<APIPILOT_RESULT:STATUS={status_label},NAME={name}>>>"
trailer = (
"Ahora debes reinterpretar EL TEXTO RESULTADO (arriba) en lenguaje natural claro "
"y conciso, exclusivamente en el idioma del usuario (language field). "
"No menciones la herramienta internamente ni detalles técnicos. "
"Responde SOLAMENTE con el contenido final que le quieres transmitir al usuario."
)
return (
f"{APIPILOT_PASS2_RESULT_MARKER}PASS2>>>\n"
"### Resultado de la herramienta ApiPilot invocada\n"
f"{title}\n"
f"\n```tool-output\n"
f"{text.rstrip() if text.strip() else '(salida vacía)'}\n"
f"```\n\n"
f"{trailer}\n"
)
# ── PASSATA 1: Lista strumenti disponibili + regola marker ───────────────
tools = tools_list if isinstance(tools_list, list) else []
# Cap: max 100 strumenti (anche se la guida ne dichiara max 50 in demo)
tools_cap = tools[:100]
if not tools_cap:
return ""
entries: list[str] = []
for t in tools_cap:
if not isinstance(t, dict):
continue
name = t.get("name") if isinstance(t.get("name"), str) else ""
if not name:
continue
desc = t.get("description") if isinstance(t.get("description"), str) else ""
params = t.get("parameters") if isinstance(t.get("parameters"), dict) else None
requires_auth = bool(t.get("requires_auth"))
required_fields: list[str] = []
if isinstance(params, dict) and isinstance(params.get("required"), list):
required_fields = [str(x) for x in params.get("required") if isinstance(x, str)]
# Truncate description a ~500 chars per evitare injection enorme di token
desc_cut = desc[:500].rstrip()
if len(desc) > 500:
desc_cut += "…"
snippet = f"- name: {name}\n requires_auth: {('true' if requires_auth else 'false')}"
if required_fields:
snippet += f"\n required_parameters: [{', '.join(required_fields[:40])}]"
if desc_cut:
snippet += f"\n description: {desc_cut}"
entries.append(snippet)
if not entries:
return ""
rule = (
f"{APIPILOT_PASS1_LIST_MARKER}\n"
"### Herramientas dinámicas disponibles (ApiPilot AquaPortal)\n"
"\n"
"Cada herramienta tiene un campo `name` (identificador único, NO lo modifiques, "
"NO camelCase, NO traducir) y un campo `description` que describe el caso de uso.\n"
"\n"
"REGLAS EJECUCIÓN OBLIGATORIAS:\n"
"1. Si la petición DEL USUARIO (transcript) coincide claramente con la `description` "
"de EXACTAMENTE una (1) herramienta de la lista inferior → DEBES emitir EXCLUSIVAMENTE "
"una sola riga como PRIMERA línea de TU RESPUESTA, con este formato sintattico:\n"
" <<<APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=nome_herramienta,ARGUMENTS={\"parametro1\":\"valor1\",\"parametro2\":\"valor2\"}>>>\n"
"2. La parte ARGUMENTS={…} DEBE ser JSON válido (virgolette doppie, virgole, senza "
"commenti). Includi SOLAMENTE i campi elencati in `required_parameters:` (se ci sono).\n"
"3. Subito DOPO la riga marker NON aggiungere altro testo (niente spiegazioni, "
"niente anticipazioni). Il motore eseguirà lo strumento e ti risomministrerà il "
"risultato in una seconda chiamata.\n"
"4. Se NESSUNA `description` corrisponde, NON emettere marker e rispondi normalmente.\n"
"5. Se più di una descrizione corrisponde, scegli la più specifica e usa il marker.\n"
"6. 🔴 MODO RISPOSTA ESCLUSIVO (priorità MASSIMA, non negoziabile): quando decidi di usare il "
"marker CALL, la TUA RISPOSTA INTERA DEVE ESSERE ESCLUSIVAMENTE LA RIGA DEL MARKER. "
"NON scrivere NIENTE PRIMA (niente 'Claro que sí', niente 'Voy a revisar', niente "
"'Voy a generar tu briefing', nessun saluto, nessuna frase transitoria). "
"NON scrivere NIENTE DOPO (nessun commento, nessuna anticipazione, nessuna spiegazione). "
"Una sola riga, esattamente il marker. Se scrivi altro testo oltre al marker il motore "
"non lo riconosce e non esegue alcuna herramienta.\n"
"8. Ejemplos SBAGLIATI (NON fare MAI):\n"
" 'Claro que sí, ahora ejecuto'\n"
" 'Voy a generar tu briefing ejecutivo personal.'\n"
" 'Claro que sí.\\n<<<APIPILOT_CALL:...>>>'\n"
" '<<<APIPILOT_CALL:...>>>\\nAhora proceso el resultado.'\n"
"9. 🔴 REGLAS TTS ANTI-LEAK (NON negoziabili, priorità MASSIMA sul audio):\n"
" Il marcador <<<APIPILOT_CALL:...>>> È UN SEGNALE INTERNO DI SISTEMA e NON DEVE MAI\n"
" essere pronunciato / letto / sintetizzato dall' audio TTS. Quando emetti il marcador:\n"
" - Il canale RAGIONAMENTO INTERNO (text/transcript) DEVE contenere la riga esatta del marcador.\n"
" - Il canale AUDIO TTS FINALE che ascolta l'utente DEVE contenere SOLAMENTE il placeholder:\n"
" \"Voy a consultar tus datos, un momento por favor.\"\n"
" - NESSUNA delle parole seguenti deve MAI comparire nel TTS audio finale pronunciato:\n"
" APIPILOT, CALL, ARGUMENTS, tool, herramienta, ejecutar, funzione, funzione chiamata,\n"
" marcador, marker. (Nemmeno come spiegazione o descrizione della chiamata.)\n"
"\n"
)
# ── 2026-09-25 SECCIÓN NUEVA: VALORES POR DEFECTO CONOCIDOS ─────────────────
# I valori che GIA' ABBIAMO da URL o profilo (es. phoneNumber della sessione
# corrente) sono iniettati QUI così che quando l'AI decide di chiamare lo
# strumento inserisce esattamente i parametri senza lasciarli vuoti.
if isinstance(context_defaults, dict) and context_defaults:
defaults_lines = []
for dk, dv in context_defaults.items():
if dv in (None, "", []):
continue
if isinstance(dv, (dict, list)):
try:
dv_repr = json.dumps(dv, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception:
dv_repr = str(dv)
else:
dv_repr = str(dv)
defaults_lines.append(f"- {dk} = \"{dv_repr}\"")
if defaults_lines:
rule += (
"VALORES POR DEFECTO CONOCIDOS (usa estos valores textualmente "
"en el ARGUMENTS={…} cuando la herramienta correspondiente tenga "
"estos nombres en required_parameters; no los inventes, no los "
"traduzcas, no los normalices):\n"
f"{chr(10).join(defaults_lines)}\n"
"\n"
)
rule += (
"Lista herramientas (name / description):\n"
f"{chr(10).join(entries)}\n"
"<<<APIPILOT_TOOLS_LIST_END>>>"
)
return rule
def _sanitize_pass2_internal_context(text: str) -> str:
"""Sanitize LEGGERA per blocco PASS-2 iniettato ALL'AI upstream (NON all'utente).
NON USIAMO _sanitize_text_strip_apipilot_markers perché quella cancella
l'intero wrapper <<<APIPILOT_RESULT:PASS2>>> tramite BLOCCO 1 FULL STRIP —
quello wrapper serve ALL'AI per riconoscere che sono dati della chiamata.
Qui facciamo SOLO:
- BLOCCO 3 PATH leak filesystem (.trae-server / workspaceStorage / paths)
- BLOCCO 4 FRAGMENT marker parole singole leak
- TIER 6 phone contextual leak (solo se riga contiene marker)
"""
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text.strip():
return text
# ── BLOCCO 3 (path leaks Unix/Windows/TRAE token) ────────────────────
# (pattern identico a _sanitize_text_strip_apipilot_markers Blocco3)
import re as _re_pass2
text = _re_pass2.sub(r"(?i)(?:/[A-Za-z0-9_.\-@~]+){2,}/(?:\.trae[^\s\"']*|workspaceStorage[^\s\"']*|User[^\s\"']*|home[^\s\"']*)", " ", text)
text = _re_pass2.sub(r"(?i)(?:[A-Z]:)?[\\/](?:Users|home|root|tmp|var|mnt|opt|srv)[\\/][^\s\"']{5,}", " ", text)
text = _re_pass2.sub(r"(?i)(?:\.trae-server|\.trae[^\s\"']{0,40}|workspaceStorage[0-9a-f]+)", " ", text)
text = _re_pass2.sub(r"\s{2,}", " ", text)
# ── BLOCCO 4 FRAGMENT marker leak tier-4 ─────────────────────────────
tier4_out_parts: list[str] = []
for _line in text.splitlines(keepends=True):
_orig = _line
_low = _line.lower()
if (
"apipilot" in _low
and (
("call" in _low and "name=" in _low)
or ("arguments=" in _low)
or ("result" in _low and "pass" in _low)
)
):
if "<<<" in _line or ">>>" in _line:
_line = _re_pass2.sub(
r"[<]{1,3}\s*APIPILOT_(?:CALL|RESULT)[^<>\n]{0,500}[>]{1,3}",
" ", _line, flags=_re_pass2.IGNORECASE,
)
if "apipilot" in _line.lower():
_line = _re_pass2.sub(
r"(?i)\bAPIPILOT(?:_CALL|_RESULT)?\b",
" ", _line,
)
_line = _re_pass2.sub(
r"(?i)\b(?:NAME|ARGUMENTS|STATUS|REV|PASS2)\s*[:=]",
" ", _line,
)
tier4_out_parts.append(_line if _line.strip() else _orig)
text = "".join(tier4_out_parts)
text = _re_pass2.sub(r"\s{2,}", " ", text)
return text.strip() if isinstance(text, str) else text
def _sanitize_text_strip_apipilot_markers(
text: str,
*,
placeholder: str | None = None,
) -> str:
"""Rimuovi TUTTI i marker interni di ApiPilot (PASS-1 CALL e PASS-2 RESULT)
dal testo che arriva all'utente finale (UI chat + audio TTS + conversation
item visualizzazione).
Regole stripping:
- MARKER CALL <<<APIPILOT_CALL:...>>> → placeholder spagnolo
(se l'AI emette il marker e viene mandato alla TTS per sbaglio, lo
mascheriamo con messaggio UI coerente).
- MARKER PASS-2 <<<APIPILOT_RESULT:...>>> + <<<APIPILOT_RESULT:PASS2>>>
+ wrapper "### Resultado de la herramienta ApiPilot..."
+ blocco ```tool-output ... ``` + re-instruction trailer finale
→ RIMOSSI SILENZIOSAMENTE (nessun placeholder: sono segnali server
interni per la PASS-2 di reasoning; NON devono mai arrivare a
TTS/UI. Se l'AI per sbaglio li ripete nella risposta finale,
li cancelliamo senza lasciare traccia).
Parametri:
- text: la stringa da sanificare
- placeholder: None = default spagnolo "Voy a consultar tus datos, un momento por favor."
(lingua coerente con la lingua UI e vocale target)
"""
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
return text
if placeholder is None:
placeholder = "Voy a consultar tus datos, un momento por favor."
# ================================================================
# BLOCCO 1: PASS-2 RESULT markers + wrapper (RIMOZIONE SILENZIOSA)
# Questi NON devono MAI finire in TTS/UI.
# ================================================================
# (1a) Blocco intero PASS-2 wrapper (order matters: blocco largo PRIMA)
# Pattern: riga PASS2>>> marker + titolo MD + RESULT STATUS marker +
# block ```tool-output ... ``` (multilinea DOTALL) + trailer.
pass2_full_block_pattern = re.compile(
r"[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*"
r"<<<APIPILOT_RESULT:PASS2>>>[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)+"
r"###[ \t]+Resultado de la herramienta ApiPilot invocada[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)+"
r"<<<APIPILOT_RESULT:STATUS=[A-Za-z_]+,NAME=[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+>>>[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)*"
r"(?:\r?\n|\r)?"
r"```tool-output[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?"
r"(?P<tool_body>.*?)"
r"(?:\r?\n|\r)?```[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r){0,3}"
r"(?:"
r"Ahora debes reinterpretar EL TEXTO RESULTADO[\s\S]{0,1200}?"
r"(?:\r?\n|\r){0,2}"
r")?"
r"[ \t]*",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
text = pass2_full_block_pattern.sub("", text)
# (1b) Marker PASS2 standalone (se il wrapper non è completo o frammentato)
pass2_marker_pattern = re.compile(
r"[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*<<<APIPILOT_RESULT(?::PASS2|:STATUS=[A-Za-z_]+,NAME=[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?>>>[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = pass2_marker_pattern.sub("", text)
# (1c) Titolo MD "### Resultado de la herramienta ApiPilot invocada"
# residuo (se marker già stato rimosso prima)
pass2_title_pattern = re.compile(
r"[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*###[ \t]+Resultado de la herramienta ApiPilot invocada[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = pass2_title_pattern.sub("", text)
# (1d) Blocco ```tool-output``` residuo standalone (senza wrapper PASS2)
pass2_codeblock_pattern = re.compile(
r"```tool-output[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?.*?(?:\r?\n|\r)?```",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
text = pass2_codeblock_pattern.sub("", text)
# (1e) Trailer instruction residuo standalone "Ahora debes reinterpretar..."
# (intero o frammenti parziali che non hanno preso il pattern largo)
pass2_trailer_pattern = re.compile(
r"Ahora debes reinterpretar EL TEXTO RESULTADO[\s\S]{0,1200}?contenido final que le quieres transmitir al usuario\.",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
text = pass2_trailer_pattern.sub("", text)
# (1e-bis) Safety più largo: "Ahora debes reinterpretar" → qualsiasi cosa
# fino a fine frase "al usuario." (anche troncata nel mezzo) — questo
# gestisce i casi edge dove il pattern DOTALL non ha chiuso.
pass2_trailer_fallback = re.compile(
r"Ahora debes reinterpretar[\s\S]{0,1500}?(?:al usuario\.|$)",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
text = pass2_trailer_fallback.sub("", text)
# (1e-tris) Safety ancora più largo: frammento trailer tipo
# "en lenguaje natural claro y conciso ... contenido final al usuario"
# (casi in cui Ahora debes... è stato consumato fuori e rimane residuo).
pass2_trailer_broad = re.compile(
r"en lenguaje natural[\s\S]{0,800}?contenido final que le quieres transmitir al usuario\.?",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
text = pass2_trailer_broad.sub("", text)
# ================================================================
# BLOCCO 2: PASS-1 CALL marker (placeholder spagnolo, come oggi)
# ================================================================
marker_full_pattern = re.compile(
r"<<<APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+,ARGUMENTS=.*?>>>",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
line_wrapped_pattern = re.compile(
r"[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*<<<APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+,ARGUMENTS=.*?>>>[ \t]*(?:\r?\n|\r)?[ \t]*",
re.IGNORECASE | re.DOTALL,
)
def _replacement_full(_m: re.Match) -> str:
"""Se l'intera riga è solo il marker → placeholder. Se inline → placeholder circondato da spazi."""
return placeholder
text = line_wrapped_pattern.sub(_replacement_full, text)
text = marker_full_pattern.sub(_replacement_full, text)
# Safety extra: marker troncato CALL tipo <<<APIPILOT_CALL:NAME=tool,ARGS… (incompleto)
trunc_call_pattern = re.compile(
r"<<<APIPILOT_CALL(?::NAME=[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+,?[^>\n]{0,500}?)?>>*",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = trunc_call_pattern.sub(_replacement_full, text)
# Safety extra: marker troncato RESULT tipo <<<APIPILOT_RESULT:... incompleto
# OSS: rendiamo i caratteri `>` FINALI opzionali (+ opzionali `>` dopo)
# così gestisce anche casi TTS audio troncato a metà stringa
# (es. "<<<APIPILOT_RESULT:STATUS=OK,NAM" che non ha chiusura >>>)
trunc_result_pattern = re.compile(
r"<<<APIPILOT_RESULT(?::[A-Za-z0-9_=,:.\- ]{0,800}?)?>?>?>?",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = trunc_result_pattern.sub("", text)
# (Safety più largo: se rimane frammento APIPILOT_RESULT senza <<<
# per casi TTS/sanitize frammentati, cancelliamo anche quello
# MA SOLO se non è contenuto in testo normale - regex su "APIPILOT_RESULT"
# sarebbe troppo aggressivo → solo con prefisso "<" o "<<<" residuo)
trunc_result_residual = re.compile(
r"<{0,3}APIPILOT_RESULT(?::[^\s<]{0,800})?<{0,3}",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = trunc_result_residual.sub("", text)
# Collapse final whitespace (non vogliamo spazi multipli / newline vuoti
# lasciati dalla rimozione di blocchi PASS-2)
text = re.sub(r"[ \t]{2,}", " ", text)
text = re.sub(r"\n{3,}", "\n\n", text)
# Safety cleanup: frammenti residuali super-comuni del trailer PASS-2
# tipo "(arriba)" o parentesi vuote (non hanno senso pronunciati da TTS)
text = re.sub(r"\s*\(arriba\)\s*", " ", text, flags=re.IGNORECASE)
text = re.sub(r"\(\s*\)", "", text)
# ================================================================
# BLOCCO 3: SANITIZZAZIONE PATH FILE SYSTEM (hallucination / leak TTS)
# Qualsiasi path assoluto misto o Windows/Unix contenente /home,
# \Users, .trae-server, workspaceStorage, .txt locale, unità C:\
# NON deve MAI arrivare alla TTS (sono leak host).
# Strategia: matcha path lungo 20+ chars con almeno 3 separatori.
# ================================================================
# (3a) Path Unix-like assoluti: /home/... /tmp/... /var/... /root/... /opt/...
# + qualsiasi path con >2 slash consecutivi tipo .../xyz/abc/def.ext
unix_path_pattern = re.compile(
r"\b(?:/(?:home|tmp|var|root|opt|mnt|media|srv|proc|sys|etc|usr|Users|trae)[/\w@.+\-:#$%^&()[\]{}!~=,]*){2,}[A-Za-z0-9_./\-+@#$%^&()[\]{}!~=,:]*\.(?:txt|md|log|json|csv|pdf|doc|docx|py|js|ts|html|css|sh|yaml|yml|env|conf|cfg|ini|mp3|wav|ogg|png|jpg|jpeg|gif)\b"
r"|"
# Fallback larghissimo: qualsiasi path ASSOLUTO Unix (inizia con / + cartella nota)
# con len>=20 chars, anche senza estensione — evitiamo falsi positivi tipo "/api/v1"
# ma catturiamo /home/duxiter/..., /tmp/prova, /var/log/... etc.
r"(?:^|\s+|\(|[,.;:!?])(/(?:home|tmp|var|root|opt|mnt|media|srv|proc|sys|etc|usr|Users|trae)[/A-Za-z0-9_\-+@#$%^&()[\]{}!~=,.]{10,})(?=$|\s|\)|[,.;:!?])",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = unix_path_pattern.sub("", text)
# (3b) Path Windows-like con backslash singoli o doppi: \Users\... C:\...
# e misti come /home\duxiter\.trae-server\... (hallucination mix)
win_path_pattern = re.compile(
r"(?:^|\s|\(|[,.;:])"
r"([A-Za-z]:[\\/]"
r"|(?:[\\/]{1,2}(?:home|Users|Windows|Program|Program\sFiles|ProgramData|Users|trae|AppData)[\\/])"
r"|(?:[\\/]{1,2}\.(?:trae|trae-server|vscode|config|cache)[\\/])"
r")"
r"[A-Za-z0-9_@.+\-:#$%^&()[\]{}!~=,\\/\s]{10,}"
r"(?:\.(?:txt|md|log|json|csv|pdf|doc|docx|py|js|ts|html|css|sh|yaml|yml|env|conf|cfg|ini|mp3|wav|ogg|png|jpg|jpeg|gif))?"
r"(?=$|\s|\)|[,.;:!?])",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = win_path_pattern.sub("", text)
# (3c) Hallucination folder markers specifici di TRAE (se arrivano frammenti
# senza path completo, rimuoviamo anche i token chiave)
trae_leak_tokens = re.compile(
r"\b(?:workspaceStorage|long-text|\.trae-server|\.trae|ckg_server|ai-agent)\b[^\s()'\"`,.]{0,80}",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = trae_leak_tokens.sub("", text)
# (3d) Safety: qualsiasi token lungo > 80 chars che contenga BOTH (/) e (\)
# o più di 5 slash/backslash ravvicinati → 100% path leak → rimuovi
mixed_path_pattern = re.compile(
r"(?=\S{0,200})"
r"(?=\S*(?:[/\\].*){5,})"
r"(?:\S{10,})",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
def _mixed_safe(m):
s = m.group(0)
has_slash = "/" in s
has_back = "\\" in s
if (has_slash and has_back) or s.count("/") + s.count("\\") >= 6:
return ""
return s
text = mixed_path_pattern.sub(_mixed_safe, text)
# ================================================================
# BLOCCO 4: SANITIZZAZIONE FRAGMENT-BASED APIPILOT CALL (anti-TTS leak)
# Quando il pipeline upstream (start_pipeline_rag / Qwen3-TTS)
# normalizza il marker RIMUOVENDO <<< >>>, il TTS pronuncia letteralmente:
# "APIPILOT CALL name get_user_briefing arguments phone +56912345678"
# Questi pattern NON sono più catturati dai marker <<<...>>> del Blocco 2.
# Quindi catturiamo FRAMMENTI con regole di contesto, 5 tier fallback.
# ================================================================
# Tier 1 - Forma normalizzata completa (senza graffe):
# APIPILOT CALL name <toolname> arguments <qualsiasi cosa fino a end-frases>
call_normalized_full = re.compile(
r"(?:^|\s+|\(|[,.;:!?\"\'])\s*"
r"(?:"
r"APIPILOT[\s_\-]+CALL\s+(?:marker\s+)?(?:de\s+)?(?:señal\s+)?(?:herramienta\s+)?(?:funci[oó]n\s+)?"
r"|marcador\s+APIPILOT(?:\s+CALL)?\s*"
r"|señal\s+de\s+llamada\s+APIPILOT\s*"
r"|llamada\s+(?:a\s+)?(?:la\s+)?(?:herramienta|funci[oó]n)\s+APIPILOT\s*"
r")"
r"(?:\s*(?:con\s+)?(?:identificador|ID|name|nombre)\s*[:=]?\s*[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+)?"
r"(?:\s*(?:y\s+)?(?:con\s+)?(?:argumentos|ARGUMENTS|params|par[áa]metros)\s*[:=]?\s*(?:\{[^{}]{0,800}\}|[\"'][^\"']{0,200}[\"']|[^\s.!,?;]{3,100}(?:\s*[,:]\s*[^\s.!,?;]{3,100})*\s*)?)?"
r"(?:\s*(?:phone|tel[ée]fono|correo|email)\s*[:=]?\s*[+0-9A-Za-z._@\-]{6,50})?"
r"(?=$|\s+|\)|[,.;:!?\"\'])",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = call_normalized_full.sub(placeholder, text)
# Tier 2 - Forme abbreviate (qualsiasi contesto con token APIPILOT_CALL o APIPILOT + CALL vicini)
apipilot_call_token = re.compile(
r"(?:^|\s|\(|[,.;:!?\"\'])\s*"
r"APIPILOT(?:[\s_\-]+CALL|_CALL|\s+llamada|\s+marker)"
r"(?:[^.!,?;\n]{0,600})?"
r"(?=$|\s|\)|[,.;:!?\"\'])",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = apipilot_call_token.sub(placeholder, text)
# Tier 3 - Singoli token di servizio che non devono MAI comparire soli in
# output assistant (se lo fanno → 99% leak marker normalizzato):
# ARGUMENTS=... o APIPILOT solitario in contesto "call / name / argument"
service_token_context = re.compile(
r"(?:"
r"ARGUMENTS\s*[:=]\s*(?:\{[^{}]{0,800}\}|[^\s,.;!?]{3,100})"
r"|\barguments\s+(?:de\s+)?(?:la\s+)?(?:llamada|herramienta|funci[oó]n)\b[^\n.]{0,200}"
r")",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = service_token_context.sub("", text)
# Tier 4 - Safety catch-all: se dopo i blocchi 1/2/3/4 rimane la
# sequenza "APIPILOT" (non APIClient o simili) in un contesto che ha
# "name", "arguments", "tool", "herramienta", "phone", "+56" o "+44"
# nella stessa frase → rimuoviamo l'intera frase.
def _apipilot_frase(m):
frase = m.group(0)
lowered = frase.lower()
# Se già contiene il placeholder spagnolo di sanitize CALL → Tier1/2/5
# hanno già sostituito il marker. Non cancellare la frase intera
# (altrimenti perdiamo testo naturale "prima/dopo" attorno).
if "voy a consultar tus datos" in lowered:
return frase
ctx_kw = ("name", "argument", "arg", "herramienta", "tool",
"funci", "phone", "tel", "+56", "+44", "marker",
"call", "llamada", "señal", "marcador")
if any(k in lowered for k in ctx_kw) and "apipilot" in lowered:
return ""
return frase
catchall_frase = re.compile(
r"[^.?!;\n]{0,600}APIPILOT[^.?!;\n]{0,600}[.?!;\n]{0,1}",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = catchall_frase.sub(_apipilot_frase, text)
# Tier 5 - Safety ultimo: se rimane "APIPILOT CALL" o "APIPILOT_CALL"
# anche senza contesto → placeholder (non si pronuncia mai)
final_apipilot_leak = re.compile(
r"\bAPIPILOT[\s_\-]+CALL\b|\bAPIPILOT_CALL\b",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
text = final_apipilot_leak.sub(placeholder, text)
# Tier 6 - Phone blacklist safety (placeholder fake e/o phone reale leaks):
# Quando APIPILOT CALL viene catturato ma la parte "phone" e'
# residua, rimuoviamo i numeri di telefono finti/placeholder che
# NON devono mai comparire in TTS (sono interni al motore).
# N.B. Le regex matchano SIA forma compatta (+56912345678) SIA spaziata
# (+56 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8) per tolleranza alla normalizzazione TTS.
fake_phone_pattern = re.compile(
r"("
# Forme COMPATTE (nessuno spazio):
r"\+56912345678"
r"|\+1234567890"
r"|\+447432477433"
r"|56912345678"
r"|1234567890"
r"|447432477433"
# Forme SPAZIATE / CON SEGNI:
r"|\+?\s*56\s*[\s\-()]?9\s*[\s\-()]?1\s*[\s\-()]?2\s*[\s\-()]?3\s*[\s\-()]?4\s*[\s\-()]?5\s*[\s\-()]?6\s*[\s\-()]?7\s*[\s\-()]?8"
r"|\+?\s*1\s*[\s\-()]?2\s*[\s\-()]?3\s*[\s\-()]?4\s*[\s\-()]?5\s*[\s\-()]?6\s*[\s\-()]?7\s*[\s\-()]?8\s*[\s\-()]?9\s*[\s\-()]?0"
r"|\+?\s*44\s*[\s\-()]?7\s*[\s\-()]?4\s*[\s\-()]?3\s*[\s\-()]?2\s*[\s\-()]?4\s*[\s\-()]?7\s*[\s\-()]?7\s*[\s\-()]?4\s*[\s\-()]?3\s*[\s\-()]?3"
# Forme GENERICHE con etichetta (phone/teléfono):
r"|phone\s*[:=]\s*[+()\-\s]*[0-9][+()\-\s0-9]{6,}"
r"|tel(?:éfono|efono)?\s*[:=]\s*[+()\-\s]*[0-9][+()\-\s0-9]{6,}"
r")",
re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Applichiamo lo strip SOLO se nella frase (stessa riga / stessa frase)
# e' presente "APIPILOT", "CALL", "ARGUMENTS", "marker", "herramienta",
# "función", "ejecutar", "llamada", "marcador", "señal"
# OPPURE se c'e' il placeholder spagnolo (Voy a consultar tus datos...)
# perche' vuol dire che abbiamo appena sostituito un marker CALL in
# questa stessa frase, quindi il phone residuo appartiene a quel contesto.
lines = text.splitlines(keepends=True)
_phone_ctx = ("apipilot", "call", "arguments", "marker", "herramienta",
"funcion", "función", "ejecutar", "llamada", "marcador",
"señal", "voy a consultar tus datos")
def _phone_line_safe(line: str) -> str:
lowered = line.lower()
has_ctx = any(c in lowered for c in _phone_ctx)
if has_ctx:
# Remove phone numbers in this line (strip also surrounding space)
return fake_phone_pattern.sub(" ", line)
return line
text = "".join(_phone_line_safe(l) for l in lines)
# Collapse whitespace finale (dopo strip di marker/path si creano buchi)
text = re.sub(r"[ \t]{2,}", " ", text)
text = re.sub(r"\n{3,}", "\n\n", text)
return text.strip()
async def _apipilot_execute_tool(
*,
auth_header: str | None,
demo_session: str | None,
name: str,
arguments: dict | None,
) -> dict:
"""Run a single ApiPilot tool via POST /execute.
Implements the full PRE-CHECK flow (§2.2) BEFORE sending the HTTP
request:
1. Fresh tool discovery (<= TTL cache, force_refresh=True se tool non trovato)
2. requires_auth check: blocco con HTTP 401 se true ma nessun token
3. Strict JSON-Schema validation: filtra params extra, controlla required
Il payload di ritorno è SEMPRE la busta standard `{success, data, error}`
della guida §2.2. In caso di errori PRE-CHECK (network discovery,
requires_auth, validazione arg) la busta ha `success=false` e
`error.{code,message,status_code}` popolati.
"""
name_clean = (name or "").strip() if isinstance(name, str) else ""
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=EXECUTE_ENTRYPOINT name=%r argsKeys=%s authHead=%.20s demo=%.20s", name_clean, sorted(list((arguments or {}).keys())) if isinstance(arguments, dict) else [], str(auth_header or "")[:20], str(demo_session or "")[:20])
if not S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL:
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "APIPILOT_NOT_CONFIGURED",
"message": "ApiPilot no está configurado en este despliegue (S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL no establecido).",
"status_code": 501,
"raw": None,
},
}
if not name_clean:
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {"code": "TOOL_NAME_REQUIRED", "message": "Falta el campo obligatorio: name (nombre de la herramienta).", "status_code": 400, "raw": None},
}
tools = await _apipilot_fetch_tools(auth_header=auth_header, demo_session=demo_session, force_refresh=False)
tool_def = next((t for t in tools if t.get("name") == name_clean), None)
if tool_def is None:
# Tool sconosciuto: forza refresh discovery e riprova (max 1).
logger.info("[APIPILOT-EXEC] tool=%s non found → forced re-discovery", name_clean)
tools = await _apipilot_fetch_tools(auth_header=auth_header, demo_session=demo_session, force_refresh=True)
tool_def = next((t for t in tools if t.get("name") == name_clean), None)
if tool_def is None:
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "TOOL_NOT_FOUND",
"message": (
f"Herramienta «{name_clean}» no encontrada en el catálogo ApiPilot. "
"Actualice la lista de herramientas y vuelva a intentarlo."
),
"status_code": 404,
"raw": None,
},
}
# ── PRE-CHECK 2: requires_auth ────────────────────────────────────────────
requires_auth = bool(tool_def.get("requires_auth"))
has_token = bool(auth_header) or bool(demo_session) or bool(S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN)
if requires_auth and not has_token:
logger.warning("[APIPILOT-EXEC] tool=%s requires_auth=true bloccato (nessun token)", name_clean)
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "AUTH_REQUIRED",
"message": (
f"La herramienta «{name_clean}» requiere autenticación. "
"Inicie sesión o proporcione un token para continuar."
),
"status_code": 401,
"raw": None,
},
}
# ── PRE-CHECK 3: validazione argomenti strict JSON-Schema ─────────────────
cleaned_args, errors = _apipilot_validate_arguments(arguments, tool_def)
if errors:
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "INVALID_ARGUMENTS",
"message": " / ".join(errors),
"status_code": 400,
"raw": {"removed": sorted(list(set(arguments) - set(cleaned_args))) if isinstance(arguments, dict) else []},
},
}
# ── HTTP: POST /execute ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
url = _apipilot_resolve_execute_url()
if not url:
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "APIPILOT_NOT_CONFIGURED",
"message": "ApiPilot no está configurado en este despliegue (S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL e S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL entrambe vuote).",
"status_code": 501,
"raw": None,
},
}
headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "accept": "application/json,text/plain,*/*"}
# 2026-09-25 SUPER API KEY (PRIORITÀ ASSOLUTA 🔴): bypass autenticazione AquaPortal.
# Tutti e 3 le forme contemporaneamente per max compatibilità:
# - X-API-Key: <key>
# - Authorization: Bearer <key>
# - x-demo-session: <key>
# Qualsiasi altro auth (service token, login_by_phone) viene completamente
# ignorato quando la API KEY è valorizzata.
if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY:
headers["X-API-Key"] = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY}"
headers["x-demo-session"] = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
final_auth = f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY}"
else:
# 2026-09-25 Priorità auth: 1) S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN (override max .env),
# 2) auth_header (Bearer AquaPortal da _login_by_phone, da WS connect DISCOVERY
# o fallback PASS-2 login), 3) nessun auth.
if S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN:
_svc = S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN.strip()
final_auth = (f"Bearer {_svc}" if (not _svc.lower().startswith("bearer ")) else _svc) if _svc else None
else:
final_auth = auth_header if isinstance(auth_header, str) and auth_header.strip() else None
if final_auth:
headers["Authorization"] = final_auth
if demo_session:
headers["x-demo-session"] = demo_session
payload = {"name": name_clean, "arguments": cleaned_args}
removed = sorted(list(set(arguments) - set(cleaned_args))) if isinstance(arguments, dict) else []
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT-EXEC] → POST %s name=%s argsKeys=%s removedKeys=%s auth=%s demo=%s",
url, name_clean, sorted(cleaned_args.keys()), removed,
("APIKEY" if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY else ("Y" if final_auth else "-")),
("APIKEY" if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY else ("Y" if demo_session else "-")),
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=APIPILOT_HTTP_TIMEOUT, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.post(url, json=payload, headers=headers)
except Exception as exc:
logger.error("[APIPILOT-EXEC] ✗ network error: %s", exc)
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {"code": "EXECUTION_ERROR", "message": f"Error de red al ejecutar «{name_clean}»: {exc}", "status_code": 502, "raw": None},
}
# Tentativo di deserializzare come busta standard. Se il backend risponde
# 5xx o body non-JSON, costruisce una envelope errore coerente.
raw_text = resp.text
# 2026-09-25 Diagnostica Dettagliata ALWAYS-ON se http >= 400 (401/403/404/5xx)
# Log: payload request (name + arguments RAW completo demo session NON mascherato
# response http status code, raw response body full (max 2000 chars).
if resp.status_code >= 400:
try:
payload_dump = __import__("json").dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
payload_dump = str(payload)
logger.warning(
"[APIPILOT-EXEC][DIAGNOSTIC 4xx] HTTP=%d url=%s name=%s demoSession=%.60s AUTH=%s requestPAYLOAD=%s |RAW RESPONSE BODY (max 1800 chars)=|%s|",
resp.status_code,
url,
name_clean,
(demo_session if isinstance(demo_session, str) else "?"),
("YES len="+str(len(final_auth)) if isinstance(final_auth, str) and final_auth.strip() else "-"),
payload_dump,
(raw_text or "")[:1800],
)
try:
parsed = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.error("[APIPILOT-EXEC] ✗ non-JSON body HTTP %s: %s", resp.status_code, raw_text[:500])
return {
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "EXECUTION_ERROR",
"message": f"La respuesta de ejecución «{name_clean}» no es JSON válido (HTTP {resp.status_code}).",
"status_code": resp.status_code,
"raw": raw_text[:2000] if raw_text else None,
},
}
# Caso: envelope standard `{success,data,error}` — ritorno as-is.
if isinstance(parsed, dict) and "success" in parsed and isinstance(parsed.get("success"), bool):
envelope_ok = parsed["success"] and parsed.get("error") in (None, {})
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT-EXEC] ← %s name=%s success=%s http=%s dataKeys=%s",
"OK" if envelope_ok else "FAIL", name_clean, bool(parsed.get("success")), resp.status_code,
sorted(list(parsed.get("data").keys())) if isinstance(parsed.get("data"), dict) else "-",
)
if (not envelope_ok) and isinstance(parsed.get("error"), dict):
err = parsed["error"]
logger.warning(
"[APIPILOT-EXEC] ERROR: code=%s status=%s msg=%s",
err.get("code"), err.get("status_code"),
(str(err.get("message"))[:200] if err.get("message") is not None else "-"),
)
return parsed
# Caso: backend ha restituito data pura (senza envelope). Wrappa come
# success=true (§2.2 della guida: envelope obbligatorio — se non lo
# rispetta noi normalizziamo lato proxy per stabilità downstream).
logger.warning("[APIPILOT-EXEC] backend non ha restituito envelope standard → wrap manuale http=%s", resp.status_code)
return {
"success": 200 <= resp.status_code < 300,
"data": parsed if (200 <= resp.status_code < 300) else None,
"error": None if (200 <= resp.status_code < 300) else {
"code": "EXECUTION_ERROR",
"message": (
f"Ejecución «{name_clean}» devolvió HTTP {resp.status_code} sin envelope estándar."
),
"status_code": resp.status_code,
"raw": (raw_text[:2000] if raw_text else None),
},
}
# Node-RED reasoning engine endpoint (modalità NODE_RED).
# Es.: http://localhost:1881 oppure http://s2s-reasoning:1880 (rete docker)
NODE_RED_REASONING_URL = os.environ.get("S2S_REASONING_NODE_RED_URL", "").strip().rstrip("/")
# Speech-to-speech load balancer URL. When set, the browser POSTs /api/session
# (which proxies <lb>/session here, server-side) and connects to the URL the LB
# returns (the original flow). The LB address itself is never sent to the browser.
# When empty, the user may instead set a direct s2s server URL in Settings and the
# browser connects to it straight (no load balancer).
LOAD_BALANCER_URL = os.environ.get("LOAD_BALANCER_URL", "").strip()
# Direct s2s server URL pinned by the deploy. Takes priority over the load
# balancer: when set, ALL LB logic is disabled (no /api/session proxy, no queue,
# no limiter, no sign-in) and the browser connects to this URL directly. Unlike
# the LB address it is NOT a secret — /api/config sends it to the client, which
# shows it read-only in Settings.
SPEECH_TO_SPEECH_URL = os.environ.get("SPEECH_TO_SPEECH_URL", "").strip()
# Optional same-origin WebSocket relay target. When set, the browser dials this
# app over ws(s)://<this-app>/v1/realtime and the server relays frames to the
# upstream speech-to-speech endpoint, keeping the internal host private.
S2S_PROXY_TARGET = os.environ.get("S2S_PROXY_TARGET", "").strip()
if SPEECH_TO_SPEECH_URL or S2S_PROXY_TARGET:
LOAD_BALANCER_URL = ""
# HF injects SPACE_ID ("owner/space") into every Space runtime; it's absent
# locally and on a plain `docker run`. We meter conversation time ONLY on the
# deployed Space — i.e. when BOTH the LB is configured AND we're on a Space.
# Off-Space (local dev, even with the LB exported) the app still proxies the LB,
# but nothing is metered: no budget, no reservations, no sign-in gating.
SPACE_ID = os.environ.get("SPACE_ID", "").strip()
LIMITER_ENABLED = bool(LOAD_BALANCER_URL) and bool(SPACE_ID)
SERPER_URL = "https://google.serper.dev/search"
# Cap results so the tool output stays small enough to feed back to the model.
MAX_RESULTS = 5
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
app = FastAPI(title="s2s-demo")
# Wire HF OAuth before the app serves (no-op unless the OAuth env is present).
# Sign-in only matters when we're metering (prod Space), so gate it on that.
AUTH_ENABLED = LIMITER_ENABLED and auth.attach(app)
# Calcolo dell'URL execute risolto (serve per STARTUP banner e _apipilot_resolve_execute_url).
# Nota: la funzione formale _apipilot_resolve_execute_url è definita più avanti (dopo
# _apipilot_parse_authorization) e usa la stessa identica logica; la ripetiamo qui
# perché il banner STARTUP viene stampato PRIMA della funzione.
def _resolve_exec_url_for_startup_banner():
base = (S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL or S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL).strip().rstrip("/")
if not base:
return ""
if base.lower().endswith("/execute"):
return base
return f"{base}/execute"
_STARTUP_APIPILOT_EXEC_URL = _resolve_exec_url_for_startup_banner()
del _resolve_exec_url_for_startup_banner
logger.info(
"[STARTUP] Other externals — reasoning=%s nodeRed=%s serper=%s lb=%s s2sProxy=%s s2sDirect=%s userAuth=%s reportsApi=%s injectReports=%s reportsHintMax=%d reportsInjectMode=%s injectToday=%s summaryApi=%s summaryText=%s loginApi=%s injectProfile=%s debugPrompt=%s startSessionMode=%s theme=%s auth=%s apipilotToolsUrl=%s apipilotExecuteUrlOverride=%s apipilotServiceToken=%s apipilotTtl=%ds apipilotTimeout=%.1fs apipilotReasoningPass2=%s apipilotApiKeyBypass=%s",
S2S_REASONING_TYPE,
NODE_RED_REASONING_URL or "-",
bool(SERPER_KEY),
bool(LOAD_BALANCER_URL),
bool(S2S_PROXY_TARGET),
bool(SPEECH_TO_SPEECH_URL),
bool(VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL),
bool(S2S_REPORT_LIST),
S2S_INJECT_REPORTS,
S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX,
S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE,
S2S_INJECT_TODAY,
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY),
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT),
bool(S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE),
S2S_INJECT_PROFILE,
S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT,
S2S_START_SESSION_MODE or "-",
S2S_THEME or "-",
AUTH_ENABLED,
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL or "-",
(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL + f"(risolto:{_STARTUP_APIPILOT_EXEC_URL})") if S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL else "-",
"Y" if bool(S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN) else "-",
APIPILOT_CACHE_TTL_SEC,
APIPILOT_HTTP_TIMEOUT,
"Y" if (bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL) or bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL)) else "-",
("YES head=" + (S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY[:6] + "..." if len(S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY) > 6 else S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY) + " (3 FORME!)") if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY else "-",
)
del _STARTUP_APIPILOT_EXEC_URL
logger.debug(
"[STARTUP] Runtime config — SPACE_ID=%s LIMITER_ENABLED=%s MAX_RESULTS=%d",
bool(SPACE_ID), LIMITER_ENABLED, MAX_RESULTS,
)
async def _report_server_debug(hypothesis_id: str, location: str, msg: str, data: dict | None = None) -> None:
return
def _realtime_event_summary(raw: str) -> dict | None:
try:
payload = json.loads(raw)
except Exception:
return None
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return None
event_type = payload.get("type")
if not isinstance(event_type, str):
return None
summary = {"type": event_type}
if event_type == "session.update":
session = payload.get("session") if isinstance(payload.get("session"), dict) else {}
tools = session.get("tools") if isinstance(session.get("tools"), list) else []
summary["toolCount"] = len(tools)
summary["toolNames"] = [tool.get("name") for tool in tools if isinstance(tool, dict)]
summary["toolChoice"] = session.get("tool_choice")
summary["instructionLength"] = len(session.get("instructions") or "")
elif event_type in {"response.function_call_arguments.done", "error", "session.updated"}:
for key in ("name", "call_id", "code", "message", "response_id"):
if key in payload:
summary[key] = payload.get(key)
# --- INPUT (user speech → STT transcript) ---
# Can arrive from upstream (server-side STT) — match either direction.
elif event_type == "conversation.item.input_audio_transcription.completed":
summary["transcript"] = payload.get("transcript", "")
summary["item_id"] = payload.get("item_id")
elif event_type == "conversation.item.created":
item = payload.get("item") if isinstance(payload.get("item"), dict) else None
if isinstance(item, dict):
summary["item_id"] = item.get("id")
summary["role"] = item.get("role")
summary["item_type"] = item.get("type")
summary["status"] = item.get("status")
content_parts = []
for c in (item.get("content") or []):
if isinstance(c, dict):
if c.get("type") in {"input_text", "text"} and isinstance(c.get("text"), str):
content_parts.append(c["text"])
elif c.get("type") == "transcript" and isinstance(c.get("transcript"), str):
content_parts.append(c["transcript"])
if content_parts:
summary["text"] = " ".join(content_parts)
# --- OUTPUT (agent text/speech generation) ---
elif event_type == "response.output_item.done":
item = payload.get("item") if isinstance(payload.get("item"), dict) else None
if isinstance(item, dict):
summary["item_id"] = item.get("id")
summary["role"] = item.get("role")
summary["status"] = item.get("status")
content_parts = []
for c in (item.get("content") or []):
if isinstance(c, dict):
if c.get("type") == "text" and isinstance(c.get("text"), str) and c["text"]:
content_parts.append(c["text"])
elif c.get("type") == "audio" and isinstance(c.get("transcript"), str) and c["transcript"]:
content_parts.append(c["transcript"])
if content_parts:
summary["text"] = " ".join(content_parts)
elif event_type == "response.content_part.done":
part = payload.get("part") if isinstance(payload.get("part"), dict) else None
if isinstance(part, dict):
summary["response_id"] = payload.get("response_id")
summary["item_id"] = payload.get("item_id")
summary["output_index"] = payload.get("output_index")
summary["content_index"] = payload.get("content_index")
if part.get("type") == "text":
summary["text"] = part.get("text", "")
elif part.get("type") == "audio":
if isinstance(part.get("transcript"), str) and part["transcript"]:
summary["text"] = part["transcript"]
# Variante standard OpenAI:
elif event_type == "response.audio_transcript.done":
summary["response_id"] = payload.get("response_id")
summary["item_id"] = payload.get("item_id")
summary["text"] = payload.get("transcript", "")
# Variante upstream custom (osservato nel log dell'utente):
elif event_type == "response.output_audio_transcript.done":
summary["response_id"] = payload.get("response_id")
summary["item_id"] = payload.get("item_id")
summary["output_index"] = payload.get("output_index")
# Try field names in order of likelihood
text = ""
for key in ("transcript", "text", "output_text", "audio_text",
"output_transcript", "final_transcript", "output_audio_text",
"content", "message", "utterance"):
v = payload.get(key)
if isinstance(v, str) and v.strip():
text = v.strip()
break
# Se text ancora vuoto, cerca all'interno di eventuali sotto-oggetti noti
if not text:
for container in ("item", "part", "content", "output", "delta", "audio"):
sub = payload.get(container)
if isinstance(sub, dict):
for key in ("transcript", "text", "output_text"):
v = sub.get(key)
if isinstance(v, str) and v.strip():
text = v.strip()
break
if text:
break
if not text:
# Ultima risorsa: content[] array
arr = payload.get("content")
if isinstance(arr, list):
parts = []
for c in arr:
if isinstance(c, dict):
for key in ("transcript", "text"):
v = c.get(key)
if isinstance(v, str) and v.strip():
parts.append(v.strip())
if parts:
text = " ".join(parts)
summary["text"] = text
# Se non abbiamo ancora trovato testo, salva un'anteprima del raw
# per capire dove lo sta emettendo l'upstream custom.
if not text:
preview = raw[:800]
try:
pretty = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=True)[:800]
except Exception:
pretty = preview
summary["_raw_preview"] = pretty
elif event_type == "response.function_call_arguments.done":
summary["arguments"] = payload.get("arguments")
# Questo evento è il KEY CHECK della Strategia B: se lo vediamo =
# ai-server ha accettato tools[] nativi (native toolcall detected).
_tool_name = payload.get("name") if isinstance(payload.get("name"), str) else ""
_call_id = payload.get("call_id") if isinstance(payload.get("call_id"), str) else ""
_args_json = payload.get("arguments") if isinstance(payload.get("arguments"), str) else "{}"
logger.info(
"[TOOLCALL] ✓ UPSTREAM ha emesso response.function_call_arguments.done! "
"tool=%s callId=%s argsLen=%d argsPreview=%s",
_tool_name or "(empty)",
_call_id or "-",
len(_args_json),
_args_json[:200],
)
try:
_args_parsed = json.loads(_args_json or "{}")
logger.info(
"[TOOLCALL] ✓ Tool call parsed argsKeys=%s",
sorted(_args_parsed.keys()) if isinstance(_args_parsed, dict) else "N/A",
)
except Exception:
pass
return summary
# Eventi realtime ad alta frequenza da silenziare nel log dettagliato (rumore).
# Essi vengono comunque tracciati dal report_server_debug interno se abilitato.
_NOISY_REALTIME_EVENT_TYPES = frozenset({
"response.output_audio.delta",
"response.audio.delta",
"conversation.item.input_audio_transcription.delta",
"response.text.delta",
"response.output_text.delta",
"rate_limits.updated",
})
# Eventi realtime silenziati anche quando arrivano dal lato cliente (input_audio_buffer.append ecc.).
_NOISY_CLIENT_EVENT_TYPES = frozenset({
"input_audio_buffer.append",
"input_audio_buffer.commit",
"input_audio_buffer.clear",
"input_audio_buffer.speech_started",
"input_audio_buffer.speech_stopped",
})
@app.on_event("startup")
async def _startup():
"""Stand up the usage DB and a periodic sweeper — metered (prod Space) only."""
if not LIMITER_ENABLED:
return
limiter.init()
asyncio.create_task(_sweeper())
async def _sweeper():
while True:
await asyncio.sleep(limiter.REAP_AFTER_SEC)
try:
await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.sweep)
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover - defensive
logger.warning("usage sweep failed: %r", exc)
class SearchRequest(BaseModel):
query: str
# Optional user-supplied key (fallback when the deploy has no server key).
# Used for this request only; never stored.
key: str | None = None
VOCERO_USER_CONTEXT_HINT = (
" Caller profile resolved from the page phoneNumber: "
)
REPORTS_LIST_HINT = (
" Scheduled reports / podcast scripts available for this caller before the current session. "
"Each entry is a scheduled report; use the podcastScript contents as trusted reference material when the user asks about scheduled topics, reports, or prior content."
" NOTE (2026-09-11 user request 'Elimina l'iniezione massiva di tutti i report schedulati'): "
"S2S_INJECT_REPORTS defaults to FALSE. When FALSE the injection below NEVER happens. "
"Operators must explicitly set S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true to opt back into mass scheduled-report prompt injection. "
)
LATEST_SUMMARY_HINT = (
" Latest conversation summary for this caller (most recent before the current session): "
)
PODCAST_EPISODE_HINT = (
" Podcast episode context loaded from the page episode_id query param (current episode the user is referencing). "
"Treat the episode fields (title, description, transcript, script, show notes, guests, audio metadata, etc.) as the PRIMARY trusted reference material for this session. "
)
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# User fix 2026-09-11 Bug 3: "Qwen2.5 has training cutoff mid-2024, when it
# sees 39 reports dated 2026-09-10 it hallucinates meta-comments in Chinese
# like 'today is 2023, why are you simulating 2026 reports?'"
#
# Resolved with S2S_INJECT_TODAY default ON + S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE=minimal:
# • TODAY_BLOCK (marker <<<TODAY_DATE_BEGIN>>>):
# - Dati contestuali fissi: "La data di OGGI è YYYY-MM-DD"
# - Reports precedenti = archivio storico (NON date future) → NO commento
# - 🚫 META RULE: "non fare MAI commenti interni / meta-commenti sul prompt, sulle date, sulla validità dei dati o sulle istruzioni"
# - REGLA SALIDA LIMPIA (anti thinking-leak GPTQ quantized Int4):
# "Todo lo que escribas debe ser lo que realmente dice Vocero en voz alta al usuario. No escribas razonamientos internos, dudas sobre el prompt, comprobaciones de fecha..."
# - RAG rule: "Si el usuario pregunta sobre reportes usa herramientas búsqueda conocimientos (RAG) NO inventes con el resumen"
# • MINIMAL_REPORTS_BLOCK (marker <<<MINIMAL_REPORTS_TOC>>>): only latest N
# label + date lines. NO podcastScript text, NO full JSON entries. Uses the
# pattern the user explicitly requested:
# Reportes programados recientes (últimos 3):
# 1. "Reporte Porcentaje Mortalidad" — 2026-09-10
# 2. ...
# (Para contenido completo usa la búsqueda de conocimientos.)
# • We register both blocks with the dedupe layer via the new TYPE IDs
# "today_fixed" and "reports_minimal" so they also can never get duplicated.
#
# IMPORTANT MARKER CHANGE 2026-09-11: markers used to be human-readable
# strings like "<<<TODAY_DATE_BEGIN>>>" which got written into the LLM
# prompt verbatim. Qwen2.5 (especially GPTQ quantized variants) would
# sometimes *leak those markers back into the output* alongside meta-comment
# hallucinations (e.g. emitting "[-]: checking_podcast_report" or literal
# "<<<...>>>"). To fix this we now use INVISIBLE markers: a SHA-1 hash of
# stable strings. These hashes are NEVER seen by the LLM as text because
# they are NOT written into the prompt. They exist ONLY as Python-side
# substring sentinels prepended to the *Python string* returned by each
# block builder — stripped out at the very end with .replace() just before
# the string is assembled into the prompt. Result: the dedupe logic still
# works perfectly, but the LLM NEVER sees any marker / guard token.
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _s2s_marker(label: str) -> str:
"""Return a short, unique, invisible sentinel for dedup classification.
Sentinel is 40 hex chars (SHA1) of a stable string; it is NEVER written
into the prompt — we strip all markers at the end of each builder.
"""
import hashlib
return hashlib.sha1(f"S2S-ctx-marker/{label}/v1".encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
TODAY_BLOCK_MARKER = _s2s_marker("today_fixed_block")
MINIMAL_REPORTS_MARKER = _s2s_marker("reports_minimal_toc")
VOICE_RULES_HEAD_MARKER = _s2s_marker("voice_rules_head_lock")
REPORTS_FULL_MARKER = _s2s_marker("reports_full_block")
SUMMARY_FULL_MARKER = _s2s_marker("summary_full_block")
PROFILE_FULL_MARKER = _s2s_marker("profile_full_block")
EPISODE_FULL_MARKER = _s2s_marker("episode_full_block")
ALL_S2S_INTERNAL_MARKERS: tuple = (
TODAY_BLOCK_MARKER,
MINIMAL_REPORTS_MARKER,
VOICE_RULES_HEAD_MARKER,
REPORTS_FULL_MARKER,
SUMMARY_FULL_MARKER,
PROFILE_FULL_MARKER,
EPISODE_FULL_MARKER,
)
def _strip_internal_markers(text) -> str:
"""Strip every internal S2S dedup marker from the final prompt text.
Must be called right before a block is joined to the final instructions /
user_context so the LLM NEVER sees any of our sentinel strings. This is
the final guarantee that prevents marker leakage into spoken output.
"""
s = str(text or "")
if not s:
return s
for m in ALL_S2S_INTERNAL_MARKERS:
if m and m in s:
s = s.replace(m, "")
return s.strip()
def _extract_user_name_parts(profile) -> list[str]:
"""Given a profile dict (possibly wrapped in {"user": ...} or {"result": ...})
return the list of non-empty first/last name parts in order (e.g.
["Alessandro", "Valenti"]). Returns [] when profile has no name.
Used by:
• _build_voice_rules_head_lock_block — prompt rule #5 "Nombre exacto"
• _resolve_user_context_text — profile NOTA dynamic anti-anglicization
• _sanitize_agent_output — strato 7 terminal regex whole-word replace
"""
if not profile or not isinstance(profile, dict):
return []
# Unwrap common container keys (server returns both shapes depending on
# the auth source path — direct /phone/ endpoint vs login proxy wrapper).
nested = profile
for wrapper in ("user", "result", "data"):
inner = nested.get(wrapper)
if isinstance(inner, dict):
nested = inner
# Prefer explicit firstName+lastName when available (structured fields)
first = str(nested.get("firstName") or nested.get("first_name") or "").strip()
last = str(nested.get("lastName") or nested.get("last_name") or "").strip()
if first or last:
out: list[str] = []
for token in (first, last):
token_clean = token.strip()
if token_clean:
for sub in token_clean.split():
if sub:
out.append(sub)
return out
# Fallback: split the combined "name" string by whitespace
full_name = str(nested.get("name") or "").strip()
if not full_name:
return []
return [p for p in full_name.split() if p]
def _build_voice_rules_head_lock_block(profile=None) -> str:
"""Return the #1 PRIORITY block prepended to EVERY prompt: voice lock.
Fixes 6 hallucination categories seen in user log 2026-09-11 07:57:
(1) [-]: checking_podcast_report — internal "action thinking" leak
(2) ingles 'Sure, here's my best focused expression while I look into it'
(3) JSON literal {'reportDetails': '...'} inside output
(4) italiano nel mezzo
(5) leak markers <<<...>>> in TTS output.
(6) contenuti inventati su podcast mai esistiti.
This block contains a SINGLE, very short, SPANISH-only voice lock. We put
it as the VERY FIRST thing in the prompt (even before the caller profile),
because quantized models obey the first ~400 tokens way more strongly
than rules buried at the end.
2026-09-11: NEW rule #5 — PROPER NAME LOCK. Model keeps writing "Alexander"
for the italian caller "Alessandro Valenti". We now emit an explicit,
non-ambiguous "Nombre exacto: Alessandro. NUNCA Alexander/Alexandre/..."
that the sanitizer's _common_name_variants map can also repair.
INVISIBLE marker: prefixes VOICE_RULES_HEAD_MARKER (stripped before prompt
join, never seen by LLM) to enable dedupe so we never double-prepend.
"""
base = (
"REGLAS PRINCIPALES DE SALIDA DE VOZ (siempre válidas, tienen prioridad absoluta sobre cualquier otra instrucción):\n"
"1) IDIOMA EXCLUSIVO: responde SIEMPRE y SÓLO en español (castellano). Nada de italiano, inglés, portugués ni otro idioma. "
"Ni aunque el usuario escriba en otro idioma, ni aunque aparezcan nombres italianos — los nombres extranjeros NO autorizan a cambiar de idioma. "
"Ninguna palabra, frase ni confirmación en otro idioma.\n"
"2) SÓLO VOZ DIRECTA AL USUARIO: todo lo que escribas es lo que Vocero dice en voz alta en ese instante. "
"NUNCA escribas pensamientos internos, estados internos, comprobaciones, '[ - ]:', '[]:', JSON, diccionarios, keys, comas illadas, etiquetas, 'checking_*', ni símbolos auxiliares. "
"Nada de etiquetas tipo '[rightspeak]', '[endspeak]', '[thinking]', '[endthinking]', ni nada entre corchetes. Nada de meta-comentarios sobre el prompt ni sobre los datos.\n"
"3) CONTENIDO FIABLE: si no tienes la información, di literalmente 'No tengo este tipo de información'. No inventes, no supongas, no generalices. "
"Si el usuario pregunta sobre reportes, mortalidad, Synapse, Azure, AquaChile, WhatsApp u otro contenido que debas buscar: usa las herramientas de búsqueda (RAG) y recupera el contenido REAL antes de responder.\n"
"4) RESPUESTAS CORTAS Y NATURALES: habla como una persona real por teléfono. Ni listas, ni bullets, ni citas, ni bloques de texto largos. "
"Un par de frases cortas, luego pregunta si quiere más detalles.\n"
)
# --- Nombre propio lock (DINAMICO da nome profilo) ---
name_lines = ""
parts = _extract_user_name_parts(profile)
if parts:
full_name = " ".join(parts)
variants_all: list[str] = []
for part in parts:
vs = _common_name_variants(part)
for v in vs:
if v not in variants_all and v != part:
variants_all.append(v)
cleaned_variants = variants_all[:8]
if cleaned_variants:
name_lines = (
"5) NOMBRE PROPIO (regla innegociable para esta sesión): "
f"el nombre exacto del usuario ESCRITO Y PRONUNCIADO TAL CUAL es: {full_name}. "
f"NUNCA lo adaptes, traduzcas ni normalices: "
+ ", ".join(f'NUNCA "{v}"' for v in cleaned_variants)
+ ". Sólo escribe y pronuncia el nombre exacto del perfil.\n"
)
body = base + name_lines
return VOICE_RULES_HEAD_MARKER + "\n" + body
def _build_today_fixed_context_block(
today_override=None,
) -> str:
"""Return the TODAY + anti-hallucination guard block.
2026-09-11 rewrite:
• NOW 100% SPANISH (no italiano). Root of the language leak: the earlier
block had italian 'Dati contestuali fissi...' which told Qwen that
mixing italian+spanish was OK inside the spanish voice assistant.
• Only 3 bullet sentences, nothing fancy, nothing that triggers meta.
• Invisible dedup marker TODAY_BLOCK_MARKER is prefixed and will be
stripped before prompt join → LLM never sees.
"""
if not S2S_INJECT_TODAY:
return ""
today = today_override if today_override is not None else _dt_module.date.today()
iso_date = today.strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
es_weekday = [
"lunes","martes","miércoles","jueves","viernes","sábado","domingo",
][today.weekday()]
body = (
f"Fecha de hoy (referencia innegociable): {iso_date} ({es_weekday}).\n"
f"Los reportes con fechas ANTERIORES a hoy son ARCHIVO HISTÓRICO, NO son fechas futuras. No comentes nada al respecto.\n"
"El punto '.' en números separa decimales; la coma ',' separa miles (formato internacional estándar en este sistema).\n"
)
return TODAY_BLOCK_MARKER + "\n" + body
def _build_minimal_reports_toc_block(
filtered_sorted,
cap=None,
) -> str:
"""Return the user-requested MINIMAL scheduled-reports TOC block (NO script).
2026-09-11 rewrite:
• Marker <<<...>>> removed because it was leaking into output. Now the
invisible internal sentinel MINIMAL_REPORTS_MARKER (stripped before
joining) is used for dedupe classification.
• Footer is now the strict RAG rule, not a soft note.
"""
items = list(filtered_sorted or [])
if cap is None:
cap = max(1, int(S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX or 3))
if len(items) > cap:
items = items[:cap]
if not items:
return ""
lines: list[str] = []
lines.append(
f"Reportes programados recientes (últimos {len(items)}):"
)
for idx, r in enumerate(items, start=1):
label = (str(r.get("sourceScheduleLabel") or "").strip()
or "(sin título)")
raw_d = r.get("date")
date_str = ""
try:
if isinstance(raw_d, (int, float)) and not isinstance(raw_d, bool):
ts_sec = float(raw_d)
if ts_sec > 1e12:
ts_sec = ts_sec / 1000.0
dt = _dt_module.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts_sec, tz=_dt_module.timezone.utc)
date_str = dt.strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
elif raw_d is not None:
s = str(raw_d).strip()
if "T" in s and len(s) >= 10:
date_str = s[:10]
else:
date_str = s
except Exception:
date_str = str(raw_d)[:10] if raw_d else ""
if date_str:
lines.append(f' {idx}. "{label}" — {date_str}')
else:
lines.append(f' {idx}. "{label}"')
lines.append(
"Para el contenido completo de cualquier reporte usa SIEMPRE las herramientas de búsqueda (RAG). No inventes detalles que no hayas recuperado."
)
return MINIMAL_REPORTS_MARKER + "\n" + "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# User fix 2026-09-11 "Rimuovi il profilo chiamante DUPLICATO".
# Each context block returned by the _resolve_* helpers above starts with a
# unique, stable, documented HINT prefix (see VOCERO_USER_CONTEXT_HINT /
# PODCAST_EPISODE_HINT / REPORTS_LIST_HINT / LATEST_SUMMARY_HINT). We use
# these prefixes as logical "block type IDs" so a single context type is
# NEVER appended twice to the same prompt / session.instructions / user_context
# — even if two different call paths (phoneNumber fetch + identity /
# client-side supplied user_context + server-side fetch) both carry the same
# block type.
#
# Historical duplicate reported by the user:
# Caller profile resolved from the page phoneNumber: {name:"Alessandro.."}
# Caller profile resolved from the page phoneNumber: {name:"Alessandro.."}
# ↑ IDENTICAL SECOND COPY ↑
# The most likely cause is a client-side reasoning / profile fetch supplying
# the profile as part of `req.user_context` (or two overlapping server
# injection channels) while the server re-fetches it again for the
# instructions augment. Instead of trying to hunt every single call site, we
# add TWO dedupe layers below that are immune to future regressions:
#
# 1) _dedup_context_blocks_by_type([A, B, C, ...]) — given a list of
# candidate context strings, returns a new list where only the FIRST
# occurrence of each logical block TYPE (profile / episode / reports /
# summary) survives. All HINT prefixes are treated as block-type IDs.
# Used inside _augment_instructions_with_profile and the
# effective_user_context join list.
# 2) _strip_already_injected_types_from_base(base_text, [candidates]) —
# before appending new candidates to an existing base prompt string,
# scan the base for each HINT prefix. If a prefix is already present
# somewhere inside base_text, that candidate is DROPPED (skipped).
# Catches the case where session.instructions was ALREADY patched on a
# previous session.update frame, or where the client sent us the
# profile already baked into req.instructions / req.user_context.
#
# Together these two layers guarantee: per prompt / per LLM call, each block
# type appears AT MOST ONCE (zero or one).
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
_CONTEXT_DEDUPE_MARKERS: tuple = (
# (logical_type_id, unique_prefix_marker_in_text)
("voice_rules_head", VOICE_RULES_HEAD_MARKER), # NEW: 2026-09-11 #1 PRIORITY voice-language lock
("episode", PODCAST_EPISODE_HINT.strip()),
("profile", VOCERO_USER_CONTEXT_HINT.strip()),
("reports_full", REPORTS_FULL_MARKER),
("reports", "<<<REPORTS_LIST_BEGIN>>>"), # legacy back-compat marker
("summary", "<<<LATEST_SUMMARY_BEGIN>>>"), # legacy back-compat marker
("summary_full", SUMMARY_FULL_MARKER),
("today_fixed", TODAY_BLOCK_MARKER),
("reports_minimal", MINIMAL_REPORTS_MARKER),
("apipilot_tools_list", APIPILOT_PASS1_LIST_MARKER),
("apipilot_result", APIPILOT_PASS2_RESULT_MARKER),
)
def _classify_context_block(block: str) -> str | None:
"""Return the logical type of block or None for unrecognised text.
Uses the HINT prefixes / block begin markers above. Uses substring
containment (not startswith) because the augmented prompt may carry the
markers after 1-2 leading spaces. Uses the STRIPPED version of each HINT
to avoid missing matches due to leading whitespace.
"""
if not block:
return None
haystack = (block or "").strip()
if not haystack:
return None
for type_id, marker in _CONTEXT_DEDUPE_MARKERS:
if marker and marker in haystack:
return type_id
return None
def _dedup_context_blocks_by_type(candidates: list[str]) -> list[str]:
"""Keep only the FIRST occurrence of each logical block TYPE in order.
Drops duplicated block types silently and logs + returns a new list with
only the surviving blocks. Also drops empty / whitespace-only candidates
which would otherwise be a no-op append. This is layer 1 of the dedupe.
"""
if not candidates:
return []
seen_types: set[str] = set()
out: list[str] = []
dropped_types: dict[str, int] = {}
for candidate in candidates:
c = (candidate or "").strip()
if not c:
continue
type_id = _classify_context_block(c)
if type_id is None:
# Unknown type (free-form text, plain user_context, ...) is NEVER
# deduped — we only dedupe the 4 well-known S2S injected block
# types so user-supplied arbitrary context is always preserved.
out.append(candidate)
continue
if type_id in seen_types:
dropped_types[type_id] = dropped_types.get(type_id, 0) + 1
continue
seen_types.add(type_id)
out.append(candidate)
if dropped_types and S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
# Log only when dedupe actually fired (avoids spamming). Use level
# DEBUG / info level so the admin can see "profile duplicate was
# dropped" when troubleshooting prompt size issues.
logger.info(
"[INJECT-DEDUPE] dropped duplicate injected block types=%s kept=%d candidates=%d",
", ".join(f"{k}x{v}" for k, v in dropped_types.items()),
len(out),
len(candidates),
)
return out
def _strip_already_injected_types_from_base(
base_text: str, candidates: list[str]
) -> list[str]:
"""Layer 2: for each candidate, check if its HINT prefix ALREADY appears
anywhere inside base_text (i.e. was injected by a previous patch / baked
into the instructions sent by the browser). If yes, drop that candidate
entirely (keep only candidates whose types are NOT already present in
base). Works even when base_text contains the profile twice — after this
filter we won't add a third copy; layer 1 handles any further duplicates
among the candidates themselves."""
b = (base_text or "")
if not b:
return list(candidates)
out: list[str] = []
dropped_base: list[str] = []
for candidate in candidates:
c = (candidate or "").strip()
if not c:
continue
type_id = _classify_context_block(c)
if type_id is None:
# Unknown context blocks → never dedupe, always append.
out.append(candidate)
continue
# Does base already contain ANY marker for this type? Use _ALL_
# markers for this type, not just the single canonical one, in case
# an older deploy used a different stringification (though prefix
# stability is guaranteed by the module-level constants here).
already = False
for marker_tid, marker in _CONTEXT_DEDUPE_MARKERS:
if marker_tid == type_id and marker and marker in b:
already = True
break
if already:
dropped_base.append(type_id)
continue
out.append(candidate)
if dropped_base and S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-DEDUPE] dropped candidate block types already present in base instructions=%s baseLen=%d",
", ".join(dropped_base),
len(b or ""),
)
return out
def _resolve_user_context_text(phone_number, profile_obj, loaded: bool = True) -> str:
"""Given a phone+profile object -> the short context string appended to
LLM system prompt / reasoning user_context when S2S_INJECT_PROFILE is on.
Generic (deploy-agnostic): profile_obj is the JSON returned by
VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL (optionally nested under {"result": ...}).
2026-09-11 anti-language-leak rule: names like "Alessandro Valenti" are
italian/luxemburgish names but our voice assistant is 100% castellano so
we append an EXPLICIT NOTE that the model sees alongside the caller info.
2026-09-11 anti-anglicization rule (Alexander → Alessandro): when the
profile contains a known given-name (e.g. Alessandro) we emit a DYNAMIC
list of forbidden anglicizations so the model cannot "normalize" it.
"""
if not loaded or not profile_obj or not phone_number:
return ""
try:
serialized = json.dumps(profile_obj, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception:
serialized = str(profile_obj)
if len(serialized) > 1600:
serialized = serialized[:1600] + "..."
# ─── anti-anglicization dynamic note ─────────────────────────────────
parts = _extract_user_name_parts(profile_obj) or []
forbidden_lines: list[str] = []
for name_part in parts:
variants = _common_name_variants(name_part)
if variants:
# keep the first 6 variants max so the prompt stays tight
short = variants[:6]
quoted = ', '.join('"' + v + '"' for v in short)
forbidden_lines.append(
f"Para el nombre '{name_part}': NUNCA escribas ni pronuncies {quoted} ni versiones similares en inglés/francés/ruso. "
f"Sólo '{name_part}' tal cual está."
)
if forbidden_lines:
nombre_propio_note = (
"NOMBRE PROPIO (regla innegociable para esta sesión): "
+ " ".join(forbidden_lines)
+ " "
)
else:
# fallback to generic example so the rule's existence is still taught
nombre_propio_note = (
"NOMBRE PROPIO: nunca adaptes, traduzcas ni 'normalices' nombres propios "
"(ej. nunca pases 'Alessandro' a 'Alexander'). Escribe y pronuncia sólo el nombre exacto del perfil. "
)
# We build with invisible internal PROFILE_FULL_MARKER so dedup + strip
# works consistently with today/voice_rules_head blocks.
body = (
f"{VOCERO_USER_CONTEXT_HINT}{serialized}. Use this as trusted caller context when relevant. "
"NOTA IMPORTANTE (regla de idioma): aunque el usuario tenga nombre italiano (p. ej. 'Alessandro Valenti') "
"o nombre en cualquier otro idioma, SÓLO debes responderle en ESPAÑOL (castellano). "
"Los nombres extranjeros NO autorizan a cambiar de idioma. "
"Nunca escribas frases, palabras, preguntas ni confirmaciones en italiano, inglés ni ningún otro idioma. "
"Siempre habla como Vocero: voz española directa, sin prefijos, sin JSON, sin meta-comentarios. "
f"{nombre_propio_note}"
)
return PROFILE_FULL_MARKER + "\n" + body
def _resolve_latest_summary_context(summary_value) -> str:
"""Normalize the payload returned by S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY endpoint into a
single context string to be appended next to the profile block.
Accepts plain string / object (dumped JSON) / None. Capped at 1600 chars.
2026-09-11: uses INVISIBLE SUMMARY_FULL_MARKER (never seen by LLM) so the
dedupe layer can still classify it; human <<<...>>> markers removed to
stop leakage into output.
Returns "" when no summary is available.
"""
if summary_value is None:
return ""
if isinstance(summary_value, dict) or isinstance(summary_value, list):
try:
serialized = json.dumps(summary_value, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception:
serialized = str(summary_value)
else:
serialized = str(summary_value)
trimmed = serialized.strip()
if not trimmed:
return ""
if len(trimmed) > 1600:
trimmed = trimmed[:1600] + "..."
body = f"{LATEST_SUMMARY_HINT}\n{trimmed}\n. Use this as trusted history when the user references prior calls."
return SUMMARY_FULL_MARKER + "\n" + body
def _resolve_episode_context(raw_value) -> str:
"""Normalize the podcast episode API response into a prompt block injected
at the TOP of the contexts (most specific / current reference).
Accepts a dict (or {"result": {...}} wrapped) with any arbitrary episode
fields (title, description, transcript, script, showNotes, guests,
publishedAt, audioUrl, duration, author, etc.). Capped at 24000 chars
(episodes can have long transcripts).
2026-09-11: uses INVISIBLE EPISODE_FULL_MARKER so dedupe still classifies
it without leaking <<<...>>> wrappers into TTS.
Returns "" if empty / fetch failed / None.
"""
if raw_value is None:
return ""
if isinstance(raw_value, dict) and len(raw_value) == 1 and isinstance(raw_value.get("result"), (dict, list)):
raw_value = raw_value["result"]
if isinstance(raw_value, dict) or isinstance(raw_value, list):
try:
serialized = json.dumps(raw_value, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception:
serialized = str(raw_value)
else:
serialized = str(raw_value)
trimmed = serialized.strip()
if not trimmed:
return ""
if len(trimmed) > 24000:
trimmed = trimmed[:24000] + "...(episode truncated)"
body = f"{PODCAST_EPISODE_HINT}\n{trimmed}\n. Treat as PRIMARY trusted reference for this session."
return EPISODE_FULL_MARKER + "\n" + body
def _parse_date_key(value) -> tuple:
"""Return a sortable tuple for an arbitrary date-like value.
Sort order is DESC (newest first). Non-dates / empty sort to the end (lowest priority).
Accepts ISO strings ("YYYY-MM-DD", "YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS"), Python datetime objects,
int/float unix timestamps, numbers.
"""
import datetime as _dt
if value is None:
return (1, 0)
if isinstance(value, _dt.datetime):
try:
return (0, -int(value.timestamp()))
except Exception:
return (1, 0)
if isinstance(value, _dt.date):
try:
ts = int(_dt.datetime.combine(value, _dt.time.min).timestamp())
return (0, -ts)
except Exception:
return (1, 0)
if isinstance(value, (int, float)):
try:
return (0, -int(value))
except Exception:
return (1, 0)
if isinstance(value, str):
s = value.strip()
if not s:
return (1, 0)
# Try ISO parse first (handles most formats)
try:
dt = _dt.datetime.fromisoformat(s.replace("Z", "+00:00"))
return (0, -int(dt.timestamp()))
except Exception:
pass
# Fallback: date-only YYYY-MM-DD
try:
dt = _dt.datetime.strptime(s[:10], "%Y-%m-%d")
return (0, -int(dt.timestamp()))
except Exception:
pass
# Last resort: lexicographic sort DESC (newest first still works for ISO-ish)
return (0, tuple(-ord(c) for c in s[:32]))
return (1, 0)
def _resolve_reports_context(raw_value: object) -> str:
"""Normalize / filter the S2S_REPORT_LIST response into a prompt block.
Expects an array/list (or dict {"result": [...]} unwrapped by the fetcher).
For each dict item keeps only fields: sourceScheduleLabel, date, podcastScript.
Also supports nested shape: sourceSchedule.label / sourceSchedule.date.
Sorts by date DESC (newest first) via _parse_date_key. Capped at 12000 chars
(podcastScript can be long). Wrapped with <<<REPORTS_LIST_BEGIN/END>>> markers.
Returns "" if no valid items / empty list.
USER FIX 2026-09-11 "Elimina l'iniezione massiva di tutti i report schedulati":
• If the new env flag S2S_INJECT_REPORTS is FALSE (DEFAULT), this function
ALWAYS returns "" — NO scheduled reports of any kind are ever injected
into the LLM prompt, not even a TOC line with label+date. The function
returns the empty string at the very top before touching the input, so
we also skip JSON processing / sorting / serialization work.
• If S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=TRUE, behaviour is unchanged: full injection of
podcastScript text for every report, just as before.
"""
# ── MASS-INJECTION KILL SWITCH (user request) ────────────────────────
if not S2S_INJECT_REPORTS:
return ""
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if raw_value is None:
return ""
items_list: list
if isinstance(raw_value, list):
items_list = raw_value
elif isinstance(raw_value, dict) and isinstance(raw_value.get("result"), list):
items_list = raw_value["result"]
else:
return ""
# Keep only dict items; for each project ONLY the three required fields (in order).
filtered: list[dict] = []
for item in items_list:
if not isinstance(item, dict):
continue
cleaned: dict = {}
# Field extraction with fallback to nested sourceSchedule.* shape.
# 1. Label: prefer flat sourceScheduleLabel, else nested sourceSchedule.label
label_val: object = None
if item.get("sourceScheduleLabel") is not None:
label_val = item["sourceScheduleLabel"]
elif isinstance(item.get("sourceSchedule"), dict):
ss = item["sourceSchedule"]
if ss.get("label") is not None:
label_val = ss["label"]
if label_val is None and ss.get("name") is not None:
label_val = ss["name"]
if label_val is None and ss.get("title") is not None:
label_val = ss["title"]
if label_val is not None:
cleaned["sourceScheduleLabel"] = label_val
# 2. Date: prefer flat "date", else nested sourceSchedule.date
date_val: object = None
if item.get("date") is not None:
date_val = item["date"]
elif isinstance(item.get("sourceSchedule"), dict):
ss = item["sourceSchedule"]
if ss.get("date") is not None:
date_val = ss["date"]
if date_val is None and ss.get("scheduledAt") is not None:
date_val = ss["scheduledAt"]
if date_val is None and ss.get("publishedAt") is not None:
date_val = ss["publishedAt"]
if date_val is not None:
cleaned["date"] = date_val
# 3. Script: prefer flat podcastScript, else nested podcastScript / script / text
script_val: object = None
if item.get("podcastScript") is not None:
script_val = item["podcastScript"]
elif item.get("script") is not None:
script_val = item["script"]
elif item.get("text") is not None:
script_val = item["text"]
elif item.get("content") is not None:
script_val = item["content"]
if script_val is not None:
cleaned["podcastScript"] = script_val
if cleaned:
filtered.append(cleaned)
if not filtered:
return ""
# Sort by date DESC (newest first)
filtered.sort(key=lambda r: _parse_date_key(r.get("date")))
# USER FIX 2026-09-11 "riduci il quick hint report max 3-5 configurabile da .env":
# after sort by newest → keep ONLY the first S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX reports.
# Applies cap to BOTH the quick-hint TOC lines AND the serialized JSON entries,
# so the final wrapped block stays small and contains no more than N scripts.
total_raw = len(filtered)
cap = max(1, int(S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX or 5))
if total_raw > cap:
filtered = filtered[:cap]
truncated_note = ""
if total_raw > cap:
truncated_note = (
f"\n(Showing the {cap} newest scheduled reports of {total_raw} total "
f"returned upstream; older reports omitted. Set S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX "
f"in .env to raise or lower this window.)\n"
)
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# USER FIX BUG 3 2026-09-11: Qwen2.5 cutoff mid-2024 hallucinates meta on 2026 dates.
# Route output through the new tri-state S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE:
# • "off"/"none" → skip entirely (no reports block in prompt, 0 tokens).
# • "minimal" → ONLY last-N label + date TOC. NO podcastScript text, no JSON entries,
# just the user-requested Reportes programados recientes block.
# ~50 tokens instead of ~3200.
# • "full" → legacy mode with hints + full JSON entries + podcastScript.
# Kept only for explicit opt-in because user explicitly asked
# to eliminate massive script injection.
mode = (S2S_REPORTS_INJECT_MODE or "minimal").lower()
if mode in {"off", "none"}:
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] mode=%s → no scheduled reports injected into prompt (cap=%d totalRaw=%d)",
mode, cap, total_raw,
)
return ""
if mode == "minimal":
minimal_block = _build_minimal_reports_toc_block(filtered, cap=cap)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] mode=minimal blockLen=%d (no podcastScript injected) cap=%d totalRaw=%d",
len(minimal_block), cap, total_raw,
)
return minimal_block
# ───── mode == "full" — legacy behaviour (opt-in only) ───────────────
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] mode=full (LEGACY, podcastScript included) cap=%d totalRaw=%d",
cap, total_raw,
)
# Build a quick HINT LINE per report (label + date) so the LLM can see at a
# glance which scheduled topics are available before diving into scripts.
hint_lines = []
import datetime as _dt
for idx, r in enumerate(filtered, start=1):
label_piece = ""
if r.get("sourceScheduleLabel"):
label_piece = str(r["sourceScheduleLabel"]).strip()
date_piece = ""
if r.get("date") is not None:
raw_d = r["date"]
try:
# Integer / float timestamp → render as YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM (local)
if isinstance(raw_d, (int, float)) and not isinstance(raw_d, bool):
ts_sec = float(raw_d)
if ts_sec > 1e12: # ms → seconds
ts_sec = ts_sec / 1000.0
dt = _dt.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts_sec, tz=_dt.timezone.utc)
date_piece = dt.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC")
else:
s = str(raw_d).strip()
if "T" in s and len(s) >= 16:
date_piece = s.replace("T", " ")[:16]
else:
date_piece = s
except Exception:
date_piece = str(raw_d)[:32]
if label_piece and date_piece:
hint_lines.append(
f" • Report #{idx}: '{label_piece}' — scheduled on {date_piece}"
)
elif label_piece:
hint_lines.append(f" • Report #{idx}: '{label_piece}'")
elif date_piece:
hint_lines.append(f" • Report #{idx}: (no label) — scheduled on {date_piece}")
# Serialize: compact JSON (pretty-ish but one line per report saves space)
entries_lines = []
for idx, r in enumerate(filtered, start=1):
try:
entries_lines.append(f" [{idx}] {json.dumps(r, ensure_ascii=False)}")
except Exception:
entries_lines.append(f" [{idx}] {str(r)[:500]}")
hints_block = ""
if hint_lines:
hints_block = "\n".join(hint_lines) + "\n"
body = truncated_note + hints_block + "\n--- Full JSON entries ---\n" + "\n".join(entries_lines)
wrapped = (
f"{REPORTS_LIST_HINT}\n"
f"Quick hints (available scheduled reports / podcasts by label — cap {cap} newest):\n"
f"{body}\n"
f"<<<REPORTS_LIST_END>>>. Use these scheduled reports as trusted prior "
"content relevant to the caller's company topics. Reference individual "
"reports by their label when answering."
)
# Build wrapped with HINT BLOCK before the JSON. We prepend a summary line per
# report so the LLM has a quick table-of-contents of what's available.
if len(wrapped) > 12000:
# Truncate body preserving markers + hint
budget = (
12000
- len(REPORTS_LIST_HINT)
- len(f"\nQuick hints (available scheduled reports / podcasts by label — cap {cap} newest):\n")
- len("\n--- Full JSON entries ---\n")
- len("\n<<<REPORTS_LIST_END>>>...truncated.")
- 200 # reserve for wrap sentence
)
if budget > 0:
body = body[:budget] + "..."
wrapped = (
f"{REPORTS_LIST_HINT}\n"
f"Quick hints (available scheduled reports / podcasts by label — cap {cap} newest):\n"
f"{body}\n"
f"<<<REPORTS_LIST_END>>>...truncated (cap 12000 chars). Use these "
"scheduled reports as trusted prior content. Reference reports by label when relevant."
)
if total_raw and total_raw > cap and len(truncated_note) and S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] quick-hint+entries cap applied: kept=%d upstreamTotal=%d cap=%d",
len(filtered), total_raw, cap,
)
return wrapped
async def _fetch_reports_list(phone_number: str | None = None, auth_token: str | None = None) -> list | dict | None:
"""Fetch scheduled reports list from S2S_REPORT_LIST.
Completely generic / deploy-agnostic: performs GET ${S2S_REPORT_LIST} and appends
?phoneNumber=<x> if a phone is provided. Accepts JSON (optional {"result": [...]}
wrapper) and returns the list or unwrapped list. On any error logs and returns None
(never fails the proxy / reasoning tunnel).
USER FIX 2026-09-11 "Elimina l'iniezione massiva di tutti i report schedulati":
• If S2S_INJECT_REPORTS is FALSE (DEFAULT) we short-circuit to None at the
very top — NO HTTP call is made to S2S_REPORT_LIST at all. The upstream
endpoint is never hit, not even for a "cheap empty list"; combined with
_resolve_reports_context → "" above, this guarantees ZERO scheduled-report
contents reach any LLM prompt anywhere (WS session instructions patch,
/api/reasoning user_context, NODE_RED instructions augment, quick reports
lookup response).
• S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true restores prior behaviour (both the HTTP fetch AND
the full injection into every prompt path).
"""
# ── MASS-INJECTION KILL SWITCH (user request) ─────────────────────────
if not S2S_INJECT_REPORTS:
return None
# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if not S2S_REPORT_LIST:
return None
from urllib.parse import urlencode
if phone_number:
sep = "&" if "?" in S2S_REPORT_LIST else "?"
target_url = f"{S2S_REPORT_LIST}{sep}{urlencode({'phoneNumber': phone_number})}"
else:
target_url = S2S_REPORT_LIST
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] fetch upstream URL=%s phoneLen=%s bearer=%s",
S2S_REPORT_LIST,
len(phone_number) if phone_number else "none",
"yes" if auth_token else "no",
)
try:
headers = {}
if auth_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {auth_token}"
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.get(target_url, headers=headers or None)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ⛔ upstream HTTP %s response=%.250s",
resp.status_code, resp.text,
)
return None
text = (resp.text or "").strip()
if not text:
logger.info("[INJECT-REPORTS] ⏭️ upstream returned empty body.")
return None
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ⛔ upstream returned non-JSON body len=%d; cannot parse list. response=%.250s",
len(text), text,
)
return None
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ⛔ fetch unreachable error=%r",
exc,
)
return None
# Unwrap {"result": [...]} or other common list-wrapping dict keys
# (e.g. {"data": [...], "reports": [...], "items": [...], "content": [...], "value": [...]}).
unwrapped: object = payload
if isinstance(payload, dict):
# Log full structure for debugging if enabled
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
try:
keys_preview = ",".join(sorted(str(k) for k in payload.keys()))
preview = json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False)
preview = preview[:4000]
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-REPORTS][fetch] upstream response dict keys=[%s] full PREVIEW (len=%d):\n%s\n",
keys_preview, len(preview), preview,
)
except Exception:
pass
# Preferred explicit "result" key first
if "result" in payload and isinstance(payload["result"], list):
unwrapped = payload["result"]
else:
# Scan all common list-wrapper keys (case-insensitive match on the key)
wrapper_keys = {k.lower() for k in (
"data", "reports", "reportList", "report_list", "report",
"items", "itemList", "item_list", "list", "content",
"scheduled", "scheduledReports", "scheduled_reports",
"podcastList", "podcast_list", "podcasts", "entries",
"records", "rows", "pageContent", "page_content", "value",
)}
for k, v in payload.items():
if isinstance(k, str) and isinstance(v, list) and k.lower() in wrapper_keys:
unwrapped = v
break
# Fallback: if it's still a dict with only ONE list-valued key,
# assume that's the list (common pattern like {"data": [...]} with
# unusual key name we don't hardcode).
if not isinstance(unwrapped, list):
list_valued_keys = [
k for k, v in payload.items() if isinstance(v, list) and len(v) > 0
]
if len(list_valued_keys) == 1:
unwrapped = payload[list_valued_keys[0]]
# Validate array shape
if isinstance(unwrapped, list):
n_items = len(unwrapped)
n_dict = sum(1 for x in unwrapped if isinstance(x, dict))
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ✅ reports list loaded OK (list len=%d dictItems=%d)",
n_items, n_dict,
)
return unwrapped
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ⏭️ upstream returned type=%s (not list); nothing to inject.",
type(unwrapped).__name__,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and isinstance(payload, dict):
# Log final top-level keys to help diagnose wrapper shape
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-REPORTS][fetch] wrapper not detected — top-level keys of dict response: [%s] "
"(list values under keys: %s)",
",".join(sorted(str(k) for k in payload.keys())),
",".join(
sorted(str(k) + "=list[" + str(len(v)) + "]" for k, v in payload.items() if isinstance(v, list))
) or "none",
)
return None
def _extract_login_token(login_payload: dict | None) -> str | None:
"""Given the parsed response from the S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE endpoint (already
{"result":…}-unwrapped), try to extract an auth / session token.
Looks under common names (case-insensitive). Returns None if nothing found.
"""
if not login_payload or not isinstance(login_payload, dict):
return None
# Unwrap one level of nesting if result is still an dict: handled by caller already.
candidates = {c.lower() for c in (
"token", "jwt", "access_token", "accessToken", "auth_token",
"authToken", "session_token", "sessionToken", "id_token", "idToken",
"bearer", "bearer_token", "bearerToken", "authentication_token",
)}
for k, v in login_payload.items():
if isinstance(k, str) and k.lower() in candidates and isinstance(v, str) and v.strip():
return v.strip()
# Second pass: nested dict {"data": {"token": …}} or {"auth": {"jwt": …}}
for k, v in login_payload.items():
if isinstance(v, dict):
nested = _extract_login_token(v)
if nested:
return nested
# Third pass: list like [{"token": ...}] (uncommon but safe)
for k, v in login_payload.items():
if isinstance(v, list) and v:
for elem in v:
if isinstance(elem, dict):
nested = _extract_login_token(elem)
if nested:
return nested
return None
async def _login_by_phone(phone_number: str) -> tuple[str | None, dict | None]:
"""Perform login-by-phone: POST S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE with JSON
{"phoneNumber": phone_number}. Returns (bearer_token_or_None, response_obj_or_None).
Never fails: on any HTTP/parse error logs a warning and returns (None, None)
so subsequent profile/summary calls simply proceed without a Bearer token.
"""
if not S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE or not phone_number:
return None, None
body = {"phoneNumber": phone_number}
logger.info(
"[INJECT-LOGIN] POST upstream URL=%s phoneLen=%d",
S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE,
len(phone_number),
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.post(
S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE,
json=body,
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-LOGIN] ⛔ upstream HTTP %s phoneLen=%d response=%.250s",
resp.status_code, len(phone_number), resp.text,
)
return None, None
text = (resp.text or "").strip()
if not text:
logger.info("[INJECT-LOGIN] ⏭️ upstream returned empty body; no login token available.")
return None, None
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-LOGIN] ⛔ upstream returned non-JSON body len=%d; cannot extract token. response=%.250s",
len(text), text,
)
return None, None
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-LOGIN] ⛔ fetch unreachable phoneLen=%d error=%r",
len(phone_number), exc,
)
return None, None
# Unwrap {"result": …} OR {"data": …} if present (common wrapper conventions).
unwrapped: dict | None = None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
for _wrap_key in ("result", "data", "payload"):
if isinstance(payload.get(_wrap_key), dict):
unwrapped = payload[_wrap_key]
break
if unwrapped is None:
unwrapped = payload
token = _extract_login_token(unwrapped) if isinstance(unwrapped, dict) else _extract_login_token(
payload if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
)
# 2026-09-25 Diagnostica SEMPRE-ATTIVA login token (anche senza S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT)
# per verificare token length (JWT > 150 chars), anteprima primi 8 chars.
# Chiavi response + unwrap usato.
_all_keys: list[str] = []
if isinstance(payload, dict):
_all_keys.extend(str(k) for k in payload.keys())
_unwrap_keys: list[str] = []
if isinstance(unwrapped, dict):
_unwrap_keys.extend(str(k) for k in unwrapped.keys())
if isinstance(unwrapped, dict):
_t_preview = ""
_t_len = 0
if isinstance(token, str) and token.strip():
_t_len = len(token.strip())
if _t_len > 8:
_t_preview = token.strip()[:8] + "..."
else:
_t_preview = token.strip()
_fmt_note = ""
if _t_len >= 120:
_fmt_note = " [JWT-like]"
elif _t_len > 0:
_fmt_note = " [SHORT]"
_wrap_layer = "ROOT"
if isinstance(payload, dict):
for _wk in ("result", "data", "payload"):
if isinstance(payload.get(_wk), dict):
_wrap_layer = "result/data/payload"
break
_all_keys_s = ",".join(sorted(_all_keys)) if _all_keys else "-"
_unwrap_keys_s = ",".join(sorted(_unwrap_keys)) if _unwrap_keys else "-"
_t_info = "MISSING"
if _t_len:
_t_info = "YES len=" + str(_t_len) + " head=" + _t_preview
msg = "[INJECT-LOGIN] ✅ login OK: wrapLayer=%s topKeys=%s unwrappedKeys=%s token=%s%s" % (_wrap_layer, _all_keys_s, _unwrap_keys_s, _t_info, _fmt_note)
logger.info("%s", msg)
return token, unwrapped
# Fallback: non-dict payload (string/list/number) — still log it, but no token expected.
logger.info(
"[INJECT-LOGIN] ⏭️ login response parsed but type=%s (not dict); no token extracted.",
type(payload).__name__,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-LOGIN][response] FULL login payload (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(str(payload)), payload,
)
return None, None
async def _fetch_latest_summary_for_phone(phone_number: str, auth_token: str | None = None) -> str | dict | None:
"""Fetch the latest caller summary via S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY URL.
Generic / completely deploy-agnostic: plain GET
S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY?phoneNumber=<phone>; accepts JSON (optional {"result": …}
wrapper) or plain text. Never fails the proxy / reasoning; returns None on
any error and logs it. If `auth_token` is provided it is sent as
Authorization: Bearer <auth_token>.
OVERRIDE (2026-09-23): when S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT is set (non-empty) it
takes absolute priority over S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY. No HTTP call is made at all;
the raw plain-text value is returned directly. Designed for operators who want
a clean, pre-curated, essential summary snippet without any upstream API
dependency. Works even without a phone_number (static snippet).
"""
if S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT:
override_len = len(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT)
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT OVERRIDE active (len=%d chars). Skipping HTTP fetch; injecting raw static plain-text summary directly.",
override_len,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] [DEBUG-PROMPT] S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT raw value (first 800 chars):\n%s",
S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT[:800],
)
return S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT
if not S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY or not phone_number:
return None
from urllib.parse import urlencode
target_url = f"{S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY}?{urlencode({'phoneNumber': phone_number})}"
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] fetch upstream URL=%s phoneLen=%d bearer=%s",
S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY,
len(phone_number),
"yes" if auth_token else "no",
)
try:
headers = {}
if auth_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {auth_token}"
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.get(target_url, headers=headers or None)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ⛔ upstream HTTP %s phoneLen=%d response=%.200s",
resp.status_code, len(phone_number), resp.text,
)
return None
# Accept JSON first, then fall back to plain text (some summary APIs
# return text/plain).
text = (resp.text or "").strip()
if not text:
return ""
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] upstream returned non-JSON response (len=%d); treating as plain string summary.",
len(text),
)
return text
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ⛔ fetch unreachable phoneLen=%d error=%r",
len(phone_number), exc,
)
return None
# Unwrap {"result": …} just like profile fetch (common wrapper pattern).
if isinstance(payload, dict) and "result" in payload:
payload = payload["result"]
# Filter out empty dict/list / empty string after unwrap.
empty = (
payload is None
or (isinstance(payload, str) and not payload.strip())
or (isinstance(payload, dict) and len(payload) == 0)
or (isinstance(payload, list) and len(payload) == 0)
)
if empty:
logger.info("[INJECT-SUMMARY] ⏭️ upstream returned empty summary; nothing to inject.")
return None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ✅ summary loaded OK (object) keys=%s",
",".join(sorted(str(k) for k in payload.keys())),
)
elif isinstance(payload, list):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ✅ summary loaded OK (list) len=%d",
len(payload),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ✅ summary loaded OK (string) len=%d",
len(str(payload)),
)
return payload
async def _fetch_podcast_episode(episode_id: str) -> dict | str | None:
"""Fetch a single podcast episode by ID from the Aquachile AzurianLab API.
Completely generic / deploy-agnostic: plain GET
https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/podcast/episodes/<episode_id>
Accepts JSON (optional {"result": …} wrapper) or plain text. Never fails
the proxy / reasoning; returns None on any error and logs it.
"""
if not episode_id:
return None
target_url = f"https://aquachile.azurianlab.com/api/v1/podcast/episodes/{episode_id}"
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] fetch upstream URL=%s episodeId=%.80s",
target_url,
episode_id,
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.get(target_url)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ⛔ upstream HTTP %s episodeId=%.80s response=%.200s",
resp.status_code, episode_id, resp.text,
)
return None
text = (resp.text or "").strip()
if not text:
return ""
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] upstream returned non-JSON response (len=%d); treating as plain string.",
len(text),
)
return text
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ⛔ fetch unreachable episodeId=%.80s error=%r",
episode_id, exc,
)
return None
if isinstance(payload, dict) and "result" in payload:
payload = payload["result"]
empty = (
payload is None
or (isinstance(payload, str) and not payload.strip())
or (isinstance(payload, dict) and len(payload) == 0)
or (isinstance(payload, list) and len(payload) == 0)
)
if empty:
logger.info("[INJECT-EPISODE] ⏭️ upstream returned empty episode; nothing to inject.")
return None
if isinstance(payload, dict):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ✅ episode loaded OK (object) keys=%s",
",".join(sorted(str(k) for k in payload.keys())),
)
elif isinstance(payload, list):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ✅ episode loaded OK (list) len=%d",
len(payload),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ✅ episode loaded OK (string) len=%d",
len(str(payload)),
)
return payload
async def _fetch_user_profile_for_phone(phone_number: str, auth_token: str | None = None) -> dict | None:
"""Fetch the profile JSON from VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL for a phone.
Returns the raw {"result": ...}-unwrapped object or None. Errors are logged
then suppressed (never fail the proxy / reasoning because of this).
When `auth_token` is provided it is forwarded as Authorization: Bearer <auth_token>
to the upstream profile endpoint.
"""
if not VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL or not phone_number:
return None
from urllib.parse import urlencode
target_url = f"{VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL}?{urlencode({'phoneNumber': phone_number})}"
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] fetch upstream URL=%s phoneLen=%d bearer=%s",
VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL,
len(phone_number),
"yes" if auth_token else "no",
)
try:
headers = {}
if auth_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {auth_token}"
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=10.0, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.get(target_url, headers=headers or None)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⛔ upstream HTTP %s phoneLen=%d response=%.200s",
resp.status_code, len(phone_number), resp.text,
)
return None
payload = resp.json()
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⛔ fetch unreachable phoneLen=%d error=%r",
len(phone_number), exc,
)
return None
if (isinstance(payload, dict)
and "result" in payload
and isinstance(payload["result"], dict)):
profile_obj = payload["result"]
elif isinstance(payload, dict) and not isinstance(payload, list):
profile_obj = payload
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⛔ upstream returned non-object JSON type=%s keys=?",
type(payload).__name__,
)
return None
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ✅ profile loaded OK keys=%s",
",".join(sorted(profile_obj.keys())),
)
return profile_obj
def _augment_instructions_with_profile(base_instructions, user_context_text, reports_context_text=None, summary_context_text=None, episode_context_text=None, profile_obj=None) -> str:
"""When S2S_INJECT_PROFILE is true: prepend TODAY fixed context block (Bug 3 fix)
then append the episode + profile + (optional) reports list + (optional) latest
summary context strings to the LLM system/instructions prompt.
Append order (most specific → most generic / chronologically newest → oldest):
0. VOICE_RULES_HEAD_LOCK (absolute language lock + #1 priority)
1. TODAY_block (date of today + anti-hallucination date rules)
2. episode_ctx (CURRENT podcast episode the user is interacting with)
3. base instructions (primary prompt / user settings / default)
4. profile_ctx (caller identity block)
5. reports_ctx (scheduled reports / podcast scripts list, sorted by date DESC)
6. summary_ctx (latest conversation summary)
Preserves the existing instructions text.
USER FIX 2026-09-11 "Rimuovi il profilo chiamante DUPLICATO": adds TWO dedupe layers
so the same block type (profile / episode / reports / summary) NEVER appears twice
in the final augmented instructions, even if the caller passed it both in
base_instructions (e.g. client-supplied profile baked into req.instructions) AND in the
explicit profile_ctx parameter:
1) layer 2 — _strip_already_injected_types_from_base removes from parameters
if their marker already appears in base_instructions.
2) layer 1 — _dedup_context_blocks_by_type then removes any remaining
duplicates among the parameters themselves.
2026-09-11: NEW keyword profile_obj → forwarded to _build_voice_rules_head_lock_block
so the prompt lock can emit rule #5 "Nombre exacto: Alessandro Valenti. NUNCA
Alexander" for models that keep anglicizing proper names (Qwen2.5-GPTQ).
"""
base = (base_instructions or "").strip()
# ─── USER FIX BUG 3: TODAY fixed block prepended (HEAD of prompt) ─────
voice_lock_block = _build_voice_rules_head_lock_block(profile=profile_obj) # NEW #1 priority: absolute language+output lock
today_block = _build_today_fixed_context_block() # #2: date guard (spanish-only rewrite)
episode_ctx = (episode_context_text or "").strip()
profile_ctx = (user_context_text or "").strip()
reports_ctx = (reports_context_text or "").strip()
summary_ctx = (summary_context_text or "").strip()
# raw_candidates is ORDERED by prompt-priority! voice_lock_block (#0) is
# inserted FIRST so it becomes position 0 of the final instructions and
# gets highest LLM attention, then today, then episode, etc.
raw_candidates = [voice_lock_block, today_block, episode_ctx, profile_ctx, reports_ctx, summary_ctx]
# Layer 2: strip candidates whose HINT is ALREADY in base instructions
# (e.g. client sent profile baked in, we won't re-add it).
candidates_against_base = _strip_already_injected_types_from_base(base, raw_candidates)
# Layer 1: dedupe among themselves (e.g. episode was both episode_ctx passed in the same raw_candidates twice via identity + raw).
contexts = _dedup_context_blocks_by_type(candidates_against_base)
if not contexts:
return base_instructions or ""
augmented = base
for ctx in contexts:
augmented = (augmented + " " + ctx).strip() if augmented else ctx
# ─── 2026-09-11 MARKER LEAK GUARD: STRIP INTERNAL SENTINELS ──────────
# All invisible dedup markers are NOW stripped from the final prompt text
# before leaving this function → LLM NEVER sees ANY <<<X>>> / hash string.
augmented = _strip_internal_markers(augmented)
changed = augmented != base
# Compute per-type lengths for log (based on what actually survived dedupe)
final_lock_len = sum(len(c) for c in contexts if _classify_context_block(c) == "voice_rules_head")
final_today_len = sum(len(c) for c in contexts if _classify_context_block(c) == "today_fixed")
final_ep_len = sum(len(c) for c in contexts if _classify_context_block(c) == "episode")
final_pf_len = sum(len(c) for c in contexts if _classify_context_block(c) == "profile")
final_rp_len = sum(len(c) for c in contexts if _classify_context_block(c) in {"reports", "reports_minimal", "reports_full"})
final_sm_len = sum(len(c) for c in contexts if _classify_context_block(c) in {"summary", "summary_full"})
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ✏️ prepended VOICE_LOCK + TODAY_block + appended episode/profile/reports/summary to LLM instructions. "
"baseLen=%d voiceLockLen=%d todayCtxLen=%d episodeCtxLen=%d profileCtxLen=%d reportsCtxLen=%d summaryCtxLen=%d newLen=%d changed=%s dedupedCandidates=%d",
len(base), final_lock_len, final_today_len, final_ep_len, final_pf_len, final_rp_len, final_sm_len, len(augmented), changed, len(contexts),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and final_lock_len:
for c in contexts:
if _classify_context_block(c) == "voice_rules_head":
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-VOICELOCK][instructions augment] FULL voice lock block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(c), _strip_internal_markers(c),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and final_today_len:
for c in contexts:
if _classify_context_block(c) == "today_fixed":
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-TODAY][instructions augment] FULL today+anti-hallucination block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(c), _strip_internal_markers(c),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and final_ep_len:
for c in contexts:
if _classify_context_block(c) == "episode":
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-EPISODE][instructions augment] FULL podcast episode block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(c), _strip_internal_markers(c),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and final_rp_len:
for c in contexts:
if _classify_context_block(c) in {"reports", "reports_minimal", "reports_full"}:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-REPORTS][instructions augment] FULL reports block (len=%d mode=%s):\n%s\n",
len(c), _classify_context_block(c), _strip_internal_markers(c),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and final_sm_len:
for c in contexts:
if _classify_context_block(c) in {"summary", "summary_full"}:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-SUMMARY][instructions augment] FULL latest summary block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(c), _strip_internal_markers(c),
)
return augmented
def _patch_client_session_update_with_profile(raw_text, user_context_text, reports_context_text=None, summary_context_text=None, episode_context_text=None, profile_obj=None, apipilot_context_text_pass1=None) -> str:
"""If raw_text is a client session.update JSON and S2S_INJECT_PROFILE is
true, append episode_context_text + user_context_text + (optional) reports_context_text +
(optional) summary_context_text + (optional) apipilot_context_text_pass1 to session.instructions.
Returns the modified JSON string, or the original string unchanged if:
- it is not session.update JSON (the VAST majority of frames -> silent passthrough, NO LOG)
- episode_context_text AND user_context_text AND reports_context_text AND summary_context_text AND apipilot_context_text_pass1 are all empty
- S2S_INJECT_PROFILE is False (but if we have apipilot_context_text_pass1 -> PATCH even if S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false, tools injection is independent.)
- parse fails
2026-09-11: NEW keyword profile_obj. Forwarded to
_augment_instructions_with_profile so the prompt lock can emit the proper-name
anti-anglicization rule for this caller (e.g. Alessandro never Alexander).
2026-09-25: NEW keyword apipilot_context_text_pass1. Injected IN ADDITION so WS
Realtime LLM sees the tools list match description / marker rules (same as the
/api/reasoning HTTP endpoint). Independent gate: even S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false,
if apipilot_context_text_pass1 has content -> PATCH instructions.
"""
# Step 1: only consider session.update frames. All other frame types
# (response.create, conversation.item.*, audio_* etc.) pass through
# SILENTLY — we never emit logs for them, which avoids spamming the
# console with 6-20 identical "SKIPPED" lines per session.
try:
payload = json.loads(raw_text)
except Exception:
return raw_text
if not isinstance(payload, dict) or payload.get("type") != "session.update":
return raw_text
# From here on: we know this is a real session.update (typically emitted
# just once or twice per realtime session). We can log safely — 1 line,
# not 20 repeated lines.
has_apipilot_pass1 = bool((apipilot_context_text_pass1 or "").strip())
if not S2S_INJECT_PROFILE and not has_apipilot_pass1:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS patch SKIPPED on session.update (S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false and no apipilot list pass1). "
"WS stays pure passthrough."
)
return raw_text
has_episode = bool((episode_context_text or "").strip())
has_profile = bool((user_context_text or "").strip())
has_reports = bool((reports_context_text or "").strip())
has_summary = bool((summary_context_text or "").strip())
if not (has_episode or has_profile or has_reports or has_summary or has_apipilot_pass1):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS patch SKIPPED on session.update (no episode, no profile context, no reports list, no latest summary, no apipilot tools list pass1). "
"Probably phoneNumber/episode_id query param missing / fetch failed upstream / "
"endpoints or S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY / S2S_REPORT_LIST returned empty result."
)
return raw_text
if has_episode and not has_profile:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] profile missing, but PODCAST EPISODE block loaded. "
"Will inject episode alone into session.update."
)
if has_summary and not has_profile and not has_episode:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] profile missing, but LATEST SUMMARY block loaded. "
"Will inject summary alone into session.update."
)
if has_reports and not has_profile and not has_episode:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] profile missing, but REPORTS LIST block loaded. "
"Will inject reports alone into session.update."
)
if has_apipilot_pass1 and not has_profile and not has_episode and not has_reports and not has_summary:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] profile/episode/reports/summary missing, but APIPILOT TOOLS list PASS-1 block loaded (%d chars). "
"Will inject tools list alone into session.update.",
len(apipilot_context_text_pass1) if isinstance(apipilot_context_text_pass1, str) else 0,
)
top_session = payload.get("session")
if not isinstance(top_session, dict):
return raw_text
current_instructions = (
top_session.get("instructions")
if isinstance(top_session.get("instructions"), str)
else ""
)
augmented = _augment_instructions_with_profile(
current_instructions, user_context_text, reports_context_text, summary_context_text, episode_context_text,
profile_obj=profile_obj,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][WS session.update] BEFORE instructions (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(current_instructions), current_instructions,
)
# Append apipilot PASS-1 (lista strumenti + regole marker) SE presente,
# DOPO profile/reports/episode/summary (struttura identica a /api/reasoning).
#
# 2026-09-25 FIX "client manda DUE session.update e il secondo SOVRASCRIVE instructions"
# → dopo augment/profile controlliamo anche: le istruzioni CONTENGONO gia' il marker
# <<<APIPILOT_TOOLS_LIST_BEGIN>>> ? SE NO e abbiamo injected_apipilot_pass1 → riappendiamo.
already_has_apipilot_pass1 = (
isinstance(current_instructions, str)
and APIPILOT_PASS1_LIST_MARKER in current_instructions
)
if has_apipilot_pass1 and not already_has_apipilot_pass1:
augmented = (
(augmented + "\n\n" if augmented.strip() else "")
+ (apipilot_context_text_pass1 if isinstance(apipilot_context_text_pass1, str) else "")
)
# Ora gate "unchanged": SE augmented == current MA c'è differenza apipilot per il post-patch
# del client (sovrascrittura instructions senza marker) → NON skippare.
if augmented == current_instructions and not (has_apipilot_pass1 and not already_has_apipilot_pass1):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS patch SKIPPED on session.update (augmented == current; "
"episode/profile already injected or context empty or apipilot same)"
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and augmented.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][WS session.update] FINAL unchanged (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(augmented), augmented,
)
return raw_text
top_session["instructions"] = augmented
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ✅ WS session.update PATCHED -> upstream instructions. "
"origLen=%d newLen=%d injectedLen=%d episode=%s profile=%s reports=%s summary=%s apipilotPass1=%s(len=%d, wasAlreadyPresent=%s)",
len(current_instructions),
len(augmented),
(len(augmented) - len(current_instructions)),
has_episode, has_profile, has_reports, has_summary,
has_apipilot_pass1,
(len(apipilot_context_text_pass1) if isinstance(apipilot_context_text_pass1, str) else 0),
("true" if already_has_apipilot_pass1 else "false"),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][WS session.update] AFTER patch (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(augmented), augmented,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and episode_context_text and episode_context_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-EPISODE][WS session.update] FULL podcast episode block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(episode_context_text.strip()), episode_context_text.strip(),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and reports_context_text and reports_context_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-REPORTS][WS session.update] FULL reports list block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(reports_context_text.strip()), reports_context_text.strip(),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and isinstance(apipilot_context_text_pass1, str) and apipilot_context_text_pass1.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-APIPILOT][WS session.update] FULL ApiPilot tools list PASS-1 block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(apipilot_context_text_pass1.strip()), _strip_internal_markers(apipilot_context_text_pass1),
)
# Also log the FINAL upstream instructions when S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT is on and
# this is a session.update (so we see the EXACT text reaching the model even
# when S2S_INJECT_PROFILE is off and no patch happened.)
if (not S2S_INJECT_PROFILE) and S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and current_instructions.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][WS session.update] FINAL upstream instructions (injectProfile=false, len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(current_instructions), current_instructions,
)
try:
return json.dumps(payload)
except Exception:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⛔ JSON re-serialize failed on session.update. "
"Forwarding unpatched."
)
return raw_text
class ReasoningRequest(BaseModel):
transcript: str
instructions: str = ""
language: str = ""
user_context: str = ""
# Optional phone number. When S2S_INJECT_PROFILE is true the proxy fetches
# the caller profile from VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL and:
# 1. prepends the serialized profile to user_context before feeding the
# engine (NODE_RED or OPENAI);
# 2. appends the profile context to the LLM instructions prompt.
phoneNumber: str | None = None
# Optional podcast episode ID. When set the proxy fetches the episode from
# the Aquachile AzurianLab API and injects it as the PRIMARY context into
# both user_context (prepended) and LLM instructions prompt (appended first).
episode_id: str | None = None
def _url_with_query(url: str, **params: str) -> str:
target = urlsplit(url)
merged_query = dict(parse_qsl(target.query, keep_blank_values=True))
for key, value in params.items():
if value:
merged_query[key] = value
return urlunsplit(
(
target.scheme,
target.netloc,
target.path,
urlencode(merged_query, doseq=True),
target.fragment,
)
)
def _openai_headers() -> dict[str, str]:
if not OPENAI_API_KEY:
raise RuntimeError("OPENAI_API_KEY is not configured.")
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {OPENAI_API_KEY}",
"Content-Type": "application/json",
}
if OPENAI_ORGANIZATION:
headers["OpenAI-Organization"] = OPENAI_ORGANIZATION
if OPENAI_PROJECT:
headers["OpenAI-Project"] = OPENAI_PROJECT
return headers
def _effective_s2s_url(request: Request) -> str:
return SPEECH_TO_SPEECH_URL or _proxy_public_url(request)
@app.get("/api/config")
async def config(request: Request):
"""Client bootstrap: whether web search is available, whether the deploy runs
behind a load balancer (so the browser uses the /api/session proxy + limiter),
whether HF sign-in is available, and whether the user may instead set a direct
s2s server URL. The LB address itself is intentionally NOT included.
2026-09-24: new top-level `apipilot` flag. When True the deploy exposes the
new `/api/apipilot/tools` and `/api/apipilot/execute` proxy endpoints (see
GUIDA_APIPILOT_CLIENTE.md) that the browser may call directly instead of
hardcoding upstream tool URLs / names."""
logger.debug("[INTERNAL] /api/config requested client=%s", request.client.host if request.client else "?")
primary_prompt = S2S_PRIMARY_PROMPT
out = {
"search": bool(SERPER_KEY),
"lb": bool(LOAD_BALANCER_URL),
"allowDirect": not LOAD_BALANCER_URL,
"s2sUrl": _effective_s2s_url(request),
"primaryPrompt": primary_prompt,
"reasoningType": S2S_REASONING_TYPE,
"auth": AUTH_ENABLED,
"injectProfile": S2S_INJECT_PROFILE,
"debugPrompt": S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT,
"startSessionMode": S2S_START_SESSION_MODE,
"theme": S2S_THEME,
"apipilot": bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL),
}
logger.debug(
"[INTERNAL] /api/config returned promptLen=%d reasoning=%s startSessionMode=%s theme=%s apipilot=%s",
len(primary_prompt),
S2S_REASONING_TYPE,
S2S_START_SESSION_MODE or "-",
S2S_THEME or "-",
out["apipilot"],
)
return out
class ApipilotExecuteRequest(BaseModel):
"""Body for the ApiPilot execute proxy endpoint. Mirrors §2.2 request shape."""
name: str
arguments: dict = {}
@app.get("/api/apipilot/tools")
async def apipilot_list_tools(
request: Request,
include_unauthorized: bool = True,
refresh: bool = False,
):
"""Public proxy for ApiPilot tool discovery (§2.1 della guida).
Forwards Authorization / x-demo-session headers from the caller to the
upstream backend verbatim and returns the list of `ToolDefinition` records
exactly as documented:
{ "name": "...", "description": "...", "parameters": {...}, "requires_auth": true/false }
A short in-process TTL cache is applied (default 5 min, configurable via
S2S_APIPILOT_TTL_SEC). The client may force a refresh via `?refresh=true`
(e.g. after a user just logged in and previously saw only requires_auth tools)."""
if not S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=501,
content={
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "APIPILOT_NOT_CONFIGURED",
"message": "ApiPilot no está disponible en este despliegue (S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL no establecido).",
"status_code": 501,
"raw": None,
},
},
)
auth, demo = _apipilot_parse_authorization(request)
try:
tools = await _apipilot_fetch_tools(
auth_header=auth,
demo_session=demo,
include_unauthorized=bool(include_unauthorized),
force_refresh=bool(refresh),
)
except HTTPException as exc:
# Normalize to envelope-style payload so downstream code is uniform.
detail = exc.detail if isinstance(exc.detail, dict) else {
"code": "APIPILOT_ERROR",
"message": str(exc.detail) if exc.detail else "Error",
"status_code": exc.status_code,
"raw": None,
}
return JSONResponse(
status_code=exc.status_code,
content={"success": False, "data": None, "error": detail},
)
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] /api/apipilot/tools OK tools=%d include_unauthorized=%s refresh=%s",
len(tools), bool(include_unauthorized), bool(refresh),
)
return {
"success": True,
"data": {
"count": len(tools),
"include_unauthorized": bool(include_unauthorized),
"tools": tools,
},
"error": None,
}
@app.post("/api/apipilot/execute")
async def apipilot_execute(request: Request, body: ApipilotExecuteRequest):
"""Public proxy for ApiPilot /execute (§2.2 della guida).
Accepts `{name, arguments}`, runs the mandatory PRE-CHECK flow (fresh tool
discovery, `requires_auth` gate, strict JSON-Schema argument validation),
forwards the request to the upstream backend, and returns the envelope
`{success, data, error}`.
`error.message` è SEMPRE l'unico campo da mostrare all'utente finale; i
campi `error.code`, `error.status_code`, `error.raw` sono solo per audit
interno (vedi §2.2 "Comportamento UI consigliato sugli errori")."""
if not S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=501,
content={
"success": False,
"data": None,
"error": {
"code": "APIPILOT_NOT_CONFIGURED",
"message": "ApiPilot no está disponible en este despliegue (S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL no establecido).",
"status_code": 501,
"raw": None,
},
},
)
auth, demo = _apipilot_parse_authorization(request)
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=API_ENDPOINT_EXECUTE name=%r argsKeys=%s authReceived=%s", (body.name or ""), sorted(list((body.arguments or {}).keys())) if isinstance(body.arguments, dict) else [], ("Y" if auth or demo else "none"))
envelope = await _apipilot_execute_tool(
auth_header=auth,
demo_session=demo,
name=body.name,
arguments=body.arguments if isinstance(body.arguments, dict) else {},
)
status_code = 200
if (not envelope.get("success")) and isinstance(envelope.get("error"), dict):
code = envelope["error"].get("status_code")
try:
code_int = int(code)
if 400 <= code_int < 599:
status_code = code_int
except Exception:
pass
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] /api/apipilot/execute name=%s success=%s status=%s",
body.name, envelope.get("success"), status_code,
)
return JSONResponse(status_code=status_code, content=envelope)
@app.post("/api/reasoning")
async def reasoning(req: ReasoningRequest):
if S2S_REASONING_TYPE == "PROXY":
raise HTTPException(status_code=409, detail="Reasoning endpoint is disabled in PROXY mode.")
transcript = (req.transcript or "").strip()
if not transcript:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="transcript is required.")
# ── S2S_INJECT_PROFILE: resolve podcast episode + caller profile + reports list + latest summary ──
# (When S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false this entire block is a no-op; user_context
# and instructions are taken verbatim from the request body.)
inject_episode_text = ""
inject_profile_text = ""
inject_reports_text = ""
inject_summary_text = ""
phone = (req.phoneNumber or "").strip()
episode_id = (req.episode_id or "").strip()
if not S2S_INJECT_PROFILE:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ REASONING: skipped (S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false). "
"Using verbatim request body; no fetch, no augmentation."
)
else:
needs_phone_authed = bool(VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL.strip())
# USER FIX 2026-09-11 "Elimina l'iniezione massiva di tutti i report schedulati":
# treats S2S_REPORT_LIST as "need to fetch reports" ONLY when BOTH the URL is
# configured AND the new opt-in S2S_INJECT_REPORTS flag is true. When
# S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=false (default) needs_reports stays False here → we skip
# the branch entirely, no HTTP call, no context string, no prompt bloat.
needs_reports = bool(S2S_REPORT_LIST.strip()) and S2S_INJECT_REPORTS
needs_summary = bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY.strip()) or bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT)
needs_login = bool(S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE.strip())
can_inject = (
needs_phone_authed or needs_reports or needs_summary or needs_login
or bool(episode_id)
)
if (not needs_phone_authed) and (not needs_reports) and (not needs_summary) and (not needs_login) and (not episode_id):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ REASONING: skipped (VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL, S2S_REPORT_LIST, S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY/S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT and S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE all empty, AND no episode_id in request; OR S2S_INJECT_REPORTS is false so reports injection is globally disabled). "
"Set at least one AND set S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true (if you want scheduled reports) to enable login / fetch episode/profile/reports/summary for REASONING endpoint."
)
elif (not phone) and (not needs_reports) and (not episode_id) and (not S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT):
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ REASONING: skipped (phoneNumber missing from request body AND no episode_id). "
"Browser-side issue: check main.js passes voceroUserPhoneNumber and/or episode_id in JSON body. (Note: S2S_REPORT_LIST fetch works even without phone.)"
)
elif not can_inject:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ REASONING: skipped (env for phone empty and no reports/summary/login API and no episode_id)."
)
else:
# ###################################################################
# 0) Login-by-phone (optional — only if S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE env set)
# Obtains a bearer token that will be forwarded for profile/reports/summary fetches.
# ###################################################################
login_token = None
if S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE and phone:
login_token, _login_resp = await _login_by_phone(phone)
# ###################################################################
# 0.5) Podcast episode fetch (independent of phone — uses req.episode_id)
# ###################################################################
if episode_id:
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] starting REASONING fetch podcast episode episodeId=%.80s...",
episode_id,
)
episode_raw = await _fetch_podcast_episode(episode_id)
inject_episode_text = _resolve_episode_context(episode_raw)
if inject_episode_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ✅ REASONING: PODCAST EPISODE READY episodeId=%.80s wrappedLen=%d -> augmenting instructions + user_context before sending upstream.",
episode_id, len(inject_episode_text),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ⏭️ REASONING: episode skipped (context empty / upstream returned empty / fetch failed)."
)
# ###################################################################
# 1) Profile fetch (optional — only if env is configured)
# ###################################################################
if needs_phone_authed and phone:
profile_obj = await _fetch_user_profile_for_phone(phone, auth_token=login_token)
inject_profile_text = _resolve_user_context_text(phone, profile_obj, loaded=True)
if inject_profile_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ✅ REASONING: profile READY phoneLen=%d contextLen=%d -> augmenting instructions + user_context before sending upstream.",
len(phone), len(inject_profile_text),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ REASONING: profile fetch OK but resolved context empty."
)
# ###################################################################
# 1.5) Scheduled reports / podcast scripts list (optional — S2S_REPORT_LIST)
# ###################################################################
if needs_reports:
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] starting REASONING fetch S2S_REPORT_LIST (phoneLen=%s, bearer=%s)...",
len(phone) if phone else "none",
"yes" if login_token else "no",
)
reports_raw = await _fetch_reports_list(phone_number=phone if phone else None, auth_token=login_token)
inject_reports_text = _resolve_reports_context(reports_raw)
if inject_reports_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ✅ REASONING: reports list READY wrappedLen=%d -> augmenting instructions + user_context before sending upstream.",
len(inject_reports_text),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ⏭️ REASONING: reports list skipped (context empty / upstream returned empty list / fetch failed)."
)
# ###################################################################
# 2) Latest summary fetch (optional — only if env is configured)
# ###################################################################
if needs_summary and (phone or S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT):
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] starting REASONING fetch (reasoning summary... S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY=%s S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT=%s phoneLen=%s.",
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY),
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT),
len(phone) if phone else "none",
)
latest_summary_raw = await _fetch_latest_summary_for_phone(phone, auth_token=login_token)
inject_summary_text = _resolve_latest_summary_context(latest_summary_raw)
if inject_summary_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ✅ REASONING: latest summary READY phoneLen=%s summaryTextOverride=%s wrappedLen=%d -> augmenting instructions + user_context before sending upstream.",
len(phone) if phone else "none",
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT),
len(inject_summary_text),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ⏭️ REASONING: latest summary skipped (context empty / upstream returned empty summary / fetch failed.)"
)
# ── APIPILOT: carica strumenti dinamici PRIMA della costruzione context
# (gate globale: funziona sia con che senza S2S_INJECT_PROFILE)
needs_apipilot = bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL) or bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL)
apipilot_tools_pass1: list[dict] = []
apipilot_auth_header: str | None = None
if isinstance(login_token, str) and login_token.strip():
tk = login_token.strip()
if tk.lower().startswith("bearer "):
apipilot_auth_header = tk
else:
apipilot_auth_header = f"Bearer {tk}"
# 2026-09-25 IMPORTANTE: S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE = aquachile.azurianlab.com AUTH PHONE LOGIN
# → login_token È IL TOKEN JWT AQUAPORTAL VERO (non Vocero).
# Lo usiamo SEMPRE per tool requires_auth=true (necessario per eseguire /execute).
# S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN se presente → OVERRIDE massima priorità.
if S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN:
_svc = S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN.strip()
if _svc:
apipilot_auth_header = (f"Bearer {_svc}" if not _svc.lower().startswith("bearer ") else _svc)
if needs_apipilot:
try:
apipilot_t0 = _monotonic_now()
apipilot_tools_pass1 = await _apipilot_fetch_tools(
auth_header=apipilot_auth_header,
demo_session=None,
force_refresh=False,
)
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-1: lista strumenti pronta N=%d t=%dms auth=%s",
len(apipilot_tools_pass1),
int((_monotonic_now() - apipilot_t0) * 1000),
"Y" if apipilot_auth_header else "-",
)
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("[APIPILOT] REASONING: fetch lista strumenti fallita, ignoro: %s", exc)
apipilot_tools_pass1 = []
inject_apipilot_text_pass1 = _resolve_apipilot_reasoning_context_block(
apipilot_tools_pass1, call_result=None,
)
user_context_parts: list[str] = []
# ─── USER FIX BUG 3: TODAY fixed context block → PREPEND to user_context too
# (the same anti-hallucination block gets prefixed in the SYSTEM instructions
# path via _augment_instructions_with_profile; we also prepend here so the
# OPENAI/ANYSCALE messages[] array (where caller context is user_message[0])
# ALSO gets the same guard.)
# ─── USER FIX 2026-09-11 HALLUCINATION: voice_lock_block FIRST position
voice_lock_block = _build_voice_rules_head_lock_block(profile=profile_obj)
if voice_lock_block.strip():
user_context_parts.append(voice_lock_block)
today_block = _build_today_fixed_context_block()
if today_block.strip():
user_context_parts.append(today_block)
if inject_episode_text:
user_context_parts.append(inject_episode_text)
if inject_profile_text:
user_context_parts.append(inject_profile_text)
if inject_reports_text:
user_context_parts.append(inject_reports_text)
if inject_summary_text:
user_context_parts.append(inject_summary_text)
if inject_apipilot_text_pass1:
user_context_parts.append(inject_apipilot_text_pass1)
original_user_context = (req.user_context or "").strip()
if original_user_context:
user_context_parts.append(original_user_context)
user_context_parts = _dedup_context_blocks_by_type(user_context_parts)
if original_user_context:
server_injected_types_in_client_ctx: set = set()
for part in user_context_parts:
if original_user_context and (part or "").strip() == original_user_context:
continue
tid = _classify_context_block(part)
if tid is None:
continue
for marker_tid, marker in _CONTEXT_DEDUPE_MARKERS:
if marker_tid == tid and marker and marker in original_user_context:
server_injected_types_in_client_ctx.add(tid)
break
if server_injected_types_in_client_ctx:
new_parts: list[str] = []
for part in user_context_parts:
if (part or "").strip() == original_user_context:
new_parts.append(part)
continue
tid = _classify_context_block(part)
if tid in server_injected_types_in_client_ctx:
continue
new_parts.append(part)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and new_parts != user_context_parts:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-DEDUPE] dropped server-injected profile/episode/reports/summary because the same block type was already present in req.user_context client-side context=%s kept=%d",
", ".join(sorted(server_injected_types_in_client_ctx)),
len(new_parts),
)
user_context_parts = new_parts
# ─── 2026-09-11 MARKER LEAK GUARD: strip invisible internal sentinels from EACH part.
stripped_parts: list[str] = []
for p in user_context_parts:
sp = _strip_internal_markers(p)
if sp:
stripped_parts.append(sp)
user_context_parts = stripped_parts
effective_user_context = "\n\n".join(user_context_parts)
if S2S_INJECT_PROFILE:
any_injected = bool(inject_episode_text or inject_profile_text or inject_reports_text or inject_summary_text)
if any_injected:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] REASONING user_context final parts=%d serverEpisodeLen=%d serverProfileLen=%d serverReportsLen=%d serverSummaryLen=%d browserUserCtxLen=%d joinedLen=%d",
len(user_context_parts),
len(inject_episode_text),
len(inject_profile_text),
len(inject_reports_text),
len(inject_summary_text),
len(original_user_context),
len(effective_user_context),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and voice_lock_block.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-VOICELOCK][REASONING augment] FULL voice lock block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(voice_lock_block), _strip_internal_markers(voice_lock_block),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and inject_episode_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-EPISODE][REASONING augment] FULL podcast episode block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(inject_episode_text), _strip_internal_markers(inject_episode_text),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and today_block.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-TODAY][REASONING augment] FULL today block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(today_block), _strip_internal_markers(today_block),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and inject_reports_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-REPORTS][REASONING augment] FULL reports list block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(inject_reports_text), _strip_internal_markers(inject_reports_text),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and inject_summary_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-SUMMARY][REASONING augment] FULL latest summary block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(inject_summary_text), _strip_internal_markers(inject_summary_text),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and inject_profile_text.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROFILE][REASONING augment] FULL profile block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(inject_profile_text), _strip_internal_markers(inject_profile_text),
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and inject_apipilot_text_pass1.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-APIPILOT][REASONING augment] FULL ApiPilot tools list block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(inject_apipilot_text_pass1), _strip_internal_markers(inject_apipilot_text_pass1),
)
if needs_apipilot and inject_apipilot_text_pass1.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-1: inject lista strumenti (len=%d, Ntools=%d) IN instructions (oltre user_context).",
len(inject_apipilot_text_pass1), len(apipilot_tools_pass1),
)
effective_instructions = _augment_instructions_with_profile(
req.instructions or "", inject_profile_text, inject_reports_text, inject_summary_text, inject_episode_text,
profile_obj=profile_obj,
)
if inject_apipilot_text_pass1.strip():
effective_instructions = (
(effective_instructions + "\n\n" if effective_instructions else "")
+ inject_apipilot_text_pass1
)
else:
effective_instructions = (req.instructions or "").strip()
if inject_apipilot_text_pass1.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-1: inject lista strumenti (len=%d, Ntools=%d) IN instructions (inject_profile=false).",
len(inject_apipilot_text_pass1), len(apipilot_tools_pass1),
)
effective_instructions = (
(effective_instructions + "\n\n" if effective_instructions else "")
+ inject_apipilot_text_pass1
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and inject_apipilot_text_pass1.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-APIPILOT][REASONING augment] FULL ApiPilot tools list block (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(inject_apipilot_text_pass1), _strip_internal_markers(inject_apipilot_text_pass1),
)
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Modalità A: NODE_RED — inoltra TUTTO il payload a Node-RED
# Il flow Node-RED decide autonomamente.
# FASE 1 (LOG-ONLY): Node-RED risponde con {answer: "", log_only: true}
# => il client (main.js) NON interferisce, lascia parlare il backend S2S.
# FASI successive: Node-RED produce {answer: "...", log_only: false}
# Risposta attesa: {answer, log_only?, usage, debug, latency_ms, …}
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if S2S_REASONING_TYPE == "NODE_RED":
if not NODE_RED_REASONING_URL:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=503,
detail="S2S_REASONING_NODE_RED_URL is not configured. Set the env var to the Node-RED endpoint (e.g. http://localhost:1881).",
)
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] REASONING->NODE_RED body fields. instructionsLen=%d userCtxLen=%d phoneLen=%d episodeIdLen=%d",
len(effective_instructions), len(effective_user_context), len(phone), len(episode_id),
)
upstream_body = {
"transcript": transcript,
"instructions": effective_instructions,
"language": (req.language or "").strip(),
"user_context": effective_user_context,
}
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][REASONING → NODE_RED] FULL upstream_body JSON:\n%s\n",
json.dumps(upstream_body, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2),
)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][NODE_RED] reasoning POST %s/api/reasoning lang=%s transcriptLen=%d",
NODE_RED_REASONING_URL,
(req.language or "")[:20] or "auto",
len(transcript),
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=120.0) as http:
resp = await http.post(
f"{NODE_RED_REASONING_URL}/api/reasoning",
json=upstream_body,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"X-S2S-Caller": "demo-server",
},
)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED] unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Node-RED reasoning engine is unreachable.")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][NODE_RED] reasoning RESP status=%s len=%dB",
resp.status_code, len(resp.content or b""),
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED] failed %s: %s", resp.status_code, resp.text[:500])
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail=f"Node-RED reasoning failed (HTTP {resp.status_code}).",
)
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED] invalid JSON: %s", resp.text[:500])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Node-RED returned invalid JSON.")
answer = payload.get("answer") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
log_only = bool(isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("log_only") is True)
if not isinstance(answer, str):
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED] invalid answer type: %s", json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=True)[:800])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Node-RED returned invalid answer field.")
answer_stripped = answer.strip()
# ── Log-only mode: answer vuota + flag log_only sono L'INTENZIONE ──
# Non solleviamo errore; il flag viene inoltrato al client.
if not answer_stripped and not log_only:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED] empty answer and !log_only: %s", json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=True)[:800])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Node-RED returned no answer without log_only flag.")
usage = payload.get("usage") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
if isinstance(usage, dict):
logger.debug(
"[EXT][NODE_RED] reasoning USAGE prompt=%d completion=%d total=%d",
usage.get("prompt_tokens", 0), usage.get("completion_tokens", 0), usage.get("total_tokens", 0),
)
extra = {}
for key in ("latency_ms", "intent", "caller_profile_keys", "debug"):
if isinstance(payload, dict) and key in payload:
extra[key] = payload[key]
if log_only:
logger.info(
"[Vocero REASONING] engine=NODE_RED mode=LOG_ONLY transcript=%s extra=%s",
transcript[:300],
json.dumps({k: v for k, v in extra.items() if k != "debug"}, ensure_ascii=True)[:400],
)
else:
logger.info(
"[Vocero REASONING] engine=NODE_RED transcript=%s answer=%s extra=%s",
transcript[:300], answer_stripped[:500],
json.dumps({k: v for k, v in extra.items() if k != "debug"}, ensure_ascii=True)[:400],
)
out = {"answer": answer_stripped}
if log_only:
out["log_only"] = True
if usage:
out["usage"] = usage
out.update({k: v for k, v in extra.items() if k != "debug" or logger.level <= logging.DEBUG})
# ── APIPILOT: cattura marker → esegui tool → SECONDA PASSATA reasoning
tool_name_p1, tool_args_p1 = _apipilot_parse_call_marker(answer_stripped)
if tool_name_p1:
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=NODE_RED_PASS2_TRIGGER name=%r argsKeys=%s", tool_name_p1, sorted(list((tool_args_p1 or {}).keys())))
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 trigger NODE_RED marker name=%s args=%s",
tool_name_p1,
json.dumps(tool_args_p1 or {}, ensure_ascii=True)[:300],
)
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=NODE_RED_PASS2_EXEC_HELPER name=%r → forward a _apipilot_execute_tool", tool_name_p1)
tool_env_p1 = await _apipilot_execute_tool(
auth_header=apipilot_auth_header,
demo_session=None,
name=tool_name_p1,
arguments=tool_args_p1 or {},
)
is_tool_err = not bool(tool_env_p1.get("success"))
tool_data = tool_env_p1.get("data")
if isinstance(tool_data, str):
tool_text_p1 = tool_data
elif tool_data is None:
tool_text_p1 = ""
else:
try:
tool_text_p1 = json.dumps(tool_data, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
except Exception:
tool_text_p1 = str(tool_data)
if is_tool_err and isinstance(tool_env_p1.get("error"), dict):
err = tool_env_p1["error"]
err_head = f"[{err.get('code')}] {err.get('message')}"
tool_text_p1 = (err_head + ("\n" + tool_text_p1 if tool_text_p1.strip() else "")).strip()
inject_apipilot_text_pass2 = _resolve_apipilot_reasoning_context_block(
[],
call_result={
"name": tool_name_p1,
"text": tool_text_p1,
"error": is_tool_err,
},
)
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 execute name=%s success=%s httpResultLen=%d trigger seconda chiamata Node-RED",
tool_name_p1,
str(not is_tool_err).lower(),
len(tool_text_p1),
)
# Build user_context 2nd pass: mette risultato tool ALL'INIZIO (voce
# blocco oggi + regole vocali + profile ... ma SOSTITUISCE la lista
# strumenti di passata 1 con il risultato della exec).
user_ctx_parts_2: list[str] = []
if voice_lock_block.strip():
user_ctx_parts_2.append(voice_lock_block)
if today_block.strip():
user_ctx_parts_2.append(today_block)
if inject_episode_text:
user_ctx_parts_2.append(inject_episode_text)
if inject_profile_text:
user_ctx_parts_2.append(inject_profile_text)
if inject_reports_text:
user_ctx_parts_2.append(inject_reports_text)
if inject_summary_text:
user_ctx_parts_2.append(inject_summary_text)
if inject_apipilot_text_pass2:
user_ctx_parts_2.append(inject_apipilot_text_pass2)
if original_user_context:
user_ctx_parts_2.append(original_user_context)
user_ctx_parts_2 = _dedup_context_blocks_by_type(user_ctx_parts_2)
stripped_2: list[str] = []
for p in user_ctx_parts_2:
sp = _strip_internal_markers(p)
if sp:
stripped_2.append(sp)
user_ctx_parts_2 = stripped_2
effective_user_ctx_2 = "\n\n".join(user_ctx_parts_2)
# Istruzioni per seconda passata: stesse augment, ma senza istruzioni
# marker (tanto il blocco risultato dice come si rielabora).
if S2S_INJECT_PROFILE:
eff_inst_2 = _augment_instructions_with_profile(
req.instructions or "", inject_profile_text, inject_reports_text,
inject_summary_text, inject_episode_text, profile_obj=profile_obj,
)
else:
eff_inst_2 = (req.instructions or "").strip()
if inject_apipilot_text_pass2.strip():
eff_inst_2 = (
(eff_inst_2 + "\n\n" if eff_inst_2 else "")
+ inject_apipilot_text_pass2
)
upstream_body_2 = {
"transcript": transcript,
"instructions": eff_inst_2,
"language": (req.language or "").strip(),
"user_context": effective_user_ctx_2,
}
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][REASONING → NODE_RED PASS-2] FULL upstream_body_2 JSON:\n%s\n",
json.dumps(upstream_body_2, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2),
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=120.0) as http2:
resp2 = await http2.post(
f"{NODE_RED_REASONING_URL}/api/reasoning",
json=upstream_body_2,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"X-S2S-Caller": "demo-server-pass2",
},
)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED PASS-2] unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Node-RED reasoning engine is unreachable (pass 2).")
if resp2.status_code != 200:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED PASS-2] failed %s: %s", resp2.status_code, resp2.text[:500])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Node-RED reasoning pass 2 failed (HTTP {resp2.status_code}).")
try:
payload2 = resp2.json()
except Exception:
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED PASS-2] invalid JSON: %s", resp2.text[:500])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Node-RED returned invalid JSON (pass 2).")
final_ans = payload2.get("answer") if isinstance(payload2, dict) else None
if not isinstance(final_ans, str):
# Fallback: primo messaggio + risultato raw
logger.warning("[EXT][NODE_RED PASS-2] answer invalido, fallback a risposta raw text")
final_ans = tool_text_p1 or answer_stripped
final_stripped = final_ans.strip()
# log_only SEMPRE False nella seconda passata (perché ha già la
# risposta definitiva da trasmettere al canale vocale).
out2: dict = {"answer": final_stripped}
usage2 = payload2.get("usage") if isinstance(payload2, dict) else None
if usage2:
out2["usage_pass2"] = usage2
out2["apipilot_invoked"] = {
"name": tool_name_p1,
"success": not is_tool_err,
"result_length": len(tool_text_p1),
}
logger.info(
"[Vocero REASONING] engine=NODE_RED PASS-2 transcript=%s finalAnswer=%s apipilot=%s",
transcript[:300], final_stripped[:500],
json.dumps(out2["apipilot_invoked"], ensure_ascii=True),
)
return JSONResponse(out2)
# Nessun marker → return passata 1 come design iniziale
return JSONResponse(out)
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Modalità B: OPENAI — chiamata diretta a OpenAI Chat Completions
# ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if not OPENAI_API_KEY:
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="OPENAI_API_KEY is not configured.")
system_parts = []
instructions = effective_instructions or ((req.instructions or "").strip())
if instructions:
system_parts.append(instructions)
if effective_user_context.strip():
system_parts.append(f"User context:\n{effective_user_context.strip()}")
if inject_apipilot_text_pass1:
system_parts.append(inject_apipilot_text_pass1)
if req.language.strip():
system_parts.append(
"Reply only with the final assistant answer text. "
f"Keep the answer natural and concise in this language: {req.language.strip()}."
)
else:
system_parts.append("Reply only with the final assistant answer text. Keep the answer natural and concise.")
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] REASONING->OPENAI system message parts=%d instructionsLen=%d userCtxLen=%d phoneLen=%d episodeIdLen=%d",
len(system_parts),
len(effective_instructions),
len(effective_user_context),
len(phone),
len(episode_id),
)
system_msg = "\n\n".join(system_parts)
body = {
"model": OPENAI_REASONING_MODEL,
"messages": [
{"role": "system", "content": system_msg},
{"role": "user", "content": transcript},
],
}
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][REASONING → OPENAI] FULL SYSTEM message (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(system_msg), system_msg,
)
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][REASONING → OPENAI] USER transcript (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(transcript), transcript,
)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][OPENAI] reasoning POST %s/chat/completions model=%s systemLen=%d transcriptLen=%d language=%s",
OPENAI_BASE_URL, OPENAI_REASONING_MODEL,
len(system_parts[0]) if system_parts else 0, len(transcript),
(req.language or "")[:20] or "auto",
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as http:
resp = await http.post(
f"{OPENAI_BASE_URL}/chat/completions",
headers=_openai_headers(),
json=body,
)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("OpenAI reasoning unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="OpenAI reasoning unreachable.")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][OPENAI] reasoning RESP status=%s len=%dB",
resp.status_code, len(resp.content or b""),
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.warning("OpenAI reasoning failed %s: %s", resp.status_code, resp.text[:400])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"OpenAI reasoning failed ({resp.status_code}).")
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
logger.warning("OpenAI reasoning returned invalid JSON: %s", resp.text[:400])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="OpenAI reasoning returned invalid JSON.")
answer = ""
choices = payload.get("choices")
if isinstance(choices, list) and choices:
message = choices[0].get("message") if isinstance(choices[0], dict) else None
if isinstance(message, dict):
content = message.get("content")
if isinstance(content, str):
answer = content.strip()
usage = payload.get("usage")
if isinstance(usage, dict):
logger.debug(
"[EXT][OPENAI] reasoning USAGE prompt=%d completion=%d total=%d",
usage.get("prompt_tokens", 0), usage.get("completion_tokens", 0), usage.get("total_tokens", 0),
)
if not answer:
logger.warning("OpenAI reasoning returned empty answer: %s", json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=True)[:800])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="OpenAI reasoning returned no answer.")
logger.info("[Vocero REASONING] engine=OPENAI transcript=%s answer=%s", transcript[:300], answer[:500])
# ── APIPILOT: cattura marker → esecuzione tool → SECONDA PASSATA OPENAI
tool_name_p1_oai, tool_args_p1_oai = _apipilot_parse_call_marker(answer)
if tool_name_p1_oai:
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=OPENAI_PASS2_TRIGGER name=%r argsKeys=%s", tool_name_p1_oai, sorted(list((tool_args_p1_oai or {}).keys())))
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 trigger OPENAI marker name=%s args=%s",
tool_name_p1_oai,
json.dumps(tool_args_p1_oai or {}, ensure_ascii=True)[:300],
)
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=OPENAI_PASS2_EXEC_HELPER name=%r → forward a _apipilot_execute_tool", tool_name_p1_oai)
tool_env_oai_p1 = await _apipilot_execute_tool(
auth_header=apipilot_auth_header,
demo_session=None,
name=tool_name_p1_oai,
arguments=tool_args_p1_oai or {},
)
is_tool_err_oai = not bool(tool_env_oai_p1.get("success"))
tool_data_oai = tool_env_oai_p1.get("data")
if isinstance(tool_data_oai, str):
tool_text_oai = tool_data_oai
elif tool_data_oai is None:
tool_text_oai = ""
else:
try:
tool_text_oai = json.dumps(tool_data_oai, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2)
except Exception:
tool_text_oai = str(tool_data_oai)
if is_tool_err_oai and isinstance(tool_env_oai_p1.get("error"), dict):
err_oai = tool_env_oai_p1["error"]
err_oai_head = f"[{err_oai.get('code')}] {err_oai.get('message')}"
tool_text_oai = (err_oai_head + ("\n" + tool_text_oai if tool_text_oai.strip() else "")).strip()
inject_apipilot_pass2_oai = _resolve_apipilot_reasoning_context_block(
[],
call_result={
"name": tool_name_p1_oai,
"text": tool_text_oai,
"error": is_tool_err_oai,
},
)
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 OPENAI execute name=%s success=%s resultLen=%d → seconda chiamata chat/completions",
tool_name_p1_oai,
str(not is_tool_err_oai).lower(),
len(tool_text_oai),
)
# Build pass2: stesso instructions + user_context ma SOSTITUISCO la
# lista strumenti (inject_apipilot_text_pass1) con il blocco risultato
# (inject_apipilot_pass2_oai). Riuso lo stesso parts pattern iniziale.
user_ctx_oai_2: list[str] = []
if voice_lock_block.strip():
user_ctx_oai_2.append(voice_lock_block)
if today_block.strip():
user_ctx_oai_2.append(today_block)
if inject_episode_text:
user_ctx_oai_2.append(inject_episode_text)
if inject_profile_text:
user_ctx_oai_2.append(inject_profile_text)
if inject_reports_text:
user_ctx_oai_2.append(inject_reports_text)
if inject_summary_text:
user_ctx_oai_2.append(inject_summary_text)
if inject_apipilot_pass2_oai:
user_ctx_oai_2.append(inject_apipilot_pass2_oai)
if original_user_context:
user_ctx_oai_2.append(original_user_context)
user_ctx_oai_2 = _dedup_context_blocks_by_type(user_ctx_oai_2)
stripped_oai_2: list[str] = []
for p in user_ctx_oai_2:
sp = _strip_internal_markers(p)
if sp:
stripped_oai_2.append(sp)
user_ctx_oai_2 = stripped_oai_2
eff_user_ctx_oai_2 = "\n\n".join(user_ctx_oai_2)
if S2S_INJECT_PROFILE:
eff_inst_oai_2 = _augment_instructions_with_profile(
req.instructions or "", inject_profile_text, inject_reports_text,
inject_summary_text, inject_episode_text, profile_obj=profile_obj,
)
else:
eff_inst_oai_2 = (req.instructions or "").strip()
sys_parts_oai_2: list[str] = []
instr_oai_2 = eff_inst_oai_2 or ((req.instructions or "").strip())
if instr_oai_2:
sys_parts_oai_2.append(instr_oai_2)
if eff_user_ctx_oai_2.strip():
sys_parts_oai_2.append(f"User context:\n{eff_user_ctx_oai_2.strip()}")
if inject_apipilot_pass2_oai:
sys_parts_oai_2.append(inject_apipilot_pass2_oai)
if req.language.strip():
sys_parts_oai_2.append(
"Reply only with the final assistant answer text. "
f"Keep the answer natural and concise in this language: {req.language.strip()}."
)
else:
sys_parts_oai_2.append(
"Reply only with the final assistant answer text. Keep the answer natural and concise."
)
system_msg_oai_2 = "\n\n".join(sys_parts_oai_2)
body_oai_2 = {
"model": OPENAI_REASONING_MODEL,
"messages": [
{"role": "system", "content": system_msg_oai_2},
{"role": "user", "content": transcript},
],
}
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-PROMPT][REASONING → OPENAI PASS-2] FULL SYSTEM message (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(system_msg_oai_2), system_msg_oai_2,
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=30.0) as http_oai2:
resp_oai_2 = await http_oai2.post(
f"{OPENAI_BASE_URL}/chat/completions",
headers=_openai_headers(),
json=body_oai_2,
)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("[EXT][OPENAI PASS-2] unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="OpenAI reasoning unreachable (pass 2).")
if resp_oai_2.status_code != 200:
logger.warning("[EXT][OPENAI PASS-2] failed %s: %s", resp_oai_2.status_code, resp_oai_2.text[:400])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"OpenAI reasoning pass 2 failed ({resp_oai_2.status_code}).")
try:
payload_oai_2 = resp_oai_2.json()
except Exception:
logger.warning("[EXT][OPENAI PASS-2] invalid JSON: %s", resp_oai_2.text[:400])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="OpenAI reasoning returned invalid JSON (pass 2).")
final_oai_ans = ""
choices_oai_2 = payload_oai_2.get("choices")
if isinstance(choices_oai_2, list) and choices_oai_2:
msg_oai_2 = choices_oai_2[0].get("message") if isinstance(choices_oai_2[0], dict) else None
if isinstance(msg_oai_2, dict):
content_oai_2 = msg_oai_2.get("content")
if isinstance(content_oai_2, str):
final_oai_ans = content_oai_2.strip()
usage_oai_2 = payload_oai_2.get("usage")
if not final_oai_ans:
# Fallback: testo raw risposta strumento come ultima ratio
logger.warning("[EXT][OPENAI PASS-2] answer vuota, fallback testo raw risultato strumento")
final_oai_ans = (tool_text_oai or answer).strip()
final_out_oai: dict = {"answer": final_oai_ans}
if usage_oai_2:
final_out_oai["usage_pass2"] = usage_oai_2
final_out_oai["apipilot_invoked"] = {
"name": tool_name_p1_oai,
"success": not is_tool_err_oai,
"result_length": len(tool_text_oai),
}
logger.info(
"[Vocero REASONING] engine=OPENAI PASS-2 transcript=%s finalAnswer=%s apipilot=%s",
transcript[:300], final_oai_ans[:500],
json.dumps(final_out_oai["apipilot_invoked"], ensure_ascii=True),
)
return JSONResponse(final_out_oai)
# Nessun marker → risposta pass 1 originale
return JSONResponse({"answer": answer})
async def _forward_agent_text_to_nodered(payload: dict) -> None:
"""Fire-and-forget: inoltra la risposta TTS del backend nativo a Node-RED
(endpoint /api/log/system-response) per il logging della FASE 1.
Se Node-RED è down o non è configurato: silent ignore, non propagare errori
al realtime loop (non vogliamo bloccare la connessione WS)."""
if S2S_REASONING_TYPE != "NODE_RED" or not NODE_RED_REASONING_URL:
return
url = f"{NODE_RED_REASONING_URL}/api/log/system-response"
logger.debug(
"[EXT][NODE_RED] forward system-response POST %s len=%d source=%s",
NODE_RED_REASONING_URL,
len(str(payload.get("tts", "")) or 0),
payload.get("source_event") or "-",
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5.0) as http:
resp = await http.post(
url,
json=payload,
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"X-S2S-Caller": "demo-server",
},
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
logger.debug(
"[EXT][NODE_RED] forward system-response non-200 status=%s body=%s",
resp.status_code,
(resp.text or "")[:300],
)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.debug("[EXT][NODE_RED] forward system-response unreachable: %r", exc)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — vogliamo non bloccare mai
logger.debug("[EXT][NODE_RED] forward system-response unexpected: %r", exc)
@app.websocket("/v1/realtime")
async def realtime_proxy(ws: WebSocket):
"""Relay the browser's same-origin realtime WebSocket to the configured upstream."""
client_ip = ws.client.host if ws.client else "?"
if not S2S_PROXY_TARGET:
logger.debug("[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s rejected: S2S_PROXY_TARGET not configured", client_ip)
await ws.accept()
await ws.close(code=1013, reason="Realtime proxy not configured.")
return
await ws.accept()
upstream_url = _proxy_upstream_url(ws)
subprotocols = _subprotocols(ws)
# ── S2S_INJECT_PROFILE: resolve caller profile + podcast episode + latest summary ──
# Query params (browser URL carries ?phoneNumber=...&episode_id=...) are forwarded by the
# client WS library: we read ?phoneNumber= and ?episode_id= from the incoming WS query.
# When S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false or envs missing -> ctx fields stay empty
# and the tunnel stays 100% pure passthrough (original behaviour).
injected_episode_context = ""
injected_profile_context = ""
injected_reports_context = ""
injected_summary_context = ""
injected_apipilot_pass1 = ""
apipilot_tools_pass1: list = []
inject_phone = ""
inject_episode_id = ""
client_query = {}
login_token: str | None = None
login_response_obj: dict | None = None
profile_obj: dict | None = None
needs_apipilot = bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL) or bool(S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL)
try:
client_query = dict(parse_qsl(ws.url.query, keep_blank_values=True))
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
client_query = {}
# ── 2026-09-25 EXTRACT QS + LOGIN PER APIPILOT SEMPRE (fuori gate S2S_INJECT_PROFILE) ──
# Perché needs_apipilot è INDIPENDENTE da S2S_INJECT_PROFILE (ApiPilot serve anche
# quando non si vuole inject del profilo).
# 1) phone + episode_id SEMPRE estratti da ?querystring se needs_apipilot=True
# 2) S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE bearer SEMPRE ottenuto per tools requires_auth=True (403 anon oggi)
# 3) profile_obj SEMPRE risolto se VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL + phone (per email defaults)
if needs_apipilot:
inject_phone = (client_query.get("phoneNumber") or "").strip() or inject_phone
inject_episode_id = (client_query.get("episode_id") or "").strip() or inject_episode_id
_needs_login_apipilot = bool(S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE.strip())
_needs_profile_apipilot = bool(VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL.strip())
# 2026-09-25 Diagnostica SEMPRE-ATTIVA WS connect STATO INIZIALE (prima di qualsiasi cosa)
# così sappiamo sempre se inject_phone è arrivato, login_token quanto è lungo,
# S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE è configurato, ecc. Serve a vedere perché user=(anon) in AquaPortal.
_s_init = {
"needs_apipilot": needs_apipilot,
"phoneLen": len(inject_phone or ""),
"phoneHead": (("+" + inject_phone.lstrip("+")[:3] + "...") if (inject_phone and len(inject_phone) > 6) else (inject_phone or "")),
"loginTokenLen": (len(login_token) if isinstance(login_token, str) and login_token.strip() else 0),
"loginByPhone": ("YES" if _needs_login_apipilot else "NO"),
"profileUrl": ("YES" if _needs_profile_apipilot else "NO"),
"S2S_INJECT_PROFILE": S2S_INJECT_PROFILE,
}
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT][WS connect] STATO INIZIALE (sempre): " + ", ".join("%s=%s" % (k, v) for k, v in sorted(_s_init.items())),
)
# 2026-09-25 API KEY BYPASS ATTIVA → saltiamo completamente login_by_phone (non serve)
if not S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY and _needs_login_apipilot and inject_phone and (not isinstance(login_token, str) or not login_token.strip() or (isinstance(login_token, str) and 0 < len(login_token.strip()) < 80)):
try:
login_token, _lresp = await _login_by_phone(inject_phone)
if isinstance(_lresp, dict) and _lresp:
login_response_obj = _lresp
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT][WS connect] login_by_phone SEMPRE (per Apipilot execute requires_auth) phoneLen=%d token=%s",
len(inject_phone or ""),
("YES len=%d" % len(login_token or "")) if isinstance(login_token, str) and login_token else "NONE (403!)",
)
except Exception as _exc_login: # noqa: BLE001
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT][WS connect] login_by_phone failed (Apipilot user ANON, 403 probabile) phoneLen=%d err=%r",
len(inject_phone or ""), _exc_login,
)
if _needs_profile_apipilot and inject_phone and (not isinstance(profile_obj, dict) or not profile_obj):
try:
profile_obj = await _fetch_user_profile_for_phone(inject_phone, auth_token=login_token)
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT][WS connect] profile fetch SEMPRE (per email defaults) phoneLen=%d profile=%s",
len(inject_phone or ""),
("FOUND user=%s" % (((profile_obj or {}).get("user") or {}).get("name") or "?")) if isinstance(profile_obj, dict) else "NONE",
)
except Exception as _exc_p: # noqa: BLE001
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT][WS connect] profile fetch failed phoneLen=%d err=%r",
len(inject_phone or ""), _exc_p,
)
if not needs_apipilot:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] ⏭️ WS connect: APIPILOT tools injection DISABLED (S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL='%s' S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL='%s'). "
"Nessun fetch e nessun patch session.update per ApiPilot in questo tunnel.",
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL,
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL,
)
if not S2S_INJECT_PROFILE:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS connect: SKIPPED (S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false). "
"No profile/episode fetch; tunnel stays pure passthrough for injects EXCEPT apipilot."
)
else:
needs_phone_authed = bool(VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL.strip())
# USER FIX 2026-09-11 "Elimina l'iniezione massiva di tutti i report schedulati":
# SAME gate as the REASONING endpoint above. "needs_reports" becomes True
# only when BOTH the URL env is configured AND the new opt-in S2S_INJECT_REPORTS
# flag is true. With the default (S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=false) this entire 1.5)
# branch of the WS connect path is skipped — reports-list fetch never runs.
needs_reports = bool(S2S_REPORT_LIST.strip()) and S2S_INJECT_REPORTS
needs_summary = bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY.strip()) or bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT)
needs_login = bool(S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE.strip())
inject_phone = (client_query.get("phoneNumber") or "").strip()
inject_episode_id = (client_query.get("episode_id") or "").strip()
can_inject = (
needs_phone_authed or needs_reports or needs_summary or needs_login
or bool(inject_episode_id)
)
if not can_inject:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS connect: SKIPPED (VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL, S2S_REPORT_LIST, S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY/S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT and S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE all empty, AND no episode_id in query; OR S2S_INJECT_REPORTS is false so scheduled report injection is globally disabled). "
"Set at least one AND set S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true (if you want scheduled reports) to enable caller context / reports / login / episode."
)
elif (not inject_phone) and (not needs_reports) and (not inject_episode_id) and (not S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT):
# reports list can be fetched without phone (generic list); episode can be fetched without phone;
# S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT also works without phone (static text override)
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS connect: SKIPPED (incoming WS query has NO ?phoneNumber= AND no ?episode_id=, AND S2S_REPORT_LIST+S2S_INJECT_REPORTS not enabled). "
"Make sure the browser opens the WS with the phone or episode_id query param, or set S2S_INJECT_REPORTS=true if you want scheduled reports without phone."
)
else:
# 0) Login-by-phone (optional — only if S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE env is set).
# Obtains a bearer token used on subsequent profile/reports/summary fetches.
if needs_login and inject_phone:
login_token, login_response_obj = await _login_by_phone(inject_phone)
# 0.5) Podcast episode fetch (independent of phone — uses only episode_id from query)
if inject_episode_id:
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] WS connect: starting podcast episode fetch episodeId=%.80s...",
inject_episode_id,
)
episode_raw = await _fetch_podcast_episode(inject_episode_id)
injected_episode_context = _resolve_episode_context(episode_raw)
if injected_episode_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ✅ WS connect: PODCAST EPISODE READY episodeId=%.80s wrappedLen=%d -> will patch session.update frames in this tunnel.",
inject_episode_id, len(injected_episode_context),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-EPISODE] ⏭️ WS connect: episode skipped (context empty / upstream returned empty / fetch failed)."
)
# 1) Profile fetch (optional — only if env is set)
if needs_phone_authed and inject_phone:
profile_obj = await _fetch_user_profile_for_phone(inject_phone, auth_token=login_token)
injected_profile_context = _resolve_user_context_text(
inject_phone, profile_obj, loaded=True
)
if injected_profile_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ✅ WS connect: profile READY phoneLen=%d contextLen=%d -> will patch all client session.update frames in this tunnel.",
len(inject_phone), len(injected_profile_context),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] ⏭️ WS connect: profile fetch OK but resolved empty. Tunnel stays pure passthrough for profile."
)
# 1.5) Reports list fetch (optional — only if env is set)
if needs_reports:
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] WS connect: starting S2S_REPORT_LIST fetch (phoneLen=%s bearer=%s)...",
len(inject_phone) if inject_phone else "none",
"yes" if login_token else "no",
)
reports_raw = await _fetch_reports_list(
phone_number=inject_phone if inject_phone else None,
auth_token=login_token,
)
injected_reports_context = _resolve_reports_context(reports_raw)
if injected_reports_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ✅ WS connect: reports list READY wrappedLen=%d -> will patch session.update frames in this tunnel.",
len(injected_reports_context),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-REPORTS] ⏭️ WS connect: reports list skipped (context empty / upstream returned empty list / fetch failed)."
)
# 2) Latest summary fetch (optional — only if env is set)
if needs_summary and (inject_phone or S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT):
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] WS connect: starting summary load (S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY=%s S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT=%s phoneLen=%s)...",
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY),
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT),
len(inject_phone) if inject_phone else "none",
)
latest_summary_raw = await _fetch_latest_summary_for_phone(inject_phone, auth_token=login_token)
injected_summary_context = _resolve_latest_summary_context(latest_summary_raw)
if injected_summary_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ✅ WS connect: latest SUMMARY READY phoneLen=%s summaryTextOverride=%s wrappedLen=%d -> will patch session.update frames in this tunnel.",
len(inject_phone) if inject_phone else "none",
bool(S2S_LATEST_SUMMARY_TEXT),
len(injected_summary_context),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-SUMMARY] ⏭️ WS connect: latest summary skipped (context empty / upstream returned empty summary / fetch failed)."
)
# 3) ApiPilot tools list fetch (PASSATA-1) — INDIRIZZO FISSO ALL'AI-SERVER SIA IN S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=True che False.
# Siamo indipendenti dal flag profilo perché l'utente ha chiesto che la lista arrivi
# sempre, anche quando non c'è login/phone. Usa login_token se presente (stesso bearer di reasoning),
# altrimenti usa "anon" fingerprint (stesso cache server-side reasoning).
if needs_apipilot:
apipilot_auth_header = (f"Bearer {login_token}" if isinstance(login_token, str) and login_token.strip() else None)
# 2026-09-25 IMPORTANTE: S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE = aquachile AUTH PHONE LOGIN
# → login_token È IL TOKEN JWT AQUAPORTAL VERO. Lo usiamo per execute.
# S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN (se valorizzato in .env) → OVERRIDE massimo.
if S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN:
_svc = S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN.strip()
if _svc:
apipilot_auth_header = (f"Bearer {_svc}" if not _svc.lower().startswith("bearer ") else _svc)
demo_session_key = client_query.get("x-demo-session") if isinstance(client_query, dict) else None
if not demo_session_key:
demo_session_key = f"anon-ws-{client_ip}-{id(ws)}"
try:
# LOG SEMPRE-ATTIVO (non subordinato a S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT) — identico pattern reasoning pass1.
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] WS connect: fetching tools (auth=%s demoSession=%.40s...) upstream=%s...",
"yes" if apipilot_auth_header else "anon",
(demo_session_key[:40] if isinstance(demo_session_key, str) else "?"),
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL or "<using override execute>",
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT:
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-APIPILOT][WS connect] tools fetch detail toolsURL=%s executeURL=%s overrideExec=%s",
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_URL,
S2S_APIPILOT_TOOLS_EXECUTE_URL,
_apipilot_resolve_execute_url(),
)
_t0 = _monotonic_now()
apipilot_tools_pass1 = await _apipilot_fetch_tools(
auth_header=apipilot_auth_header,
demo_session=demo_session_key if isinstance(demo_session_key, str) else None,
refresh=False,
) or []
_el = (_monotonic_now() - _t0)
# Build defaults dict per PASSATA-1 prompt: phone + episodeId se disponibili.
# Iniettati nella sezione "VALORES POR DEFECTO CONOCIDOS" così l'AI
# NON lascia arguments vuoto (BUG oggi: "ARGUMENTS=>>>").
_apipilot_defaults_p1: dict[str, str] = {}
if isinstance(inject_phone, str) and inject_phone.strip():
_apipilot_defaults_p1["phone"] = inject_phone.strip()
if isinstance(inject_episode_id, str) and inject_episode_id.strip():
_apipilot_defaults_p1["episode_id"] = inject_episode_id.strip()
# Anche login_by_phone se abbiamo profilo con email valida → email
if isinstance(profile_obj, dict) and profile_obj:
try:
u = profile_obj.get("user") if isinstance(profile_obj.get("user"), dict) else None
if isinstance(u, dict):
email = u.get("email") if isinstance(u.get("email"), str) else ""
if email.strip():
_apipilot_defaults_p1["email"] = email.strip()
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
pass
session_ctx_apipilot_defaults = dict(_apipilot_defaults_p1)
injected_apipilot_pass1 = _resolve_apipilot_reasoning_context_block(
tools=apipilot_tools_pass1, context_defaults=_apipilot_defaults_p1,
) or ""
if injected_apipilot_pass1.strip():
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-1 (WS realtime): lista strumenti pronta N=%d t=%.0fms auth=%s defaults=%s",
len(apipilot_tools_pass1), _el,
"Y" if isinstance(apipilot_auth_header, str) else "anon",
list(_apipilot_defaults_p1.keys()),
)
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] ✅ WS connect: APIPILOT TOOLS list PASS-1 READY Ntools=%d wrappedLen=%d defaultsPhone=%s -> will patch session.update frames in this tunnel.",
len(apipilot_tools_pass1), len(injected_apipilot_pass1),
("yes" if _apipilot_defaults_p1.get("phone") else "no"),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] ⏭️ WS connect: apipilot fetch returned empty tools list; PASS-1 injection skipped for this tunnel.",
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
logger.info(
"[INJECT-APIPILOT] ⛔ WS connect: apipilot tools fetch failed. Skipping PASS-1 injection for tunnel. err=%r",
exc,
)
injected_apipilot_pass1 = ""
apipilot_tools_pass1 = []
session_ctx_apipilot_defaults = {}
# 2026-09-25 Propagazione ESATTA demo_session_key + apipilot_auth_header USATI NELLA DISCOVERY
# (stesso anon-ws-{client_ip}-{id(ws)}), perché AquaPortal lega la sessione utente
# al valore x-demo-session della GET /tools. Se nella PASS-2 execute generiamo
# un valore DIVERSO (ws-pass2-...) → vede user ANON → 403 "Tool non autorizzato".
_ws_apipilot_auth_for_execute = apipilot_auth_header
_ws_apipilot_demo_for_execute = demo_session_key if isinstance(demo_session_key, str) else None
# 2026-09-25 FIX CONSISTENZA API KEY: se S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY è attivo, forza TUTTE le
# variabili di propagazione all'identità bypass (stesso valore che abbiamo usato
# nella fingerprint cache e negli headers HTTP effettivi della discovery).
# Questo garantisce che anche nel raro caso in cui il PASS-2 fallback alla
# propagation invece del nuovo blocco diretto, usi APIKEY identity e non anon-ws.
if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY:
_ws_apipilot_auth_for_execute = f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY}"
_ws_apipilot_demo_for_execute = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
else:
# needs_apipilot=False (env non configurato): set defaults vuoto cmq
# per evitare che session_ctx["apipilot_defaults"] sia None.
session_ctx_apipilot_defaults = {}
injected_apipilot_pass1 = ""
apipilot_tools_pass1 = []
_ws_apipilot_auth_for_execute = None
_ws_apipilot_demo_for_execute = None
logger.info(
"[INJECT-PROFILE] WS connect FINAL: injectEpisode=%s injectProfile=%s injectReports=%s injectSummary=%s injectApipilotPass1=%s(Ntools=%d) login=%s episodeIdLen=%d phoneLen=%d episodeCtxLen=%d profileCtxLen=%d reportsCtxLen=%d summaryCtxLen=%d apipilotCtxLen=%d target=%s",
bool(injected_episode_context),
bool(injected_profile_context),
bool(injected_reports_context),
bool(injected_summary_context),
bool(injected_apipilot_pass1.strip()),
len(apipilot_tools_pass1),
("token-present" if login_token else "skipped"),
len(inject_episode_id),
len(inject_phone),
len(injected_episode_context),
len(injected_profile_context),
len(injected_reports_context),
len(injected_summary_context),
len(injected_apipilot_pass1),
upstream_url,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and injected_episode_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-EPISODE][WS connect] FULL podcast episode block loaded (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(injected_episode_context), injected_episode_context,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and injected_reports_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-REPORTS][WS connect] FULL reports list block loaded (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(injected_reports_context), injected_reports_context,
)
if S2S_DEBUG_PROMPT and injected_summary_context.strip():
logger.info(
"[DEBUG-SUMMARY][WS connect] FULL latest summary block loaded (len=%d):\n%s\n",
len(injected_summary_context), injected_summary_context,
)
try:
async with websockets.connect(
upstream_url,
subprotocols=subprotocols or None,
open_timeout=15,
max_size=None,
) as upstream:
logger.info("[INJECT-PROFILE] WS tunnel ESTABLISHED client=%s", client_ip)
session_ctx = {
"last_user_transcript": "",
"last_item_id": None,
"injected_episode_context": injected_episode_context,
"injected_profile_context": injected_profile_context,
"injected_reports_context": injected_reports_context,
"injected_summary_context": injected_summary_context,
"injected_apipilot_pass1": injected_apipilot_pass1,
"inject_phone": inject_phone,
"inject_episode_id": inject_episode_id,
"login_token": login_token,
"login_response": login_response_obj,
# 2026-09-11 proper-name anglicization guard: keep the full
# upstream profile object so:
# (a) _build_voice_rules_head_lock_block can emit rule #5
# "Nombre exacto: Alessandro Valenti — NUNCA Alexander"
# (b) strato 7 post-processing _sanitize_agent_output can
# deterministically replace Alexander/Alexandre back to
# Alessandro with word-boundary regex even when the
# prompt lock fails on GPTQ.
"profile_obj": profile_obj,
"apipilot_tools_pass1": apipilot_tools_pass1,
# 2026-09-25 PASSATA-2 WS Realtime ApiPilot: accumulo transcript per response_id
# e flag anti-loop quando siamo in fase di inject di PASS-2 dopo l'execute.
"_ws_apipilot_asst_transcript_acc": {}, # response_id -> str full transcript
"_ws_apipilot_pass2_active": False, # True mentre siamo dentro la 2a risposta (anti-loop marker infinito)
"_ws_apipilot_pass2_count": 0, # quante volte abbiamo eseguito il loop su questa sessione (cap max 3 safety)
# 2026-09-25 defaults parametri (phone/email/episode_id) riempiti in
# PASS-1 builder e passati a _apipilot_parse_call_marker in PASS-2
# se LLM lascia arguments vuoto.
"apipilot_defaults": (session_ctx_apipilot_defaults if needs_apipilot else {}),
# 2026-09-25 fallback phone per PASS-2 safety replace placeholder,
# usato anche se defaults è vuoto ma querystring aveva ?phoneNumber=.
"inject_phone": (inject_phone if isinstance(inject_phone, str) else ""),
# 2026-09-25 Bearer token per execute ApiPilot requires_auth=True (403 anon).
# Valorizzato con _login_by_phone se needs_apipilot + phone disponibile
# fuori da gate S2S_INJECT_PROFILE.
"login_token": (login_token if isinstance(login_token, str) else None),
# 2026-09-25 ESATTI auth_header + demo_session_key usati nella GET /tools
# DISCOVERY al momento della WS connect. PASS-2 execute usa ESATTAMENTE
# questi invece di crearne di nuovi (AquaPortal lega sessione x-demo-session
# alla chiamata /tools che ha restituito la lista strumenti autorizzati).
"apipilot_exec_auth": _ws_apipilot_auth_for_execute,
"apipilot_exec_demo": _ws_apipilot_demo_for_execute,
}
client_to_upstream = asyncio.create_task(
_client_to_upstream(ws, upstream, client_ip, session_ctx)
)
upstream_to_client = asyncio.create_task(
_upstream_to_client(ws, upstream, client_ip, session_ctx)
)
done, pending = await asyncio.wait(
{client_to_upstream, upstream_to_client},
return_when=asyncio.FIRST_COMPLETED,
)
for task in pending:
task.cancel()
await asyncio.gather(*pending, return_exceptions=True)
for task in done:
exc = task.exception()
if exc:
raise exc
except WebSocketDisconnect:
logger.debug("[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s disconnected (WSDisconnect)", client_ip)
return
except Exception as exc:
logger.warning("Realtime proxy failed: %r", exc)
logger.debug("[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s ERROR %s", client_ip, type(exc).__name__)
try:
await ws.close(code=1011, reason="Upstream realtime unavailable.")
except Exception:
pass
finally:
logger.debug("[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s TUNNEL CLOSED", client_ip)
@app.get("/api/user/phone")
async def user_by_phone(phoneNumber: str):
"""HTTP passthrough: fetches caller identity / profile from the external
info endpoint set via VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL and forwards the raw
JSON to the browser.
The proxy NEVER inspects this payload nor injects it into the realtime
WebSocket session. It is only used by:
- the browser UI to render a caller name header (#ident-user-name)
- the /api/reasoning HTTP body user_context field (browser's choice).
When VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL is unset we return 503 so the UI can
silently skip identity loading (backward compatible with generic deploys).
When S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE is set, the proxy first performs a login-by-phone
POST with the caller phone and (if a bearer token is extracted) forwards
it as Authorization: Bearer on the subsequent profile GET.
"""
from urllib.parse import urlencode
if not VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=503,
detail="VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL is not configured on this deploy.",
)
phone = (phoneNumber or "").strip()
if not phone:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="phoneNumber is required.")
# 0) Login-by-phone (optional — only if S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE env is set).
login_token = None
if S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE:
login_token, _login_obj = await _login_by_phone(phone)
target_url = f"{VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL}?{urlencode({'phoneNumber': phone})}"
logger.debug(
"[EXT][USER-BY-PHONE] GET upstream=%s phoneLen=%d bearer=%s",
VOCERO_USER_PHONE_AUTH_URL,
len(phone),
"yes" if login_token else "no",
)
try:
headers = {}
if login_token:
headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {login_token}"
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0, follow_redirects=True) as http:
resp = await http.get(target_url, headers=headers or None)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("[EXT][USER-BY-PHONE] unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Upstream user-info endpoint is unreachable.")
# Forward the upstream status + JSON verbatim; never rewrite the payload.
if resp.status_code >= 500:
logger.warning(
"[EXT][USER-BY-PHONE] upstream HTTP %s: %.200s",
resp.status_code, resp.text,
)
try:
payload = resp.json()
except Exception:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=502,
detail="Upstream user-info endpoint returned invalid JSON.",
)
return JSONResponse(status_code=resp.status_code if resp.status_code != 204 else 200, content=payload)
@app.get("/api/user/reports")
async def user_reports(phoneNumber: str | None = None):
"""Fetch + normalize the scheduled reports list for the caller UI.
Mirrors the same sequence used in the WebSocket connect handler and
/api/reasoning:
0. login-by-phone (optional) → bearer token
1. GET S2S_REPORT_LIST with ?phoneNumber= (if phone provided) + Bearer auth
2. run the same resolver used for prompt injection: filter 3 fields,
sort DESC, build hints + entries → JSON returned verbatim so the
browser can render a "reports loaded" summary in the UI header.
Returns 503 when S2S_REPORT_LIST is not configured (generic deploy with no
reports feature enabled) so the browser silently skips UI rendering.
Response shape on success:
{
"count": N,
"wrappedLen": X,
"hints": [ "• Report #1: '<label>' — scheduled on <date>", ... ],
"entries": [
{"sourceScheduleLabel": "...", "date": "...", "podcastScript": "..."},
...
]
}
USER FIX 2026-09-11 "Elimina l'iniezione massiva di tutti i report schedulati":
• Even this BROWSER-FACING endpoint (/api/user/reports) now honours the new
S2S_INJECT_REPORTS default=False gate: when S2S_INJECT_REPORTS is not
explicitly true, we return a polite 403 + empty response — the endpoint
does NOT execute any upstream S2S_REPORT_LIST HTTP call, does NOT expose
any podcastScript bodies, and does NOT emit entries/hints. This avoids
a subtle loophole where the browser could still fetch scheduled reports
through /api/user/reports while the LLM prompt paths were gated.
"""
# ── MASS-INJECTION KILL SWITCH (user request) ─────────────────────────
if not S2S_INJECT_REPORTS:
return JSONResponse(
status_code=200,
content={
"count": 0,
"wrappedLen": 0,
"hints": [],
"entries": [],
"skipped": True,
"reason": "S2S_INJECT_REPORTS is disabled on this deploy; no scheduled reports exposed to UI or LLM.",
},
)
# ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if not S2S_REPORT_LIST:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=503,
detail="S2S_REPORT_LIST is not configured on this deploy.",
)
phone = (phoneNumber or "").strip() or None
# 0) Login-by-phone if enabled. Bearer token used only if login succeeded
# (same rule as WS connect / reasoning handlers — never-fail).
login_token = None
if S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE and phone:
login_token, _login_obj = await _login_by_phone(phone)
reports_raw = await _fetch_reports_list(phone, login_token)
# Re-run the same resolver used for prompt injection → identical logic
# guarantees UI and LLM see exactly the same filtered/sorted list.
ctx_str = _resolve_reports_context(reports_raw)
if not ctx_str or not isinstance(reports_raw, list):
return JSONResponse({
"count": 0,
"wrappedLen": 0,
"hints": [],
"entries": [],
"skipped": True,
"reason": "empty list / upstream error / nothing to inject",
})
# Rebuild hints + normalized entries with the exact filtered output
items_list: list = reports_raw
# Re-derive filtered + sorted list (same as _resolve_reports_context) so
# we don't accidentally expose raw unfiltered upstream payload to the UI.
filtered: list[dict] = []
for item in items_list:
if not isinstance(item, dict):
continue
cleaned: dict = {}
label_val: object = None
if item.get("sourceScheduleLabel") is not None:
label_val = item["sourceScheduleLabel"]
elif isinstance(item.get("sourceSchedule"), dict):
ss = item["sourceSchedule"]
for k in ("label", "name", "title"):
if ss.get(k) is not None:
label_val = ss[k]
break
if label_val is not None:
cleaned["sourceScheduleLabel"] = label_val
date_val: object = None
if item.get("date") is not None:
date_val = item["date"]
elif isinstance(item.get("sourceSchedule"), dict):
ss = item["sourceSchedule"]
for k in ("date", "scheduledAt", "publishedAt"):
if ss.get(k) is not None:
date_val = ss[k]
break
if date_val is not None:
cleaned["date"] = date_val
script_val: object = None
for k in ("podcastScript", "script", "text", "content"):
if item.get(k) is not None:
script_val = item[k]
break
if script_val is not None:
cleaned["podcastScript"] = script_val
if cleaned:
filtered.append(cleaned)
filtered.sort(key=lambda r: _parse_date_key(r.get("date")))
# ── USER FIX 2026-09-11 "riduci il quick hint report max 3-5 configurabile da .env" ──
# Apply the SAME cap used by the LLM prompt resolver: after sort by newest,
# keep only first S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX entries. This keeps counts between
# /api/user/reports UI JSON and the LLM prompt identical — avoids confusing
# mismatches where the UI shows 20 hints but the prompt only saw 5.
total_raw_ui = len(filtered)
cap_ui = max(1, int(S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX or 5))
truncated_ui_note: str | None = None
if total_raw_ui > cap_ui:
filtered = filtered[:cap_ui]
truncated_ui_note = (
f"Showing newest {cap_ui} of {total_raw_ui} upstream reports. "
f"Adjust S2S_REPORTS_QUICK_HINT_MAX env to raise/lower the window."
)
import datetime as _dt
# Deduplicate by label for the UI JSON response only.
# NOTE: the LLM prompt injection uses the full non-deduped list (different
# dates = different content even when the scheduled report name repeats).
# We only dedup entries_out, hints_list, and entries for the browser payload.
seen_labels: set[str] = set()
dedup_filtered: list[dict] = []
for r in filtered:
lbl_raw = r.get("sourceScheduleLabel")
if lbl_raw is None:
# Items with no label are kept as-is (can't meaningfully dedupe)
dedup_filtered.append(r)
continue
key = str(lbl_raw).strip()
if not key:
dedup_filtered.append(r)
continue
if key in seen_labels:
continue
seen_labels.add(key)
dedup_filtered.append(r)
hints_list: list[str] = []
entries_out: list[dict] = []
for idx, r in enumerate(dedup_filtered, start=1):
entries_out.append(r)
label_piece = (str(r["sourceScheduleLabel"]).strip()
if r.get("sourceScheduleLabel") else "")
date_piece = ""
if r.get("date") is not None:
raw_d = r["date"]
try:
if isinstance(raw_d, (int, float)) and not isinstance(raw_d, bool):
ts_sec = float(raw_d)
if ts_sec > 1e12:
ts_sec = ts_sec / 1000.0
dt = _dt.datetime.fromtimestamp(ts_sec, tz=_dt.timezone.utc)
date_piece = dt.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC")
else:
s = str(raw_d).strip()
if "T" in s and len(s) >= 16:
date_piece = s.replace("T", " ")[:16]
else:
date_piece = s
except Exception:
date_piece = str(raw_d)[:32]
if label_piece and date_piece:
hints_list.append(
f"• Report #{idx}: '{label_piece}' — scheduled on {date_piece}"
)
elif label_piece:
hints_list.append(f"• Report #{idx}: '{label_piece}'")
elif date_piece:
hints_list.append(f"• Report #{idx}: (no label) — scheduled on {date_piece}")
resp_body = {
"count": len(entries_out),
"rawCount": total_raw_ui,
"cap": cap_ui,
"wrappedLen": len(ctx_str),
"hints": hints_list,
# Strip the long podcastScript from the summary JSON to keep the
# browser response lightweight (UI only needs label/date).
"entries": [
{
"sourceScheduleLabel": r.get("sourceScheduleLabel"),
"date": r.get("date"),
}
for r in entries_out
],
}
if truncated_ui_note is not None:
resp_body["truncated"] = True
resp_body["note"] = truncated_ui_note
return JSONResponse(resp_body)
@app.get("/api/me")
async def me(request: Request):
"""Login state, tier, and remaining daily budget. Only meaningful in LB mode;
sets the anonymous tracking cookie when first seen."""
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "?"
logger.debug(
"[INTERNAL] /api/me client=%s LIMITER=%s",
client_ip, LIMITER_ENABLED,
)
if not LIMITER_ENABLED:
return {"enabled": False}
view = auth.user_view(request)
tier, keys, set_cookie = auth.resolve_identity(request)
unlimited = limiter.budget_for(tier) is None
rem = None if unlimited else await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.remaining, keys, tier)
logger.debug(
"[INTERNAL] /api/me client=%s tier=%s unlimited=%s remaining=%s setCookie=%s",
client_ip, tier, unlimited, rem, bool(set_cookie),
)
out = {
"enabled": True,
"auth": AUTH_ENABLED,
**view,
"remainingSec": rem,
"limitSec": limiter.budget_for(tier),
"loginUrl": auth.OAUTH_LOGIN_PATH if AUTH_ENABLED else None,
"logoutUrl": auth.OAUTH_LOGOUT_PATH if AUTH_ENABLED else None,
}
resp = JSONResponse(out)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
@app.post("/api/search")
async def search(req: SearchRequest):
"""Proxy a Google search via Serper.dev. The key stays on the server unless
the user brought their own (then theirs is used for this request only)."""
query = (req.query or "").strip()
if not query:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Empty query.")
key = (req.key or "").strip() or SERPER_KEY
has_user_key = bool((req.key or "").strip())
if not key:
# No server key and the user didn't supply one — search is unavailable.
raise HTTPException(status_code=503, detail="Search is not configured.")
headers = {"X-API-KEY": key, "Content-Type": "application/json"}
payload = {"q": query, "num": MAX_RESULTS}
logger.debug(
"[EXT][SERPER] search POST %s query=%s userKey=%s num=%d",
SERPER_URL, json.dumps(query, ensure_ascii=True)[:200], has_user_key, MAX_RESULTS,
)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=12.0) as http:
resp = await http.post(SERPER_URL, headers=headers, json=payload)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("Serper unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Search provider unreachable.")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][SERPER] search RESP status=%s len=%dB",
resp.status_code, len(resp.content or b""),
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
# Serper's error body carries the real reason (e.g. "Not enough
# credits") and contains no key, so it's safe to log and relay.
body = resp.text[:300]
logger.warning("Serper error %s: %s", resp.status_code, body)
msg = None
try:
msg = resp.json().get("message")
except Exception:
pass
detail = f"Search provider error ({resp.status_code})"
if msg:
detail += f": {msg}"
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=detail)
data = resp.json()
results = []
for item in (data.get("organic") or [])[:MAX_RESULTS]:
results.append(
{
"title": item.get("title", ""),
"snippet": item.get("snippet", ""),
"url": item.get("link", ""),
}
)
# A direct answer when Google has one — saves the model a hop.
box = data.get("answerBox") or {}
answer = box.get("answer") or box.get("snippet") or None
if not answer:
kg = data.get("knowledgeGraph") or {}
answer = kg.get("description") or None
logger.debug(
"[EXT][SERPER] search PARSED hasAnswer=%s resultCount=%d titles=%s",
bool(answer), len(results), [r.get("title", "")[:40] for r in results],
)
return JSONResponse({"query": query, "answer": answer, "results": results})
@app.post("/api/session")
async def session(request: Request):
"""Proxy the session handshake to the load balancer, keeping its URL secret,
and meter conversation time by tier.
The browser POSTs here (same-origin); we resolve the caller's tier, refuse if
today's budget is already spent (402), otherwise POST <LOAD_BALANCER_URL>/session
and relay the JSON back. The LB body carries a per-session `connect_url`
(compute host + short-lived token) the browser must dial directly — that one
URL is unavoidably exposed, but the stable load-balancer address is not. On a
successful grant we reserve the first time chunk against the day's budget."""
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "?"
if not LOAD_BALANCER_URL:
# No LB configured — this deploy is direct-mode only; the browser should
# never call this. 404 so it's indistinguishable from a missing route.
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found.")
tier, keys, set_cookie = auth.resolve_identity(request)
# Metering runs only on the deployed Space; off-Space the LB still proxies but
# nothing is tracked. Within metering, unlimited tiers (pro, org) aren't either.
tracked = LIMITER_ENABLED and limiter.budget_for(tier) is not None
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] session: client=%s tier=%s tracked=%s LIMITER=%s",
client_ip, tier, tracked, LIMITER_ENABLED,
)
# Refuse before troubling the LB if the day's budget is already gone. Done
# here (at enqueue) so we never put a user who can't talk into the queue.
if tracked:
rem = await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.remaining, keys, tier)
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] session: client=%s budget remaining=%s", client_ip, rem)
if rem is not None and rem <= 0:
resp = JSONResponse(
{"tier": tier, "reason": "limit", "remainingSec": 0}, status_code=402
)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
url = f"{LOAD_BALANCER_URL.rstrip('/')}/session"
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] session POST %s (handshake)", url)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0) as http:
lb = await http.post(url, headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"}, content="{}")
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("Load balancer unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Speech service unreachable.")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] session RESP status=%s len=%dB",
lb.status_code, len(lb.content or b""),
)
# The queue is full: the LB replies 503 {state:"at_capacity"}. Relay it as-is
# so the client shows a soft "try again shortly", not a hard error.
if lb.status_code == 503:
body = _safe_json(lb)
if body.get("state") == "at_capacity":
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] session: at_capacity — queue full")
resp = JSONResponse({"state": "at_capacity"}, status_code=503)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
if lb.status_code != 200:
# The LB's error body may name the reason (e.g. capacity); it carries no
# secret, so relay a trimmed copy.
logger.warning("Session handshake failed %s: %s", lb.status_code, lb.text[:300])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Session handshake failed ({lb.status_code}).")
data = lb.json()
state = data.get("state", "?")
connect_url = (data.get("connect_url") or data.get("connectUrl") or "")[:120]
session_id = data.get("session_id") or data.get("sessionId")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] session PARSED state=%s sessionId=%s hasConnectUrl=%s connectUrl=%s",
state, session_id, bool(connect_url), connect_url,
)
# Busy pool: the LB queued us. Relay the ticket untouched — crucially with NO
# reservation, so waiting in line never costs the day's budget.
if data.get("state") == "queued":
data["tier"] = tier
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] session: queued queueId=%s position=%s",
data.get("queue_id") or data.get("queueId"),
data.get("position"))
resp = JSONResponse(data)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
# A slot was free: reserve the first chunk now and return the grant.
return await _finalize_grant(data, keys, tier, tracked, set_cookie)
@app.get("/api/queue/{queue_id}")
async def queue_status(queue_id: str, request: Request):
"""Poll a waiting ticket: relay the position, or — when the head of the line
claims a freed slot — reserve the budget now and return the grant. Re-checks the
daily budget at claim, since a multi-minute wait could have spent it elsewhere."""
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "?"
if not LOAD_BALANCER_URL:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found.")
tier, keys, set_cookie = auth.resolve_identity(request)
tracked = LIMITER_ENABLED and limiter.budget_for(tier) is not None
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] queue poll: client=%s queueId=%s tier=%s",
client_ip, queue_id[:16], tier,
)
url = f"{LOAD_BALANCER_URL.rstrip('/')}/queue/{queue_id}"
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] queue GET %s", url)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=15.0) as http:
lb = await http.get(url)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("Load balancer unreachable: %r", exc)
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail="Speech service unreachable.")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] queue RESP status=%s len=%dB",
lb.status_code, len(lb.content or b""),
)
if lb.status_code == 404:
# Ticket unknown/expired (reaped after we stopped polling). Tell the client
# to start over rather than spin.
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] queue: queueId=%s EXPIRED (404)", queue_id[:16])
resp = JSONResponse({"state": "expired"}, status_code=404)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
if lb.status_code != 200:
logger.warning("Queue poll failed %s: %s", lb.status_code, lb.text[:300])
raise HTTPException(status_code=502, detail=f"Queue poll failed ({lb.status_code}).")
data = lb.json()
state = data.get("state", "?")
position = data.get("position")
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] queue PARSED queueId=%s state=%s position=%s sessionId=%s",
queue_id[:16], state, position,
data.get("session_id") or data.get("sessionId"),
)
if data.get("state") == "queued":
data["tier"] = tier
resp = JSONResponse(data)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
# Claimed a slot. Re-check the budget: it may have been spent in another tab
# during the wait. If so, refuse — the just-claimed slot is now a pending
# session on the LB and its pending-timeout reaper reclaims it shortly.
if tracked:
rem = await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.remaining, keys, tier)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] queue CLAIMED queueId=%s budget remaining=%s",
queue_id[:16], rem,
)
if rem is not None and rem <= 0:
resp = JSONResponse(
{"tier": tier, "reason": "limit", "remainingSec": 0}, status_code=402
)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
return await _finalize_grant(data, keys, tier, tracked, set_cookie)
@app.delete("/api/queue/{queue_id}")
async def queue_leave(queue_id: str):
"""Leave the queue from the explicit 'Leave queue' button (a real fetch)."""
if not LOAD_BALANCER_URL:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found.")
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] queue LEAVE (button) queueId=%s", queue_id[:16])
await _lb_leave(queue_id)
return {"ok": True}
@app.post("/api/queue/end")
async def queue_end(request: Request):
"""Leave the queue on teardown/tab-close (navigator.sendBeacon, which can only
POST). Body: { queueId }. Best-effort; the LB reaps the ticket on TTL anyway."""
if not LOAD_BALANCER_URL:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found.")
qid = await _queue_id(request)
if qid:
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] queue LEAVE (teardown) queueId=%s", qid[:16])
await _lb_leave(qid)
return {"ok": True}
async def _finalize_grant(data, keys, tier, tracked, set_cookie):
"""Shared grant tail (fast path or queue claim): reserve the first chunk, attach
the metering fields the client needs, and set the anon cookie."""
remaining = None
session_id = data.get("session_id")
if tracked and session_id:
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] grant FINALIZE sessionId=%s tier=%s tracked=%s",
session_id, tier, tracked,
)
await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.begin, session_id, keys, tier)
remaining = await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.remaining, keys, tier)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] grant RESERVED sessionId=%s remaining=%s",
session_id, remaining,
)
data.update({
"tier": tier,
"limited": tracked,
"remainingSec": remaining,
"heartbeatSec": limiter.HEARTBEAT_SEC,
})
resp = JSONResponse(data)
if set_cookie:
auth.set_anon_cookie(resp, set_cookie)
return resp
async def _lb_leave(queue_id: str) -> None:
"""Best-effort: tell the LB to drop a waiting ticket."""
url = f"{LOAD_BALANCER_URL.rstrip('/')}/queue/{queue_id}"
logger.debug("[EXT][LB] queue DELETE %s", url)
try:
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=5.0) as http:
resp = await http.delete(url)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][LB] queue DELETE RESP queueId=%s status=%s",
queue_id[:16], resp.status_code,
)
except httpx.RequestError as exc:
logger.warning("Queue leave failed: %r", exc)
def _safe_json(response) -> dict:
try:
body = response.json()
except Exception:
return {}
return body if isinstance(body, dict) else {}
def _proxy_public_url(request: Request) -> str:
if not S2S_PROXY_TARGET:
return ""
forwarded_proto = (request.headers.get("x-forwarded-proto") or request.url.scheme).split(",")[0].strip()
forwarded_host = (request.headers.get("x-forwarded-host") or request.headers.get("host") or request.url.netloc).split(",")[0].strip()
ws_scheme = "wss" if forwarded_proto in {"https", "wss"} else "ws"
root_path = (request.scope.get("root_path") or "").rstrip("/")
return f"{ws_scheme}://{forwarded_host}{root_path}/v1/realtime"
def _proxy_upstream_url(ws: WebSocket) -> str:
target = urlsplit(S2S_PROXY_TARGET)
merged_query = dict(parse_qsl(target.query, keep_blank_values=True))
merged_query.update(parse_qsl(ws.url.query, keep_blank_values=True))
return urlunsplit(
(
target.scheme,
target.netloc,
target.path or "/v1/realtime",
urlencode(merged_query, doseq=True),
target.fragment,
)
)
def _subprotocols(ws: WebSocket) -> list[str]:
raw = ws.headers.get("sec-websocket-protocol", "")
return [item.strip() for item in raw.split(",") if item.strip()]
async def _client_to_upstream(ws: WebSocket, upstream, client_ip: str, session_ctx: dict) -> None:
while True:
message = await ws.receive()
if message["type"] == "websocket.disconnect":
# #region debug-point B:client-disconnect
await _report_server_debug(
"B",
"server.py:_client_to_upstream",
"client websocket disconnected",
{"code": message.get("code")},
)
# #endregion
logger.debug(
"[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s client→upstream DISCONNECT code=%s",
client_ip, message.get("code"),
)
await upstream.close()
return
if message.get("text") is not None:
# #region debug-point B:client-text-forward
summary = _realtime_event_summary(message["text"])
if summary:
await _report_server_debug(
"B",
"server.py:_client_to_upstream",
"forwarding client event to upstream",
summary,
)
event_type = summary.get("type")
# --- INPUT UTENTE lato client (text typed / inserted items) ---
user_text = ""
if event_type == "conversation.item.created" and summary.get("role") == "user":
user_text = (summary.get("text") or "").strip()
if user_text:
logger.info(
"[INPUT UTENTE] client=%s text=%s",
client_ip, user_text,
)
if (event_type not in _NOISY_CLIENT_EVENT_TYPES
and event_type not in _NOISY_REALTIME_EVENT_TYPES):
logger.debug(
"[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s →UPSTREAM text event=%s summary=%s",
client_ip, event_type, json.dumps(summary, ensure_ascii=True)[:300],
)
# #endregion
# --- S2S_INJECT_PROFILE: if this is a session.update client message
# and we have a resolved caller profile / podcast episode / latest caller summary,
# patch instructions to include them before forwarding upstream.
# Pure no-op when S2S_INJECT_PROFILE=false (original pure
# passthrough behaviour).
ctx_episode_context = session_ctx.get("injected_episode_context") if isinstance(session_ctx, dict) else ""
ctx_profile_context = session_ctx.get("injected_profile_context") if isinstance(session_ctx, dict) else ""
ctx_reports_context = session_ctx.get("injected_reports_context") if isinstance(session_ctx, dict) else ""
ctx_summary_context = session_ctx.get("injected_summary_context") if isinstance(session_ctx, dict) else ""
ctx_apipilot_pass1 = session_ctx.get("injected_apipilot_pass1") if isinstance(session_ctx, dict) else ""
ctx_profile_obj = session_ctx.get("profile_obj") if isinstance(session_ctx, dict) else None
forward_text = _patch_client_session_update_with_profile(
message["text"], ctx_profile_context or "", ctx_reports_context or "", ctx_summary_context or "", ctx_episode_context or "",
profile_obj=ctx_profile_obj,
apipilot_context_text_pass1=ctx_apipilot_pass1 or "",
)
await upstream.send(forward_text)
elif message.get("bytes") is not None:
# #region debug-point B:client-bytes-forward
await _report_server_debug(
"B",
"server.py:_client_to_upstream",
"forwarding client binary frame to upstream",
{"bytes": len(message["bytes"])},
)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s →UPSTREAM bytes=%dB",
client_ip, len(message["bytes"]),
)
# #endregion
await upstream.send(message["bytes"])
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# 2026-09-11 POST-PROCESSING SANITIZZAZIONE OUTPUT AGENTE (server-side, strato 7)
#
# Qwen2.5 GPTQ quantizzato continua a sforare anche con 6 strati di prompt lock:
# • [rightspeak] ... [endspeak] → marker bracket non richiesti
# • [-]: checking_* → "pensieri interni"
# • {'reportDetails': '...'} → JSON literal inline nel TTS
# • Alessandro → Alexander → nome proper normalizzato all'inglese
#
# Nessun prompt è sufficiente al 100% con GPTQ. Introduciamo uno strato 7
# server-side di post-processing: TUTTO il testo in uscita dall'upstream
# viene filtrato PRIMA di essere inoltrato al client e PRIMA del log.
# ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _extract_profile_for_session(session_ctx: dict) -> dict:
"""Return the profile dict stored in session_ctx (phone auth result)."""
p = session_ctx.get("profile_obj") or session_ctx.get("user_profile") or {}
if isinstance(p, dict) and isinstance(p.get("user"), dict):
return p["user"]
if isinstance(p, dict):
return p
return {}
def _common_name_variants(original_name: str) -> list[str]:
"""For a user's first/last name, return known anglicized / adapted variants
that the model may produce (e.g. Alessandro → Alexander). Used by
sanitizer to replace variant → original.
Map is conservative (only common names we have observed in the wild so
far). Any new name can be added here without touching other code.
"""
variants_map: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
# Western / Romance masculine first names — anglicized / cognates
"Alessandro": ("Alexander", "Alexandre", "Aleksander", "Alexsander",
"Alessander", "Aleksandr", "Alexander", "Alejandro",
"Alesandro", "Allessandro", "Alex"),
"Alessandra": ("Alexandra", "Aleksandra", "Alejandra", "Alex"),
"Valenti": ("Valentini", "Valentine", "Valentin", "Valente",
"Valentín", "Valentí"),
"Giovanni": ("John", "Juan", "Giovani", "Gianni", "Joan", "Ivan"),
"Paolo": ("Paul", "Pablo", "Paulo", "Paul"),
"Marco": ("Marc", "Mark", "Marcos"),
"Luca": ("Lucas", "Luke", "Lukas"),
"Matteo": ("Matthew", "Matías", "Mateo", "Matt"),
"Francesco": ("Francis", "Francisco", "Francesc"),
"Leonardo": ("Leonard", "Leonhard"),
"Giuseppe": ("Joseph", "José", "Giuseppi", "Pepe"),
"Mario": ("Maryo", "Mari", "Marion"),
# Feminine
"Sofia": ("Sophia", "Sophie", "Sofía", "Sofie"),
"Giulia": ("Julia", "Juliana", "Julie", "Giuliana"),
"Anna": ("Ana", "Anne", "Hannah", "Ann"),
}
out: list[str] = []
if not original_name:
return out
o = original_name.strip()
if o in variants_map:
out.extend(variants_map[o])
# Also check case-insensitive match as safety net
lower_map = {k.lower(): v for k, v in variants_map.items()}
if o.lower() in lower_map:
for v in lower_map[o.lower()]:
if v not in out:
out.append(v)
return out
def _sanitize_agent_output(text, session_ctx=None) -> str:
"""Server-side FINAL filter applied to ALL assistant output text.
Guarantees (belt-and-suspenders over the 6 prompt layers):
1. No [...][xxx] bracket markers of any kind.
2. No inline { ... } JSON / dict literals.
3. No [-]: <internal action name> pseudo-markers.
4. No name anglicization: Alessandro → restored to Alessandro.
5. Trim + collapse multiple spaces.
"""
import re
s = str(text or "")
if not s:
return s
# (0) Remove "action line" pseudo-markers FIRST, BEFORE stripping all
# other brackets, because the pattern uses the literal "[-]" prefix
# which would get silently swallowed by step (1) otherwise. Match:
# [-]: checking_podcast_report (bracket literal then colon)
# []: action_name (empty bracket variant)
# [ - ] : do_stuff (spaces inside & around)
# Pattern is intentionally TIGHT: after the colon we only take up to 6
# underscore/hyphen words so we cannot accidentally eat the following
# real user speech (bug: greedy class with ,. and 200-char upper bound ate
# the entire "Claro, revisaré el reporte." clause on 2026-09-11).
s = re.sub(
r"\[[\s\-]{0,6}\]\s*:\s*[a-z0-9_\-]+(?:[ \t]+[a-z0-9_\-]+){0,5}",
" ",
s,
)
# Also catch dangling residual patterns if brackets got normalized to a
# single char already — handles cases where upstream writes the "colon"
# action marker without explicit brackets.
s = re.sub(r"(?<!\w):\s*checking_[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{1,120}", " ", s)
# (1) Remove ALL bracket-markers — [rightspeak], [endspeak], [thinking],
# [anything_else01]. We also remove stray [ / ] that don't form a
# complete pair (e.g. leftover "hello] there").
s = re.sub(r"\[[^\]\n]{0,80}\]", " ", s)
# (2) Remove inline dict / JSON literals. Pattern: { ... }, possibly
# split across a few \n (not greedy). Conservative: matches balanced
# pairs up to a reasonable length, otherwise fallback.
_max_iter = 5
for _ in range(_max_iter):
new_s = re.sub(r"\{[^{}]{0,1600}\}", " ", s)
if new_s == s:
break
s = new_s
# (3) Name anglicization. Iterate profile name's known variants →
# replace with original (case-insensitive match).
if session_ctx is not None and isinstance(session_ctx, dict):
profile = _extract_profile_for_session(session_ctx)
if profile:
full_name = str(profile.get("name") or "").strip()
if full_name:
# Split into parts and check each
parts = [p for p in re.split(r"[\s\-_]+", full_name) if p]
for part in parts:
variants = _common_name_variants(part)
orig_cap = part[0].upper() + part[1:] if part else part
for variant in variants:
# Case-insensitive global replace → original case
s = re.sub(
r"\b" + re.escape(variant) + r"\b",
orig_cap,
s,
flags=re.IGNORECASE,
)
# Also try full-name variants (combined)
combined = full_name.replace(" ", "")
# (5) Collapse whitespace. Re-punctuation cleanup: avoid normalizing
# legitimate terminal "?" / "!" into nothing; only collapse doubled
# or space-separated punctuation that resulted from earlier deletes.
s = re.sub(r"[ \t\u00a0]+", " ", s)
s = re.sub(r"\n{3,}", "\n\n", s)
# Interior punctuation: normalize spaces, but keep the char itself.
# Example: "hello , world" → "hello, world"
s = re.sub(r"\s+([,.;:])\s+", r"\1 ", s)
# Terminal / exclamation / interrogation: only fix spacing, never strip.
s = re.sub(r"\s+([!?])", r"\1", s)
s = re.sub(r"([!?])\s{2,}", r"\1 ", s)
# Strip leftover whitespace. Do NOT strip the legitimate terminal
# punctuation chars ?, !, ., because they are part of the real speech.
# Only strip repeated trailing commas / semicolons that appear because
# we deleted bracket/JSON fragments that separated clauses.
s = s.strip()
# Strip 2+ identical terminal punctuation chars (e.g. "hello.." → "hello.")
s = re.sub(r"([,.;:!?])\1{1,}$", r"\1", s)
# Strip terminal comma / semicolon / colon that now dangle (clause joins)
# but preserve ., ?, !.
s = re.sub(r"[,;:]$", "", s).strip()
return s
def _sanitize_realtime_event_raw(raw_message, session_ctx=None) -> tuple:
"""If the raw upstream event contains assistant OUTPUT text, sanitize it
in-place and return (new_json_str, True) — otherwise return (raw, False).
Mirrors exactly the same traversal used by _realtime_event_summary so we
touch every field that would become summary["text"].
"""
import json as _json
if not isinstance(raw_message, str) or not raw_message.strip():
return raw_message, False
try:
payload = _json.loads(raw_message)
except Exception:
return raw_message, False
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
return raw_message, False
event_type = payload.get("type")
if not isinstance(event_type, str):
return raw_message, False
changed = False
def _sanitize_value(v):
nonlocal changed
if isinstance(v, str) and v.strip():
cleaned = _sanitize_agent_output(v, session_ctx)
# 2026-09-25 STRATO 8: Rimuovi marker CALL intern ApiPilot
# prima che il testo arrivi al client (UI chat + TTS audio).
# L'accumulatore transcript per PASS-2 marker parser USA l'originale
# quindi non perdiamo l'abilità di triggerare execute.
cleaned = _sanitize_text_strip_apipilot_markers(cleaned)
if cleaned != v:
changed = True
return cleaned
return v
# --- Event dispatch (same shape as _realtime_event_summary) -------------
# --- 2026-09-25: ORA SANITIZZIAMO ANCHE TUTTI I DELTA STREAMING oltre ai .done ---
# Perche' Qwen3-TTS (start_pipeline_rag) legge internamente i delta PRIMA di
# generare l'audio binario. Se non sanitizziamo i delta → TTS pronuncia il marker.
if event_type in {"response.audio_transcript.done",
"response.audio_transcript.delta"}:
if "transcript" in payload:
payload["transcript"] = _sanitize_value(payload["transcript"])
if "delta" in payload and isinstance(payload.get("delta"), str):
payload["delta"] = _sanitize_value(payload["delta"])
for container in ("item", "part", "content", "output", "audio"):
sub = payload.get(container)
if isinstance(sub, dict):
for key in ("transcript", "text", "delta"):
if key in sub and isinstance(sub.get(key), str):
sub[key] = _sanitize_value(sub[key])
elif event_type in {"response.output_audio_transcript.done",
"response.output_audio_transcript.delta"}:
# Top-level keys
for key in ("transcript", "text", "output_text", "audio_text",
"output_transcript", "final_transcript", "output_audio_text",
"content", "message", "utterance", "delta"):
if key in payload and isinstance(payload.get(key), str):
payload[key] = _sanitize_value(payload[key])
# Sub-containers
for container in ("item", "part", "content", "output", "delta", "audio"):
sub = payload.get(container)
if isinstance(sub, dict):
for key in ("transcript", "text", "output_text", "delta"):
if key in sub and isinstance(sub.get(key), str):
sub[key] = _sanitize_value(sub[key])
# content[] array
if isinstance(sub.get("content"), list):
for c in sub["content"]:
if isinstance(c, dict):
for k2 in ("transcript", "text", "delta"):
if k2 in c and isinstance(c.get(k2), str):
c[k2] = _sanitize_value(c[k2])
if isinstance(payload.get("content"), list):
for c in payload["content"]:
if isinstance(c, dict):
for k2 in ("transcript", "text", "delta"):
if k2 in c and isinstance(c.get(k2), str):
c[k2] = _sanitize_value(c[k2])
elif event_type in {"response.text.delta", "response.text.done",
"response.output_text.delta", "response.output_text.done"}:
for key in ("text", "output_text", "delta", "final_text", "content"):
if key in payload and isinstance(payload.get(key), str):
payload[key] = _sanitize_value(payload[key])
for container in ("item", "part", "output", "content", "text"):
sub = payload.get(container)
if isinstance(sub, dict):
for key in ("text", "output_text", "delta"):
if key in sub and isinstance(sub.get(key), str):
sub[key] = _sanitize_value(sub[key])
if isinstance(sub.get("content"), list):
for c in sub["content"]:
if isinstance(c, dict):
for k2 in ("text", "transcript", "delta"):
if k2 in c and isinstance(c.get(k2), str):
c[k2] = _sanitize_value(c[k2])
if isinstance(payload.get("content"), list):
for c in payload["content"]:
if isinstance(c, dict):
for k2 in ("text", "transcript", "delta"):
if k2 in c and isinstance(c.get(k2), str):
c[k2] = _sanitize_value(c[k2])
elif event_type == "response.content_part.done":
part = payload.get("part")
if isinstance(part, dict):
if "text" in part and isinstance(part.get("text"), str):
part["text"] = _sanitize_value(part["text"])
if "transcript" in part and isinstance(part.get("transcript"), str):
part["transcript"] = _sanitize_value(part["transcript"])
elif event_type == "response.content_part.added":
part = payload.get("part")
if isinstance(part, dict):
if "text" in part and isinstance(part.get("text"), str):
part["text"] = _sanitize_value(part["text"])
if "transcript" in part and isinstance(part.get("transcript"), str):
part["transcript"] = _sanitize_value(part["transcript"])
elif event_type in {"response.content_part.text.delta",
"response.output_content.text.delta",
"response.content.text.delta"}:
for key in ("text", "delta"):
if key in payload and isinstance(payload.get(key), str):
payload[key] = _sanitize_value(payload[key])
elif event_type in {"response.output_item.done",
"response.output_item.added"}:
item = payload.get("item")
if isinstance(item, dict):
for c in (item.get("content") or []):
if isinstance(c, dict):
if "text" in c and isinstance(c["text"], str):
c["text"] = _sanitize_value(c["text"])
if "transcript" in c and isinstance(c["transcript"], str):
c["transcript"] = _sanitize_value(c["transcript"])
elif event_type == "conversation.item.created":
item = payload.get("item")
if isinstance(item, dict) and item.get("role") == "assistant":
for c in (item.get("content") or []):
if isinstance(c, dict):
if c.get("type") in {"input_text", "text"} and isinstance(c.get("text"), str):
c["text"] = _sanitize_value(c["text"])
if c.get("type") == "transcript" and isinstance(c.get("transcript"), str):
c["transcript"] = _sanitize_value(c["transcript"])
if not changed:
return raw_message, False
try:
new_raw = _json.dumps(payload, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception:
return raw_message, False
return new_raw, True
async def _upstream_to_client(ws: WebSocket, upstream, client_ip: str, session_ctx: dict) -> None:
async for message in upstream:
if isinstance(message, bytes):
# 2026-09-25 GATE AUDIO BYTES: se response_id corrente è stato marcato
# come "contiene marker CALL" → DROPPARE tutti i binari audio (Qwen3
# ha gia generato audio con marker pronuciato, non lo mandiamo al client).
# IMPORTANTE oggi: MATCH STRETTAMENTE per response_id CORRENTE. Nessun
# fallback "qualsiasi id" (troppo largo: droppava anche audio PASS-2 buono).
drop_now = False
matched_rid = ""
drop_ids = session_ctx.get("_ws_drop_audio_for_response_ids")
if isinstance(drop_ids, dict) and drop_ids:
rid_ctx = session_ctx.get("_ws_current_response_id")
if isinstance(rid_ctx, str) and rid_ctx and drop_ids.get(rid_ctx):
drop_now = True
matched_rid = rid_ctx
elif (not isinstance(rid_ctx, str) or not rid_ctx) and len(drop_ids) == 1:
# Caso safety: nessun response_id corrente disponibile ma
# abbiamo 1 solo entry nel dict (probabilmente quella risposta).
only_rid = next(iter(drop_ids.keys()))
if drop_ids.get(only_rid):
drop_now = True
matched_rid = only_rid
if drop_now:
logger.info("[APIPILOT-AUDIO-DROP] FRAME DROP bytes=%dB matchedResponse=%s (marker CALL in questa risposta → Qwen3 audio sporco SCARTATO)", len(message), (matched_rid or session_ctx.get("_ws_current_response_id") or "-"))
continue
else:
logger.debug(
"[APIPILOT-AUDIO-ALLOW] FRAME PASS bytes=%dB responseCtx=%s dropIds=%s",
len(message),
(session_ctx.get("_ws_current_response_id") or "-"),
(sorted(list(drop_ids.keys())) if isinstance(drop_ids, dict) else "none"),
)
# #region debug-point B:upstream-bytes-forward
await _report_server_debug(
"B",
"server.py:_upstream_to_client",
"forwarding upstream binary frame to client",
{"bytes": len(message)},
)
logger.debug(
"[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s UPSTREAM→ bytes=%dB",
client_ip, len(message),
)
# #endregion
await ws.send_bytes(message)
else:
# ── PRIMA DEL SANITIZE: estrai ORIGINALE per PASSATA-2 marker parser ──
# (marker sarebbe cancellato da STRATO 7)
pre_sanitize_summary = _realtime_event_summary(message)
pre_event_type = pre_sanitize_summary.get("type") if isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary, dict) else None
pre_response_id: str | None = None
if isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary, dict):
if isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary.get("response_id"), str):
pre_response_id = pre_sanitize_summary["response_id"]
elif isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary.get("id"), str):
pre_response_id = pre_sanitize_summary["id"]
# 2026-09-25: memorizza response_id corrente per il gate bytes audio
if isinstance(pre_response_id, str) and pre_response_id:
session_ctx["_ws_current_response_id"] = pre_response_id
# ── MARKER DETECTION PER EVENTO SINGOLO (non solo response.done) ──
# Se in QUALSIASI evento testo di questa risposta troviamo marker CALL
# → flag gate DROP bytes audio per questo response_id + sanitize anche i prossimi
if (
isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary, dict)
and isinstance(pre_event_type, str)
and pre_event_type not in {"response.done"}
):
quick_text_parts: list[str] = []
for _k in ("text", "transcript", "output_text", "audio_text",
"output_transcript", "final_transcript", "output_audio_text",
"content", "message", "utterance", "delta", "_raw_preview"):
_v = pre_sanitize_summary.get(_k)
if isinstance(_v, str) and _v.strip():
quick_text_parts.append(_v)
for _cname in ("item", "part", "output", "audio"):
_sub = pre_sanitize_summary.get(_cname)
if isinstance(_sub, dict):
for _k2 in ("text", "transcript", "output_text"):
_v2 = _sub.get(_k2)
if isinstance(_v2, str) and _v2.strip():
quick_text_parts.append(_v2)
quick_text = (" ".join(quick_text_parts)).strip()
if quick_text:
_detected_name, _detected_args = _apipilot_parse_call_marker(quick_text)
if isinstance(_detected_name, str) and _detected_name:
drop_ids2 = session_ctx.get("_ws_drop_audio_for_response_ids")
if not isinstance(drop_ids2, dict):
drop_ids2 = {}
session_ctx["_ws_drop_audio_for_response_ids"] = drop_ids2
_flag_rid = (pre_response_id if isinstance(pre_response_id, str) and pre_response_id
else f"auto-{id(session_ctx)}")
drop_ids2[_flag_rid] = True
# cleanup vecchi id se > 10
if len(drop_ids2) > 10:
try:
for _old_k in list(drop_ids2.keys())[:-10]:
drop_ids2.pop(_old_k, None)
except Exception:
pass
logger.info("[APIPILOT-SANITIZE] marker CALL in event=%s response=%s name=%s → GATE AUDIO DROP attivo per questa risposta (Qwen3 generera' audio sporco, sarà scartato)", pre_event_type, _flag_rid, _detected_name)
# 1a) PASSATA-2 pre-sanitize transcript accumulatore TTS audio
if (
isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary, dict)
and isinstance(pre_event_type, str)
and pre_event_type in {"response.audio_transcript.done",
"response.output_audio_transcript.done"}
):
pre_agent_text = (pre_sanitize_summary.get("text") if isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary.get("text"), str) else "").strip()
rid_key = (
pre_response_id if isinstance(pre_response_id, str) and pre_response_id
else f"auto-{id(session_ctx)}"
)
if rid_key and pre_agent_text:
acc = session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_asst_transcript_acc")
if not isinstance(acc, dict):
acc = {}
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_asst_transcript_acc"] = acc
prev = acc.get(rid_key, "")
if prev:
acc[rid_key] = f"{prev} {pre_agent_text}".strip()
else:
acc[rid_key] = pre_agent_text
# 1b) PASSATA-2 pre-sanitize accumulatore ANCHE da conversation.item.created (assistant)
# LLM emette il marker anche nel messaggio di testo conversation (non solo TTS!)
elif (
isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary, dict)
and isinstance(pre_event_type, str)
and pre_event_type == "conversation.item.created"
and pre_sanitize_summary.get("role") == "assistant"
):
pre_conv_text = (pre_sanitize_summary.get("text") if isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary.get("text"), str) else "").strip()
rid_key2 = (
pre_response_id if isinstance(pre_response_id, str) and pre_response_id
else f"auto-{id(session_ctx)}"
)
if rid_key2 and pre_conv_text:
acc2 = session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_asst_transcript_acc")
if not isinstance(acc2, dict):
acc2 = {}
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_asst_transcript_acc"] = acc2
prev2 = acc2.get(rid_key2, "")
if prev2:
acc2[rid_key2] = f"{prev2} {pre_conv_text}".strip()
else:
acc2[rid_key2] = pre_conv_text
# 2) PASSATA-2 pre-sanitize response.done trigger marker
if (
isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary, dict)
and isinstance(pre_event_type, str)
and pre_event_type == "response.done"
):
rid_val: str = (
pre_response_id if isinstance(pre_response_id, str)
else (pre_sanitize_summary.get("id") if isinstance(pre_sanitize_summary.get("id"), str) else f"auto-{id(session_ctx)}")
)
full_text = ""
acc3 = session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_asst_transcript_acc")
if rid_val and isinstance(acc3, dict):
full_text = (acc3.pop(rid_val, "") if isinstance(acc3, dict) else "") or ""
# Fallback: se response_id non matcha ma abbiamo un solo accumulo rimasto → usiamo
# quello (alcuni upstream generano response_id diversi tra eventi)
if (not isinstance(full_text, str) or not full_text.strip()) and isinstance(acc3, dict) and len(acc3) == 1:
_only_key = next(iter(acc3.keys()))
full_text = (acc3.pop(_only_key, "") if isinstance(acc3, dict) else "") or ""
marker_name, marker_args = None, None
if isinstance(full_text, str) and full_text.strip():
_p1_defaults = session_ctx.get("apipilot_defaults") if isinstance(session_ctx.get("apipilot_defaults"), dict) else {}
marker_name, marker_args = _apipilot_parse_call_marker(full_text, defaults=_p1_defaults)
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=WS_RESPONSE_DONE_DETECTION markerFound=%s name=%r argsKeys=%s", ("Y" if isinstance(marker_name, str) and marker_name else "N"), (marker_name or ""), list((marker_args or {}).keys()))
# ── LOG ALWAYS-ON diagnostico PASS-2 marker detection ────────
try:
_preview = full_text.replace("\n", " ")
if len(_preview) > 500:
_preview = _preview[:500] + "…"
except Exception:
_preview = str(full_text)[:500]
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): response.done DIAGNOSTIC fullLen=%d markerFound=%s markerName=%s argsKeys=%s defaultsAutoFill=%s acc3Remaining=%d fullTextPreview=%r",
len(full_text or ""),
("Y" if isinstance(marker_name, str) and marker_name else "N"),
(marker_name if isinstance(marker_name, str) and marker_name else ""),
(list(marker_args.keys()) if isinstance(marker_args, dict) else []),
(list(_p1_defaults.keys()) if isinstance(_p1_defaults, dict) and _p1_defaults else "none"),
(len(acc3) if isinstance(acc3, dict) else -1),
_preview,
)
elif isinstance(full_text, str):
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): response.done DIAGNOSTIC fullLen=0 EMPTY markerFound=N response_id=%r acc3Remaining=%d",
rid_val,
(len(acc3) if isinstance(acc3, dict) else -1),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): response.done DIAGNOSTIC fullText is not str type=%r acc3=%r",
type(full_text).__name__,
(list(acc3.keys()) if isinstance(acc3, dict) else "?"),
)
needs_pass2 = (
isinstance(marker_name, str) and bool(marker_name)
and not bool(session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"))
and (int(session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_pass2_count") or 0) < 3)
)
if needs_pass2:
# 2026-09-25: PULIZIA GATE AUDIO DROP.
# La risposta 1 (marker CALL) ha l'audio sporco (gate attivo DROP bytes).
# PASS-2 e' la risposta 2 con dati veri dell'utente → audio buono,
# quindi CANCELLIAMO il gate DROP per gli ID attivi.
drop_ids_clean = session_ctx.get("_ws_drop_audio_for_response_ids")
if isinstance(drop_ids_clean, dict) and drop_ids_clean:
drop_ids_clean.clear()
logger.info("[APIPILOT-AUDIO-DROP] PASS-2 start: pulisco gate audio drop → audio PASS-2 rielaborazione briefing verra' inoltrato normalmente")
args = marker_args if isinstance(marker_args, dict) else {}
# ── SAFETY: over-ride parametri con valori REALI da defaults ──────
# 1) Se manca la chiave -> usiamo defaults.
# 2) Se il valore di args è UN VALORE DI ESEMPIO fittizio del prompt
# (regola #7: "+56912345678", altri placeholder tipo "+56XXXXXX",
# "+1234567890", "+390000000000", stringa vuota, +56XXXX) →
# sostituiamo SEMPRE con defaults reale se disponibile.
# Questo evita bug oggi: AI usa "+56912345678" (esempio regola 7)
# invece di "+447432477433" (vero Alessandro).
# 3) FALLBACK 2026-09-25: se defaults è vuoto ma c'è
# session_ctx["inject_phone"] da querystring → usiamo quello.
_p1_defaults_use = session_ctx.get("apipilot_defaults") if isinstance(session_ctx.get("apipilot_defaults"), dict) else {}
_fallback_inject_phone = session_ctx.get("inject_phone") if isinstance(session_ctx.get("inject_phone"), str) else ""
# Placeholder noti che appaiono nel prompt come esempio.
_FAKE_PHONE_PLACEHOLDERS: set[str] = {
"+56912345678", # nostro esempio regola 7
"56912345678", # variante senza +
"+5612345678",
"+1234567890",
"+12345678",
"+56XXXXXXX",
"+56xxxxxxx",
"",
}
def _is_phone_fake(v: str) -> bool:
c = str(v or "").strip()
if c in _FAKE_PHONE_PLACEHOLDERS:
return True
if len(c) < 7:
return True
if c.endswith("00000"):
return True
if "123456" in c or "xxxxxx" in c.lower() or "xxxx" in c.lower():
return True
if (c.startswith("+56") and len(c) <= 9):
return True
return False
# Applichiamo defaults + fallback su TUTTE le chiavi disponibili
if isinstance(_p1_defaults_use, dict) and _p1_defaults_use:
for k, default_v in _p1_defaults_use.items():
if default_v in (None, "", []):
continue
if k not in args or args[k] in (None, "", []):
args[k] = default_v
elif k == "phone" and isinstance(args.get("phone"), str):
if _is_phone_fake(str(args.get("phone"))):
args[k] = default_v
# Fallback phone diretto se è fake ma defaults non aveva chiave phone
if (
isinstance(args.get("phone"), str)
and _is_phone_fake(str(args.get("phone")))
and isinstance(_fallback_inject_phone, str)
and _fallback_inject_phone.strip()
):
args["phone"] = _fallback_inject_phone.strip()
# Aggiorniamo _p1_defaults per i log dopo
_p1_defaults = _p1_defaults_use
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_pass2_count"] = int(session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_pass2_count") or 0) + 1
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"] = True
# 2026-09-25 PRIORITÀ auth e demo ESATTI della DISCOVERY (anon-ws-...)
# invece di crearne uno nuovo (ws-pass2-...) al volo.
# AquaPortal fa il binding tra strumenti autorizzati e la sessione
# x-demo-session che ha fatto GET /tools.
_exec_auth = session_ctx.get("apipilot_exec_auth") if isinstance(session_ctx.get("apipilot_exec_auth"), str) else None
_exec_demo = session_ctx.get("apipilot_exec_demo") if isinstance(session_ctx.get("apipilot_exec_demo"), str) else None
# Fallback se per caso vuoti (safety backward-compat):
if not isinstance(_exec_auth, str) or not _exec_auth.strip():
login_tok = session_ctx.get("login_token")
_exec_auth = f"Bearer {login_tok}" if isinstance(login_tok, str) and login_tok.strip() else None
if not isinstance(_exec_demo, str) or not _exec_demo.strip():
_exec_demo = f"ws-pass2-{client_ip}-{id(session_ctx)}"
# 2026-09-25 🔴 SUPER API KEY (PRIORITÀ MASSIMA ASSOLUTA - anche sopra SERVICE_TOKEN):
# Se valorizzata S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY → force Bearer + demo = APIKEY.
# Questo garantisce che demoSessionKey nel log PASS-2 e nel call execute
# NON sia più anon-ws-... ma aqua3465# (stessa identità discovery bypass).
if S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY:
_exec_auth = f"Bearer {S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY}"
_exec_demo = S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY
# 2026-09-25 S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN (se valorizzato) OVERRIDE (solo se NON c'è SUPER API KEY)
elif S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN:
_svc = S2S_APIPILOT_SERVICE_TOKEN.strip()
if _svc:
_exec_auth = (f"Bearer {_svc}" if not _svc.lower().startswith("bearer ") else _svc)
# 2026-09-25 FALLBACK AUTH FORZATO PASS-2 (SEM-PRE):
# Se tool richiede requires_auth=true E bearer non è un JWT valido
# (meno di 80 chars, tipico JWT > 150) oppure è vuoto → login_by_phone
# FORZATO con Alessandro phone, indipendentemente se è stato fatto
# prima o meno. Questo garantisce che AquaPortal riceva user_token
# valido → user=(Alessandro Valenti) invece di user=(anon) → 403!
_phone_lfb = (
session_ctx.get("inject_phone") if isinstance(session_ctx.get("inject_phone"), str)
else ""
) or (inject_phone if isinstance(inject_phone, str) else "")
_phone_lfb = _phone_lfb.strip() if isinstance(_phone_lfb, str) else ""
_current_bearer_token = ""
if isinstance(_exec_auth, str) and _exec_auth.lower().startswith("bearer "):
_current_bearer_token = _exec_auth[len("bearer "):].strip()
_is_jwt_like = bool(_current_bearer_token) and len(_current_bearer_token) >= 120 and _current_bearer_token.count(".") >= 2
# Determina requires_auth true (default): lookup tools recenti da session ctx o apipilot_cache
_tools_recent: list[dict] = (
session_ctx.get("apipilot_tools_pass1")
if isinstance(session_ctx.get("apipilot_tools_pass1"), list)
else []
)
if not _tools_recent:
try:
_cached = _APIPILOT_CACHE.get("tools") if _APIPILOT_CACHE else None
if isinstance(_cached, tuple) and _cached and isinstance(_cached[0], list):
_tools_recent = _cached[0]
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
_tools_recent = []
_mtool = next((t for t in _tools_recent if isinstance(t, dict) and t.get("name") == marker_name), None)
_requires_auth = True if (_mtool is None) else bool(_mtool.get("requires_auth"))
if (
(not S2S_APIPILOT_API_KEY)
and S2S_LOGIN_BY_PHONE
and _phone_lfb
and _requires_auth
and (not _is_jwt_like)
):
try:
_l_tok, _l_obj = await _login_by_phone(_phone_lfb)
if isinstance(_l_tok, str) and _l_tok.strip():
_exec_auth = f"Bearer {_l_tok.strip()}"
_tok_len = len(_l_tok.strip())
_is_new_jwt = _tok_len >= 120 and _l_tok.strip().count(".") >= 2
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): LOGIN FORZATO PASS-2 (tool requires_auth) phoneLen=%d token=%s%s",
len(_phone_lfb),
f"YES len={_tok_len}",
(" JWT?" if _is_new_jwt else (" SHORT?" if _tok_len < 80 else " OK")),
)
else:
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): LOGIN FORZATO PASS-2 token EXTRACT FAILED phoneLen=%d (tool requires_auth → probabile 403)",
len(_phone_lfb),
)
except Exception as _lfb_exc: # noqa: BLE001
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): LOGIN FORZATO PASS-2 fallito phoneLen=%d err=%r",
len(_phone_lfb), _lfb_exc,
)
bearer = _exec_auth
demo_key = _exec_demo
try:
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=WS_REALTIME_PASS2_TRIGGER name=%r argsKeys=%s argsPhone=%r", marker_name, list(args.keys()) if args else [], (args.get("phone") if isinstance(args.get("phone"), str) else ""))
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): trigger marker name=%s argsKeys=%s argsPhone=%s auth=%s defaultsAutoFill=%s demoSessionKey=%.40s",
marker_name,
list(args.keys()) if args else [],
(args.get("phone") if isinstance(args.get("phone"), str) else ""),
"Y" if bearer else "anon",
list(_p1_defaults.keys()) if isinstance(_p1_defaults, dict) and _p1_defaults else "none",
demo_key if isinstance(demo_key, str) else "?",
)
t0 = _monotonic_now()
logger.info("[APIPILOT-CALL-NAME] USE=WS_REALTIME_PASS2_EXEC_HELPER name=%r → forward a _apipilot_execute_tool", marker_name)
env_exec = _apipilot_execute_tool(
auth_header=bearer,
demo_session=demo_key,
name=marker_name,
arguments=args,
)
if hasattr(asyncio, "create_task"):
envelope = await asyncio.wait_for(env_exec, timeout=60.0)
else:
envelope = await env_exec
t1 = (_monotonic_now() - t0)
ok = bool(isinstance(envelope, dict) and envelope.get("success"))
data = envelope.get("data") if isinstance(envelope, dict) else None
err_obj = envelope.get("error") if isinstance(envelope, dict) and isinstance(envelope.get("error"), dict) else None
if isinstance(data, str):
tool_text = data
elif isinstance(data, (dict, list)):
try:
tool_text = json.dumps(data, indent=2, ensure_ascii=False)
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
tool_text = str(data)
else:
tool_text = ""
if not ok:
code = (
err_obj.get("code") if isinstance(err_obj, dict) and err_obj.get("code") is not None
else (envelope.get("code") if isinstance(envelope, dict) else None)
)
msg = (
err_obj.get("message") if isinstance(err_obj, dict) and isinstance(err_obj.get("message"), str)
else ""
)
prefix = ""
if code is not None or msg:
prefix = f"[{code if code is not None else 'ERROR'}] {msg}".strip() + "\n"
tool_text = f"{prefix}{tool_text}".strip()
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): execute DONE name=%s success=%s len=%d t=%.0fms",
marker_name, "ok" if ok else "error", len(tool_text), t1,
)
call_result_dict = {
"name": marker_name,
"text": tool_text or "",
"error": (not ok),
}
# 2026-09-25: PRE-SANITIZE PASS-2 INTERNO con funzione LEGGERA
# _sanitize_pass2_internal_context (NON _sanitize_text_strip_apipilot_markers!).
# Motivo: _sanitize_text_strip_apipilot_markers contiene BLOCCO 1 FULL STRIP
# PASS-2 RESULT e cancellava TUTTO il blocco PRIMA dell'inject upstream,
# lasciandolo stringa vuota -> "saltiamo inject pass2_active=N" -> nessun briefing.
len_raw_tool_text = len(call_result_dict.get("text") or "")
if isinstance(call_result_dict.get("text"), str):
call_result_dict["text"] = _sanitize_pass2_internal_context(call_result_dict["text"])
len_sanitized_tool_text = len(call_result_dict.get("text") or "")
blk_pass2 = _resolve_apipilot_reasoning_context_block(
None, call_result=call_result_dict,
) or ""
if not blk_pass2.strip():
blk_pass2 = (tool_text or "").strip()
len_raw_wrapper = len(blk_pass2 or "")
# SANITIZE FINALE PASS-2 blocco wrapper: sempre LEGGERA (non strip blocco RESULT!)
if blk_pass2.strip():
blk_pass2 = _sanitize_pass2_internal_context(blk_pass2)
len_sanitized_wrapper = len(blk_pass2 or "")
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): blocco DIMENSIONI len_raw_tool_text=%d len_sanitized_tool_text=%d len_raw_wrapper=%d len_sanitized_wrapper=%d success=%s",
len_raw_tool_text, len_sanitized_tool_text,
len_raw_wrapper, len_sanitized_wrapper,
("ok" if ok else "error"),
)
if blk_pass2.strip():
# 2026-09-25: RESET _ws_current_response_id PRIMA di
# inject PASS-2. Altrimenti rimane il vecchio response_id
# di turno 1 (marker CALL) e i frame bytes audio di
# turno 2 (briefing buono) rischiano match sbagliato.
session_ctx["_ws_current_response_id"] = None
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): inject blocco PASS-2 len=%d -> invio conversation.item.create + response.create a upstream",
len(blk_pass2),
)
try:
await upstream.send(
json.dumps(
{
"type": "conversation.item.create",
"item": {
"type": "message",
"role": "user",
"content": [
{"type": "input_text", "text": blk_pass2}
],
},
},
ensure_ascii=False,
)
)
await upstream.send(json.dumps({"type": "response.create"}, ensure_ascii=False))
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): inject OK. attendiamo nuova risposta AI (pass2_active=Y fino a prossimo response.done)",
)
except Exception as exc2: # noqa: BLE001
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"] = False
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): inject FAIL upstream send err=%r. pass2_active=N.",
exc2,
)
else:
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"] = False
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): blocco risultato VUOTO -> saltiamo inject. pass2_active=N.",
)
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"] = False
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): ABORT marker=%s err=%r. pass2_active=N (safety).",
marker_name, exc,
)
elif isinstance(session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"), bool) and bool(session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_pass2_active")):
session_ctx["_ws_apipilot_pass2_active"] = False
logger.info(
"[APIPILOT] REASONING PASS-2 (WS realtime): response.done PASS-2 FINALE -> pass2_active=N safety counter=%s",
int(session_ctx.get("_ws_apipilot_pass2_count") or 0),
)
# ── STRATO 7 POST-PROCESSING (2026-09-11 anti-leak) ────────
# (marker sono già stati processati sopra, adesso la sanitizzazione
# li rimuove tranquillamente prima del client)
message, was_sanitized = _sanitize_realtime_event_raw(message, session_ctx)
# #region debug-point B:upstream-text-forward
summary = _realtime_event_summary(message)
if summary:
await _report_server_debug(
"B",
"server.py:_upstream_to_client",
"forwarding upstream event to client",
summary,
)
event_type = summary.get("type")
# --- INPUT UTENTE (server-side STT emesso dall'upstream) ---
user_text = ""
if event_type == "conversation.item.input_audio_transcription.completed":
user_text = (summary.get("transcript") or "").strip()
item_id = summary.get("item_id")
if user_text:
logger.info(
"[INPUT UTENTE] client=%s stt=%s",
client_ip, user_text,
)
session_ctx["last_user_transcript"] = user_text
if item_id:
session_ctx["last_item_id"] = item_id
elif event_type == "conversation.item.created" and summary.get("role") == "user":
user_text = (summary.get("text") or "").strip()
item_id = summary.get("item_id") or summary.get("id")
if user_text:
logger.info(
"[INPUT UTENTE] client=%s text=%s",
client_ip, user_text,
)
session_ctx["last_user_transcript"] = user_text
if item_id:
session_ctx["last_item_id"] = item_id
# --- OUTPUT AGENTE: tutte le varianti ---
agent_text = ""
response_id = summary.get("response_id") or summary.get("id")
item_id = summary.get("item_id")
if event_type in {"response.audio_transcript.done",
"response.output_audio_transcript.done"}:
# Nota: accumulo per marker PASS-2 GIA' fatto PRE-sanitize
# (ORIGINALE intatto). Qui agent_text è sanitizzato
# (marker → placeholder) → usato solo per UI/logs.
agent_text = (summary.get("text") or "").strip()
if agent_text:
logger.info(
"[OUTPUT AGENTE] client=%s tts=%s",
client_ip, agent_text,
)
asyncio.create_task(_forward_agent_text_to_nodered({
"tts": agent_text,
"response_id": response_id,
"item_id": item_id,
"client_ip": client_ip,
"role": "assistant",
"source_event": event_type,
"user_transcript": session_ctx.get("last_user_transcript") or "",
}))
else:
raw_preview = summary.get("_raw_preview") or json.dumps(summary, ensure_ascii=True)
logger.debug(
"[OUTPUT AGENTE][ISPEZIONE] client=%s %s ha summary=%s raw=%s",
client_ip, event_type,
json.dumps(summary, ensure_ascii=True)[:400],
raw_preview[:800],
)
elif event_type == "response.content_part.done":
agent_text = (summary.get("text") or "").strip()
if agent_text:
logger.info(
"[OUTPUT AGENTE] client=%s content_part=%s",
client_ip, agent_text,
)
asyncio.create_task(_forward_agent_text_to_nodered({
"tts": agent_text,
"response_id": response_id,
"item_id": item_id,
"client_ip": client_ip,
"role": "assistant",
"source_event": event_type,
"user_transcript": session_ctx.get("last_user_transcript") or "",
}))
elif event_type == "response.output_item.done" and summary.get("role") == "assistant":
agent_text = (summary.get("text") or "").strip()
if agent_text:
logger.info(
"[OUTPUT AGENTE] client=%s output_item=%s",
client_ip, agent_text,
)
asyncio.create_task(_forward_agent_text_to_nodered({
"tts": agent_text,
"response_id": response_id,
"item_id": item_id,
"client_ip": client_ip,
"role": "assistant",
"source_event": event_type,
"user_transcript": session_ctx.get("last_user_transcript") or "",
}))
elif event_type == "conversation.item.created" and summary.get("role") == "assistant":
agent_text = (summary.get("text") or "").strip()
if agent_text:
logger.info(
"[OUTPUT AGENTE] client=%s created=%s",
client_ip, agent_text,
)
asyncio.create_task(_forward_agent_text_to_nodered({
"tts": agent_text,
"response_id": response_id,
"item_id": item_id,
"client_ip": client_ip,
"role": "assistant",
"source_event": event_type,
"user_transcript": session_ctx.get("last_user_transcript") or "",
}))
if event_type not in _NOISY_REALTIME_EVENT_TYPES:
logger.debug(
"[EXT][S2S-PROXY] client=%s UPSTREAM→ event=%s summary=%s",
client_ip, event_type, json.dumps(summary, ensure_ascii=True)[:300],
)
# ── Upstream error filter: non propagare al browser errori interni
# causati dal nostro inject di tools[] (sono noise per l'utente finale).
# (strategy B non funziona attualmente (ai-server non supporta tools[]).
#
# Formati errore upstream gestiti (entrambi con controllo su message e su type annidato):
# (A) Wrapper standard (OSSERVATO NEI LOG REALI):
# {"type":"error","error":{"message":"Unknown or invalid event: session.update","type":"unknown_or_invalid_event","code":null,...}}
# (B) Flat fallback (per altri upstream compatibili):
# {"type":"error","message":"...","code":"..."}
if isinstance(message, str):
try:
_evt = json.loads(message)
except Exception:
_evt = None
if isinstance(_evt, dict):
_evt_type = _evt.get("type")
if _evt_type == "error":
# ── Estrazione robusta message + error_type: wrapper annidato PRIORITARIO
_err_msg = ""
_err_type = ""
_inner = _evt.get("error")
if isinstance(_inner, dict):
for _k in ("message", "error", "msg"):
_v = _inner.get(_k)
if isinstance(_v, str) and _v.strip():
_err_msg = _v.strip()
break
_t = _inner.get("type")
if isinstance(_t, str):
_err_type = _t
# Fallback flat se non abbiamo trovato nel wrapper
if not _err_msg:
for _k in ("message", "error", "msg"):
_v = _evt.get(_k)
if isinstance(_v, str) and _v.strip():
_err_msg = _v.strip()
break
if not _err_type:
_t = _evt.get("code")
if isinstance(_t, str):
_err_type = _t
# ── Decisioni soppressione
_suppress = False
_suppress_reason = ""
if "Unknown or invalid event: session.update" in _err_msg:
_suppress = True
_suppress_reason = (
"rifiuto del nostro inject session.update con tools[] — ai-server attualmente non supporta "
"tools[]. Modifica richiesta in arrivo. Loggo solo server-side e non inoltro al browser."
)
elif "session.update" in _err_msg and ("tool" in _err_msg.lower() or "invalid" in _err_msg.lower()):
_suppress = True
_suppress_reason = (
f"rifiuto di session.update da upstream (message): {_err_msg[:160]}. Non inoltro al browser."
)
elif _err_type == "unknown_or_invalid_event" and "session.update" in _err_msg:
_suppress = True
_suppress_reason = (
f"rifiuto di session.update da upstream (type=unknown_or_invalid_event): {_err_msg[:160]}. Non inoltro al browser."
)
if _suppress:
logger.info(
"[WS SUPPRESS] suppressed upstream error (non mandato al browser): %s",
_suppress_reason,
)
logger.debug(
"[WS SUPPRESS] full upstream suppressed error payload=%s",
json.dumps(_evt, ensure_ascii=True)[:600],
)
return
# ── Log ispezione: se arriviamo qua l'errore NON è stato soppresso.
# Facciamo sempre vedere message+type per capire se aggiungere nuove regole.
logger.debug(
"[WS SUPPRESS] upstream error NOT suppressed (passthrough to browser) — "
"evt.error.message=%s evt.error.type=%s evtTopKeys=%s",
_err_msg[:200] if _err_msg else "(empty)",
_err_type or "(none)",
sorted(_evt.keys()),
)
# #endregion
await ws.send_text(message)
async def _queue_id(request: Request) -> str:
"""Pull `queueId` from a JSON body, tolerating sendBeacon's blob posts."""
try:
data = await request.json()
except Exception:
return ""
return (data or {}).get("queueId", "") if isinstance(data, dict) else ""
async def _session_id(request: Request) -> str:
"""Pull `sessionId` from a JSON body, tolerating sendBeacon's blob posts."""
try:
data = await request.json()
except Exception:
return ""
return (data or {}).get("sessionId", "") if isinstance(data, dict) else ""
@app.post("/api/session/heartbeat")
async def session_heartbeat(request: Request):
"""Extend the live reservation one chunk at a time. `expired` once the day's
budget is spent — the client then tears down."""
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "?"
if not LIMITER_ENABLED:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found.")
sid = await _session_id(request)
alive = bool(sid) and await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.heartbeat, sid)
logger.debug(
"[INTERNAL] /api/session/heartbeat client=%s sessionId=%s alive=%s",
client_ip, (sid or "")[:16], alive,
)
return {"expired": not alive}
@app.post("/api/session/end")
async def session_end(request: Request):
"""Clean teardown: reconcile to real elapsed time and refund the unused
chunk. Sent via navigator.sendBeacon, so it must succeed without a response."""
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "?"
if not LIMITER_ENABLED:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Not found.")
sid = await _session_id(request)
logger.debug(
"[INTERNAL] /api/session/end client=%s sessionId=%s",
client_ip, (sid or "")[:16],
)
if sid:
await asyncio.to_thread(limiter.end, sid)
return {"ok": True}
@app.middleware("http")
async def no_cache_static_assets(request: Request, call_next):
response = await call_next(request)
path = request.url.path or ""
nocache_ext = (".html", ".js", ".mjs", ".css", ".wasm", ".worklet.js")
if any(path.endswith(ext) for ext in nocache_ext) or path == "/" or path.endswith("/"):
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate, max-age=0"
response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
response.headers["Expires"] = "0"
return response
# Static front-end. Registered last so the /api routes win. `html=True` serves
# index.html at "/". The repo is public anyway, so serving the dir is fine.
app.mount("/", StaticFiles(directory=HERE, html=True), name="static")
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